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ABSTRACT
An interpretation of
Paulo Freire's Theory of Education
Feoruary 1978 •
Ronald S. Goldman, B.A., Hunter College, CCHY
M.A., Fordham University
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Peter Waqschal
This dissertation interprets Paulo Freire's theory of education
in three closely related ways, (l) It argues that Freire's theory
stands in the tradition of critical theory in general; tnis tradition
stands in opposition to that which dominates, including the dominant
theoretical mode of discourse--in this case referred to as traditional
theory, (z) One form of traditional theory is empiricism. Freire's
theory is examined by analyzing what he is net saying. Any effort to
incorporate Freire into this tradition domesticates whac is most cutting
about Freire. (3) Freive's aoproach to literacy education is attempted
within the context of a fresnman Rhetoric Class. Significant changes
in a number of students' writings is cleat'ly noticeable. A full report
of the three month long educational effort is provided in order to
facillitate further understanding of the mode of tnought vfnich one
must adopt.
"inally rhe disse'-tation attempts to iinderstand why so many ef-
forts to '^reate 'innevative' educational aoproaches result in a t^r-
the- cemenMng of tlie s tatus quo. It 1s argued that there exists little
vii
'theoretical self-consciousness' amongst many such enterprises. This
concept is fully explicated. The dissertation contains an extensive
bibliography.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation attempts to elucidate and explicate the works
of the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire. The reader may well ask: Why
bother to speculate upon and essentially recapitulate what has already
been done? Why not let Freire's work stand for itself?
First of all Freire's theory has become more and more popular
amongst educators in the United States. There exists a realization that
education in America is in difficulty from a variety of. points of view;
it is the hope of many that Freire's radical pedagogy will be of help in
revitalizing our thinking about education. But the problem is that
Freire's work is difficult to understand and lends itself to considerable
mi s i nterpreta t i on
.
Recently Freire complained that one great disappointment for him
has been the bureaucratization of his work.^ How and why might this
happen? Anyone reading Freire's work with verstand (with comprehension)
would see how carefully he has attempted to prevent this from occurring.
He has written a body of theory
,
not a set of methods. He wishes those
v/ho read his work to comprehend how one thinks within the framework of
critical educational theory. To provide a set of techniques would only
make it possible for the educator using Freire to use his concepts stat-
ically. The educator would not be able to generate insight into new
problem areas based upon a deep understanding of the fundamental princi-
ples crucial to a critical educational theory.
It is the central theme of this dissertation that such an understanding
2can only come as a result of prolonged immersion in the intellectual
tradition of which Freire's work partakes. Unless this is done Freire's
language will simply be unconsciously translated into an anglo/empiricist
tradition in which most of us unconsciously and unreflectively partici-
pate. It is almost certain that those who have bureaucratized Freire
are those who have never understood him in the sense I am describing
here. They have seen words like: reflection, action, critical con-
sciousness, dialectic, subject-object, and assumed that the meanings of
these words can be obtained without extensive reference to Freire's
intellectual tradition--that they can be operationally defined, if nec-
essary. The fact is that these concepts are a part of a certain tradi-
tion of intellectual discourse--that of critical theory--and a simple
translation of them to another mode of discourse--the anglo/empiricist--
will rob them of the meaning intended by the author. The conceots could
only come to be read with verstand if one had read widely and deeply
within the tradition of critical theory; only then the context in which
these concepts have gained their meaning will be known. One cannot hope
to understand the concepts independently of this context. They have ac-
quired their meaning from the context of debate and explanation which
gave birth to them. ...The reader may well ask how I can speak with such
certainty about what must surely be a set of debatable facts. This ques-
tion provides me with the opportunity to explain the set of problems
which provoked this dissertation.
Essentially the dissertation attempts two central, interrelated
tasks. One is to examine how it is possible that extremely intelligent
3educational professionals have taken Freire's theory and so radically
altered it as to make it essentially and fundamentally difforont to
anything he intended— to have in effect bureaucratized his work. They
have packaged it, instrumental i zed it, operationalized it.^ They have
done this in order to simplify, test and disseminate widely Freire's
theories--as they refer to Freire's theory. They have worked with great
care, intellectual honesty and commitment, and have at the same time
unwittingly, but essentially, vitiated the meaning of Freire's work. This
does not mean to say that what they are doing is useless; rather that the
way they 'operationalize Freire' is counter to his theory.
Since my initial exposure to Freire's work was via these efforts,
I have some understanding of them. For many months I attempted to learn
coding system techniques, so that when it came time to do a dissertation
I would be able to know for certain whether or not the students with
whom I was working had become critically conscious. All along no matter
how hard I fought myself I was unable to read Freire in this codified
manner. I spent months attempting to understand what was in fact hap-
pening. In the process I began to read widely in the field of critical
theory, and to talk to those who have for years been immersed in this
tradition. This dissertation is essentially a report on what I have
come to understand at an early stage of this investigation. It is an
effort to describe my interpretation of Freire and indicate hov/ and why
others have so radically misinterpreted his work. The purpose of this
s pecific critique is to show that critical social theory (Freire's in-
tellectual tradition) stands in critical relationship to the empiricist
4tradition and cannot simply be incorporated by it.
The dissertation then is meant to represent in style and content
the meaning of critical theory, its relationship to traditional theory,
’
and to argue that Freire stands clearly in the former tradition and that
his work can only be adequately understood as such . It is an effort to
address others, who, like me, come to be intrigued by Freire but have had
no other exposure to critical theory. The dissertation is something I
wish I had available to me at the School of Education when I was first
exposed to Freire's theoretical formulations. The only interpretations
available to students at the moment are the anglo/empiricist interpreta-
tions and this dissertation stands in critical relationship to them. It
is in every sense meant to provide other students with a chance to get
onto a correct footing with regard to Freire, rather than spending time
and energy on what is essentially a domestication of his theory. It is
not a question of saying that others have understood Freire incompletely,
or that their interpretation is one 'opinion' and mine another--that
I should not make such strong claims for the correctness of my interpre-
tation. 'The truth is not tolerant' as Freud once said.^ It is my con-
tention, and the argument is carefully developed in this dissertation,
that the empiricist/operational efforts have effectively cut away the
heart, the cutting edge of Freire's theory. Such approaches are
not a
partial misunderstanding; they are fundamental misunderstandings
with
severe results. Primarily the consequence of such misunderstanding
is
that such efforts lead to a fundamental deception--that
systems are being
changed. Empiricist researchers may well be doing valuable
work, but it
5is not in the nature of system change, nor can it be called an appli-
cation of Paulo Freire's theory. This is not to impute either that the
researchers are unintelligent people. On the contrary, the task of this
dissertation is precisely to understand how such extremely intelligent
individuals can come to be so deceived. I have attempted to argue that
the core of the problem lies in a failure to comprehend the nature of
theory, and its relationship to history and politics. This failure is
not the fault of the researchers. The causes lie in the social/economic
nexus which, for various reasons, militiate against the development of
theoretically self-conscious people. They and others in their tradition
do have a responsibility though: will they or will they not make the
effort to develop theoretical self-consciousness about their own theory.
The points I have raised in this paragraph are argued in depth in chapters
II, III and V.
As I have said earlier, this dissertation represents an early stage
in my own exploration and investigation of critical social theory and its
relationship to education. The fact that I am writing on the subject at
such an early stage is in many ways a problem, in that I am not highly
sophisticated in the uses of the theory, nor have I read widely enough.
Yet my hope is that this problem can in fact be precisely what is the
potential contribution of this work. That is, as a result of my recen t
awakening it is still easily possible to address myself as I was two
years
ago, so to speak, and in the process hopefully address others
who may be
at a similar point. So, with apologies to critical theorists
in general
and to those who have been responsible for teaching me
specifically, I
6nevertheless hope that my audacity in writing so lengthily and so early
in my education will be of some consequence (other than of a negative
sort)
.
The intention throughout is to make clearer the meaning underlying
Freire's theory. Often people have overcome their complaints as to the
'difficulty' of Freire's work by suddenly saying that he is really very
simple--that in fact he keeps repeating himself. It is quite possible
that the reader who finishes this dissertation may say the same thing.
I would argue that we are dealing with many difficult concepts, and that
they need to be looked at and understood from a variety of slightly dif-
ferent angles. Only in this way can the meani ng underlying a set of
concepts which arise out of an intellectual tradition which is not famil-
iar to most of us be made clearer. In a sense this dissertation can be
said to be about interpreting and making sense of one single statement .
'Subject and Object are in dialectical relationship, and no critical
theory of society can lose sight of either .subject or object in its anal-
yses.' Each of the four chapters which follow are in one sense an effort
to uncover the meaning of this statement; each chapter does so from an-
other angle. Chapter II does so from the broadest of possible angles.
It attempts to understand the nature of theory and its relationship to
history and points to two traditions of theory--traditional theory and
critical theory. It briefly points out how Freire stands in the critical
theory tradition. The third chapter begins by explicating various con-
cepts at the heart of Freire's theory, particularly the ways a Freirian
investigator would attempt to discover the nature of aspects of a
7particular social reality. It then discusses in more detail the epis-
temological assumptions at the heart of the empiricist mode of knowing
and shows how certain fundamental truths about the nature of social
reality fall through the empiricist epistemological grid. Finally,
this chapter shows how clearly the empiricist efforts to understand
Freire fall into this mode and commit errors typical of this mode which
would not be committed if they had remained loyal to Freire. My hope
is that this critique will not be seen as castrating in intent or effect.
It is an effort on the one hand to deepen understanding of what Freire
is arguing by showing clearly what he is not saying. On the other hand
it could serve to deepen understanding amongst others if they took it in
the spirit intended--to provoke dialogue. Chapter IV explicates Freire
in an entirely different fashion. I spent three months teaching a Rhetoric
class to first semester freshmen at the University of Massachusetts. My
intention here was not to produce a major piece of research but rather to
show how one would think about a problem like 'how to teach Rhetoric?'
within the framework of critical educational theory. The essential pur-
pose of this chapter is to show a way of thinking rather than to offer a
body of technique to be used by others. I was also interested to see
whether Freire could 'be 'applied' to an American educational context at
all. Chapter V attempts to zero in on and explain in considerable detail
the notion of 'theoretical self-consciousness'. It is the lack of such
theoretical self-consciousness which helps explain the empiricist efforts
as well as ocher efforts to create alternatives which end up cementing
the status quo rather than transcending it. The final chapter
will be a
brief discussion of critiques of Freire's theory.
8FOOTNOTES
^See the interview of Freire in Risk . Vol . II, No. 1., (1975)
2See for example the lengthy discussion of Alschuler's efforts
in Chapter III of this dissertation.
3sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis
(N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co., 1965), p. 160“.
CHAPTER II
"True praxis is impossible in the anti-dialectic void into which all
subject/object dichotimization leads us."
"...That is why subjectivism and mechanistic objectivism (or their equiv-
alents idealism and mechanistic materialism) are always obstacles to an
authentic revolutionary process, whatever concrete forms they take on in
the praxis."
"...For Marx these relations are contradictory and dynamic. Subject and
Object are not found dichotomized, nor are they in identity, but a dia-
lectic unity. It is the same dialectic as theory and practice."
"The dialectical movement (between subject and object) is the fundamental
preamble to understanding facts. This movement implies in the first place
an acting subject possessed of theoretical instruments necessary to under-
take the analyses of reality and that he grasp the necessity of continu-
ously readapting these instruments according to the results obtained.
These remarks, found in the appendix to the French edition of Freire's
Pedagogy of the Oppressed , are an example of the source of much frustra-
tion to many who read Freire; many are intrigued by what he is saying, but
often baffled and annoyed by his seeming abstract and difficult writing.
"He is supposed to be v/riting to help people," said a friend in disgust,
"why is he so obtuse?" My initial reaction to reading Freire was similar.
Yet two years later it is my conviction that the few quotes above are not
in the slightest sense abstract; they are, in fact, the very heart of
Freire's thought. It is also now my conviction that until one has under-
stood how I could make such a claim, one has not understood Freire.
The
.following two chapters are in one sense intended to make sense of
these
quotes.
The reasons why many would initially classify these statements
as
abstract and confusing are multifaceted. The chances are,
if one has
received a fairly typical American university education, one
has little
10
expertise in thinking philosophically about social reality; and that fur-
ther, one has little reason to believe that philosophy has any role to
play in understanding and acting upon social reality. In addition, one
is likely to have little or no appreciation of the role theory plays in
relation to the perspective of the world one holds; this applies as much
to the sophisticated social scientist as it does to the majority of grad-
uates. There is little likelihood that scholars have a 'theoretical self-
consciousness'^--that is, clarity about the root assumptions which under-
lie a particular mode of social investigation. There is little awareness
of the role paradigms play in determining what is considered problemati-
cal and what is 'normal'. The problem is that the root assumptions of
the paradigm are often unknown, and there is no consciousness as to how
these root assumptions play a large role in determining how the world
looks. This is true for both the citizen who lives in the paradigm of a
particular political structure (e.g., American democracy), and for the
social scientist who works within a theoretical paradigm, which, of
course, has some relationship to the larger paradigm--the political.
My purpose in the following sections is as follows: First I want
to make clear what I mean by the notion "paradigm", a notion which is
usually used only in connection with intellectual activities. Then, fol-
lowing Sheldon Wolin^, I will discuss paradigms as they relate to
poli-
tical society. Following this I will briefly show that we are all
living
in paradigms of differing dimensions. The two dimensions I refer
to are
the liberal paradigm and the American (the two are obviously
interrelated,
the second being a specific example of the former). I then
return to the
11
world of intellectual activities and show how the paradigms which have
dominated the world of knowledge for some time are closely connected to
the dominant political paradigms--! iberal ism and Americanism. In other
words, the ideas we have as to what constitutes theory or appropriate
research are closely tied to history; they do not stand outside history
or society. The particular elementary generalizations, modes of thought
and concomitant intellectual activities which dominate this era create
considerable problems for those of us who wish to understand Freire.
The reason is that Freire speaks to us using categories of thought which
stand outside the paradigm we inhabit. It's as if he is speaking a for-
eign language. His immersion in history and philosophy is particularly
difficult for those of us who have grown up within the American paradigm.
The final section of this chapter is devoted to showing what some of the
elements of Freire' s theory are. In order to make sense of, to grasp
the meaning of what he is saying, I have found it necessary to refer to
other scholars who clearly stand in his tradition--the scholars who speak
the same language he does--who have made 'sense' of the world in similar
ways
.
Paradigms
The notion of paradigm and its relation to the work of the natural
sciences has been developed by T.E. Kuhn.^ Scientific paradigms
are
"universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time
provide
model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners.
Wolin
shows the dialectic between paradigm and its effect on the
behavior of
12
'believers' ..."a paradigm guides the community in its choice of problems;
the community in turn has as its task the solution of the puzzles set by
the paradigm."^ Even more basically, and this point is crucial to my
argument, "Every paradigm has fundamental ontological categories."^ These
categories are the most basic determinants as to how all activities will
proceed. Kuhn gives as an example the continued acceptance of Newton's
laws which, as long as they continued to be honored, helped set puzzles
and limit acceptable solutions. "The quantity of matter was a fundamental
ontological category for physical scientists, and the forces that act
between bits of matter were a dominant topic for research."^ A scientific
paradigm then, contains at basis, elementary theoretical generalizations
which have direct implications for the kinds of research, methods and
goals in which a scientist engages. Even more basically, the generaliz-
ations provide the scientist with a pair of spectacles (of which he is
mostly unconscious) through which he views the v/orld. The facts he is
looking for are imbued with the theory which he holds, which in turn is
modified in a never-ending effort to make theory and nature fit. The
activity of working out (articulating) the paradigm according to its rules
is called, by Kuhn, 'puzzle-solving'. When there are too many anomalies
for the paradigm to handle, this usually sets off a crisis among scien-
tists, and in the midst of great debate, a quantum leap takes place and
a new paradigm emerges as acceptable to the scientific community; it
often has at its base a different set of propositions which result
in a
different sort of activity in all dimensions of scientific work.
During
this period of crisis philosophy emerges as basic assumptions
are questioned;
13
during the period of 'normal science' philosophy is rejected, since one
cannot be constantly 're-tooling'.
Paradigms and Politics
In an article entitled "Paradigms and Political Theories", Sheldon
Wolin takes Kuhn's discussion of paradigm a step further and suggests
that a political society can be understood in much the same way: as a
paradigm. His idea is worth quoting in full:
From this viewpoint society would be viewed as a coherent whole in
the sense of its customary political practices, institutions, laws,
structure of authority and citizenship, and operative beliefs being
organized and interrelated. A politically organized society con-
tains definite institutional arrangements, certain widely held
beliefs regarding the location and use of political power, certain
expectations about how authority ought to treat the members of
society and about the claims that organized society can rightfully
make upon its members. In saying that the practices and beliefs
of society are organized and interrelated, that its members have
certain expectations and share certain beliefs one is saying that
the society believes itself to be one thing rather than another,
a democracy rather than a dictatorship, a republic rather than a
monarchy, a directed society rather than a free one. The ensemble
of practices and beliefs may be said to form a paradigm in the sense
that the society tries to carry on its political life in accordance
with them.^
One can now grasp how anyone growing up in the context of a political
culture (and everyone does) comes to acquire a set of elementary theoreti-
cal generalizations which are constitutive of how individuals in that
culture act upon the world. The very fact that people in a culture under-
stand each other at all, tliat everything is not blooming, buzzing con-
fusion', as William James put it, is indicative of this. There is a
world of meaning in v/hich people interact without having to question
each other at all times as to what the rules are. For now let me be
14
clear again that my argument is that all actions are 'theory imbued',
and that the particular theory with which we are imbued depends on the
particular political paradigm in which we have grown up. Thus, regard-
less of the level, quality or degree of theoretical sophistication, all
of our actions are in one way or another informed by theory, probably
unconsciously held. Freire makes the point clearly:
Human actions in the world are conditioned by their own results,
by their own outcome. Thus there are different degrees of rela-
tions to the world, different degrees of actions and perception.
Nevertheless whatever the degree of action on the world it implies
a theory. Even those actions called magic are governed by theory
(a system of principles which dictate the manner in which the act
has to be formed in order to be effective)
.
Liberalism
We live in an epochal paradigm. That is, there are certain princi-
ples and concomitant institutions and practices which set this epoch
apart from the previous one. The present era is designated as the liberal
epoch. It stands in relationships to the previous era (the Medieval)
but can be clearly demarcated from it; it is also in relationship with
all the smaller paradigms (specific cultures, specific communities) in
existence at the moment.
An epoch is characterized by a complex of ideas, concepts, hopes,
doubts, values, and challenges in dialectical interaction with
their opposites, striving towards plentitude. The concrete re-
presentation of many of these ideas, values, concepts and hopes,
as well as the obstacles which impede man's full humanization
constitute the themes of that epoch. These themes imply others
which are opposing or even antithetical.^^
When Freire posits that subject and object are in dialectical rela-
tionship, or more concretely, when he says
" the starting point of the
15
analysis must be a critical comprehension of man as a being v/ho exists
iji and with the world"12..i^g fact, suggesting a theme which is
antithetical to the theme which dominates in this, the liberal epoch.
This dominant theme is that one can actually make a radical split between
man and world, or more basically, subject and object. The categories we
unconsciously think in are heavily imbued with these liberal notions. One
way to come to know (i.e., to bring to consciousness) these categories is
to become aware of how political philosophy does in fact underlie the
social structures we participate in, the way we govern ourselves, how we
interpret problems, the decisions we make about how to allocate resources.
In order to become familiar with how liberal political doctrine rules
the roost it is useful to study what some of the early architects of the
liberal state said. The difficult task for each one of us above and
beyond this is to see how we and others manifest this thinking in the
actions and judgments we make day to day at work and at home. The same
holds true for the social scientists who may be deluding themselves into
thinking that they are creating instruments and processes which are free
of bias or, even more basically, free of judgment and interpretation (i.e.,
objective). Only when we are aware of this dimension of our lives are
we in a position to critically evaluate it.
Just as in the scientific paradigm a few ontological principles
have implications for how all activity will proceed, so too in the
political paradigm. "The premises of the liberal vision are few;
they
are tied together; and they are as powerful in the hold they
have over the
II 13
mind, as they are unacknowledged and forgotten.
16
The most basic of these premises posited by liberal theory is the
possibility of radically splitting subject and object. The early lib-
eral philosophers insisted upon it, and it led to an entirely different
vision of the relationship of the individual to society to that which
was dominant in the medieval era (the epoch preceding the liberal era).
During the medieval era the individual was subsumed by the group to which
he belonged. The common good was to be determined by the fathers--priests,
kings, and ultimately God. Individuals, all of whom knew their proper
state on earth, awaited salvation in heaven and accepted the interpreta-
tion as to what constituted right action in the eyes of God by the repre-
sentatives on earth. "The state is gathered into the presence of the king,
and the society is bound together by each subject's personal duty to him."^^
There was no concept of a private good in medieval philosophy. Recogniz-
ing the totalitarian tendencies in this position, recognizing the degree
to which this social philosophy provided the means for domination, and
confronted by a changing economy, the emerging of the industrial era,
liberal philosophers posited the possibility of a private sphere radically
separated from the public. The following is a short exposition on one
liberal philosopher's way of defining this split.
J.S. Mill's treatise On Liberty is a good example of the liberal
achievement; the conception of the abstract individual, abstracted from
social action as well as community. Mill was motivated by a desire to
develop 'the principle of non-interference in the lives of individuals
by the state, from the moral axioms of utilitarianism'. A few quotes
from Mill's work will provide concrete examples of what I am suggesting:
17
The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely
concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
So there are two separate spheres of existence posited by Mill: the
subjective (feelings, thoughts, desires, life style) and the objective
(the sphere in which the individual comes into contact with and impinges
upon other individuals). Subject and object can be understood and spoken
about as radically separate. Again let Mill speak and establish the
separation:
...But there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished
from the individual has, if any, only an indirect interest; compre-
hending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects
only himself, or if it also affects others, only with their free,
voluntary and undeceived consent and participation. . .This then is
the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises first the
inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience;
liberty of thought and feel ing. . .Secondly
,
the principle requires
liberty of tastes and pursuits of framing the plan of our life to
suit our own character, of doing as we like subject to such conse-
quences as may follow.^®
What I am hoping to point out is the sharpness of the line between
private and public developed by Mill. When Mill combined his abstract
individualistic notions with utilitarian notions of happiness, that is,
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness, he articulated one
strong strand of thought that has pervaded many liberal democracies,
although some more than others. Robert Paul Wolff captures the effect
of combining the two positions (individualism and utilitarianism):
In its most primitive form— and it is thus that a philosophy often
reveals itself best--! iberal ism views man as a rationally calcu-
lating maximizer of pleasure and minimizer of pain. . .xat ional ity
thus reduces to a calculating prudence; its highest point is
reached v/hen^wc deliberately shun the present pleasure for fear of
future pain.*'^
Arguing that this theory has implications for how men relate to each
other, Wolff goes on to say:
18
If the simple psychological egoism of liberal theory is correct,
then each individual must view others as mere instruments in the
pursuit of his private ends. As I formulate my desire and weigh
the most prudent ends for satisfying them, I discover that the
actions of other persons bent upon similar lonely quests may
effect the outcome of my enterprise. In some cases they threaten
me; in others the possibility exists of a mutually beneficial
cooperation. I adjust my plans accordingly, perhaps even enter-
ing into quite intricate and enduring alliances with other indi-
viduals. But alv/ays I seek my own pleasure (or happiness--the
shift from one to the other is not of very great significance in
liberal theory). For me other persons are obstacles to be over-
come or resources to be exploited--always means, that is to say,
and never ends in themselves . To speak fancifully, it is as though
society were an enclosed space in which float a number of spherical
balloons filled with an expanding gas. Each balloon increases in
size until its surface meets the surface of other balloons; then
it stops growing and adjusts to its surroundings. Justice in such
a society could only mean the protection of each balloon's interior
(Mill's private space) and the equal apportionment of space to all.^°
I quote Wolff at length so that the connection between the philo-
sophical position of Mill and a certain state of affairs which has de-
veloped since then is quite clear. There is, in other words, a rela-
tionship between liberal thought and practice which was taking place
at the time it was being developed, and what has occurred since then.
Thus one of the great difficulties for liberal thought was to somehow
account for community, to explain why people stayed together at all.
Indeed, today in the society which was born liberal (the United States)
it seems to me that one of its greatest problems i_s the breakdown of
community; the individual is literally in confrontation with the state;
there are no mediating groups between the individual and the state
which have any viability; this applies to that last vestige of
protec
tion from the outer world— the family“-as it appears on the point
of
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dissolution. I do not want to launch here into the concrete manifesta-
tions of the liberal paradigm but rather show that one of its prime
achievements was the creation of antinomies in various areas.
At the base is the radical split between subject and object. The
manifestations of this splitting are to be found in the antinomies be-
tween public and private, inner and outer, reason and passion, fact and
theory, fact and value, objectivity and subjectivity. Again the point
is the sharpness of the splits; the fact is that they are separable and
understood apart from each other according to liberal theory. As Wolff
says, the kind of rationality which emerges from liberal theory is more
concerned with means rather than ends, a fact which I will argue is
particularly noticeable in the United States. If one cannot posit a
public good then one cannot develop a vision, or a set of purposes by
reason; purposes are to be established by the desires of individuals.
Goals are established in any case not by reason but by what makes people
feel good (pleasure); thus all thought about what constitutes a higher
value gets reduced to 'opinion' or 'feeling'. Reasoning becomes a way
of establishing a means to an end--instrumental
,
in other words. I
mention this now because the nature of knowledge which is dominant in a
particular society has implications for educators who are, after all,
concerned about the same thing: knov/lsdge. The kind of knowledge v/hich
dominates is intimately related to the political and social realities of
any given society.
The dominance of instrumental rationality is a deeply imbedded
aspect of liberalism (along vnth abstract individualism to which it is
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closely tied). It involves a manipulative posture toward the world; it
denies the immutability of nature and society. Everything is potentially
transformable by man's work. The dominant kind of question that instru-
mental rationality is concerned with is: what can be done and how?
What are the practical applications? This mode of consciousness is in
radical contrast to the mode which dominated the medieval era, and the
full implications can probably only be grasped in the light of the contrast
to that era:
The belief in a stable organization of social ranks, estates or
classes co-exists according to the principle of appositeness with
the conception that many of the phenomena of nature are sacred and
therefore must be respected by man.-*-^
A different kind of thinking dominated in the medieval age. The
respect we now show to nature is of a vastly different sort to that true
of the medieval era. This era asks how to respect nature. Previously
this was an inconceivable question. Thus a certain kind of thinking, a
certain sort of knowledge, dominates in one era as opposed to another.
"The subordination of reason to industry beginning in the eighteenth
century (its transformation from metaphysics to instrumental rationality)
was both a condition for social progress insofar as knowledge became a
productive force and the means by which initial reason was suppressed."^®
This obviously has implications for educators. The kind of knowledge
which dominates is intimately tied to the political and social and histor-
ical realities of any given society. How the liberal mentality has been
translated into its American form is now briefly to be discussed, before
returning in more detail to the world of knowledge.
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Americanism
American practices are particularly strongly imbued with liberal
notions. Only a strong tradition of philosophy and history could counter
the absolute dominance of liberalism in this country. Instead of such a
tradition we find a skepticism about the value of philosophy and a pro-
pensity for amnesia. Instrumental rationality has a particularly strong
sway in this country. The reasons for this can only be found via a care-
ful study of American history in contrast to European history, where
unanimity does not reign supreme.
One effort at this has been Louis Hartz's Liberal Tradition in
America .^^ His book is an effort to understand precisely why American
and European political societies have diverged to the extent they have.
He is referring here to a divergence which is very striking to the new-
comer to this country. One is immediately struck by the lack of any
debate about fundamentals. Evidence for this is considerable. Two
examples will suffice for the moment. Unlike in Europe, only two pol-
itical parties, which fundamental ly agree with each other, have any
real power in this country. The debate which takes place between the
Democrats and the Republicans is one about who can tinker with what
aspect of social reality better than the other. There is no debate
about the viability of the existing paradigm by any group that has any
hope of gaining power. In France and Italy, in contrast, the Communist
Party, which to a much greater extent than anything permissible here is
arguing for fundamental change, can come very close to being elected.
In other words, at the level of institutionalized politics debate about
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fundamsntals occurs. One sees sinilar Gvidence when comparing the three
daily newspapers which can survive financially in New York City, to
the proliferation of viewpoints available in newspapers on the streets
of Paris. In a country where fundamentals are agreed upon by a vast
majority there is no market for opinions which challenge these funda-
mentals. Similarly in a climate where lack of doubt is so prevalent,
critical social theory which requires philosophical analysis and histor-
ical interpretation has little fertile soil in which to grow. Hartz
attempts to explain this phenomenon.
His essential argument is that an understanding would be enhanced
if we could grasp the significance of the fact that America has never
had to cope with an entrenched feudal structure, and the consequent fact
that it never had to endure a democratic revolution. As de Tocqueville
put it, America was 'born free'. Its liberalism was a 'natural phenomena'
as Santayana put it.^^ Thus "one of the central characteristics of a
non-feudal society is that it lacks a genuine revolutionary tradition--
the tradition which in Europe has been linked with the Puritan and French
revolutions. . .and this being the case it also lacks the tradition of
reaction. For de Tocqueville the revolution of 1776 was not noticeable
for the freedom to which it led but for the fact that it did not have to
destroy established feudal structures. Hartz, following de Tocqueville,
states that the particular way in which American democracy came to life
produced a particularly strong underlying unity. The force of this has
had an enormous sway ever since and is to be felt in every domain of
life.
Hartz speaks of this underlying unanimity as the American form of
absolutism
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The bdsic ethical problem of this version of liberalism according to
Hartz "is not the danger of the majority which has been its conscious
fear, but the danger of unanimity which slumbered unconsciously behind
it." ^ But ethical problems are not discussed on this level by a so-
ciety that is so certain of the fundamentals upon which it rests. "It
is only when you take your ethics for granted that all problems emerge
as problems of technique. Or as Horkheimer put it, "A society so
imbued with technique, with 'how to' mentality has a particularly strong
suspicion of philosophy which is typically seen as inconvenient, obstinate,
and with all that of no immediate use."^^
The absence of an historical awareness that goes beyond reference to
the constitution and to Jefferson is also particularly noticeable. The
old is always to be quickly done away with and replaced by the new. Pre-
vious generations and their approaches to the world are best forgotten
and replaced with new and progressive versions (e.g., the pressure on
every succeeding generation of parents to use the ultra-progressive child-
rearing mode currently in vogue). Similarly in the kind of social studies
which are dominant one finds little reference to historical interpreta-
tion. In fact, one finds here a rejection of historical comparison and
a sense of historical process stated with absolute certainty. Such an
attitude could only be assumed by a people with a profound lack of any
sense of history. They have grown up in a world which has a history of
ahistorici ty. And this is of course very true of the history of this
country. The absolute rejection of 'motherland' required at birth, and
the concomitant need to forget the roots has been fueled by the waves of
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immigrants who duplicated this process. Immigrant families would place
pressure on their children not to be like father, to reject the ways of
the past, and to become Yankee. In addition American schools had as one
of their prime functions the Americanization of immigrant children. 27 jhe
press for amnesia has grown up in and contributed to a rejection of an
historical consciousness.
Absolute conviction, social amnesia and the concomitant lack of
philosophy and history are deeply embedded elements of the American
paradigm. This in turn, when understood in relationship to liberalism
in general, results in an instrumental rationality of a particularly
strong sort. If the burden of history does not weigh, the outer world
takes on particularly manipulatable possibilities. So indeed does the
inner world. If man is an absolutely blank slate then it is easy to re-
compute him. The love of technique grows alongside this, as does the
image of man as a complex machine which can be appropriately programmed
as long as we develop precise enough instruments. Without philosophy
these deeply embedded notions are not exposed to the light of critical
reason. Rather, they are the ' taken-for-granted' reality of American
life that Hartz was referring to. They are seen as the background to
social reality as such by American social scientists; thus they assume
the same status as the natural world. They are truths much on the order
of a natural law.
Mention of the world of social science introduces the next phase of
this discussion and that is an explicit discussion of how the world of
knowledge stands in relationship to these political paradigms. On a
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general level I will discuss traditional theory and the paradigm within
which it operates; specifically, I will show how empiricist thinking
and practice closely resemble some aspects of the American liberal
paradigm, thus helping explain why they have such a good reception in
this country.
Traditional Theory Paradigm
First, theory like anything else is not independent of history.
The kind of theory which dominates in any one epoch has very much to
do with the 'complex of ideas, hopes, doubts, values and their concrete
representations which dominate in any particular time.' Thus there exists
a dialectical relationship between theory (the subject, in this case) and
history (object). A good example of this is Philip Rieff's explanation
of the theory of theory which dominated in the medieval era. Since
I have very briefly explained what some of the dominant themes were in
that era the following should make sense: The first and oldest theory
of theory is where "theory is the way which ought to be establishes its
hegemony over what is. Value and Truth are inseparable." The task of
the time was not to discover truth via empirical investigation but rather
to comprehend God's word and live by its demands. Rieff goes on saying
that until the eighteenth century
the emotional task of life is to conform our actions to right order
so that we too can be right. Theoretical knowledge is therefore
of the good. The ideal is therefore the most real, the model from
which the isness of things, in their splendid variety, derives. In
this theory of theory knowledge finally emerges in its final form
as faith; the best life is that of true obedience. God is the final
object of all classical theorizing, to know God in his natural order
(or moral commandments) is the highest good.
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The assertion that theory is itself an historical development must
come as a surprise to those imbued with the faith that in the scientific
age we have somehow arrived, with respect to what constitutes theory
(and therefore methods of research and evaluation). For science, which
is supposed to have dispelled ideology, has established ground rules as
to what constitutes theory--ground rules which by definition (because we
are dealing with science which purports to be value-free) are universally
true for all time— that is, ahistorical, not determined at all by a par-
ticular moment in history. Thus: "the conception of theory was absol-
utized as though it were grounded in the inner nature of knowledge as
such or justified in some other ahistorical way, and thus it became a
reified ideological category.
The rules as to what constitutes theory have been established very
largely by the successes of the natural sciences. Since social scientists
have attempted to model their endeavors on these 'more successful' activ-
ities, they have largely accepted the definitions of what constitutes
theory. Very basically, theory is to consist of a set of general propo-
sitions about a subject, "the propositions being so linked with each other
that a few are basic and the rest derive from these"^^ and "the smaller
the number or primary principles in comparison with the derivations the
more perfect the theory. Crucially the validity of the theory is de-
pendent upon its capacity to be in accordance with the facts. If this
accordance is lacking either the scientists' instruments need perfecting
or else the theory needs adjustment or replacement. Whatever the im-
provement the same relationship betv/een theory and fact will be maintained
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on thG oriG hsnd th6 concGptudlly 'formulstsd knowlGdQG* dnd on thG othGr,
the facts to be subsumed under it. "32 This relationship then, between
what is perceptually verified and a set of conceptual formulations is
known as theoretical knowledge.
It is on the basis of this approach to theory that the social sciences
have advanced insisting their aim has been to articulate descriptive, value-
free science. It follows that if the task set is to bring theory most
closely in accordance with the fact, then the possibility exists of mere-
ly describing reality as opposed to making any normative judgments. That
is, one has to accept the notion that it is possible to split off fact
from value, description from evaluation. This tendency has appeared in
the social sciences in two apparently different but essentially similar
forms: the abstracted empiricists and the Grand Theorists. ^3 j^e former
make the claim that only that which can be empirically verifiable can be
claimed to be the truth, and that anything else is chatter, no matter
how interesting it may be. The latter claim that very general princi-
ples descriptive on high planes of generalization can be made, and that
eventually it will be seen that the facts can come to fit in the appro-
priate boxes. Even though the kinds of intellectual works which emerge
from these two schools appear very different, the basic assumptions which
inform them are the same, i.e., they stand within the same paradigm. Even
though in the following chapter the epistemological and ontological assump-
tions which inform the empiricists specifically will be taken up, it
is
necessary to briefly make clear within this context what some of the
assumptions and concomitant activities of this school are.
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Empiricist Paradigm
The empiricist approach has taken the upper hand, particularly in
the United States; it has come to dominate the educational arena. Em-
piricists typically reject philosophy, or 'speculation' (as they would
refer to it), insisting that all judgment and interpretation of a sub-
jective nature must be eliminated in our effort to understand social
reality. Only that information which is 'brute data' which can be
empirically verified, usually through some sort of 'instrument', can be
considered true knowledge. Thus the careful gathering of endless facts
will gradually, when pieced together, form a total description of social
reality, and one that is objectively and universally true. Thus the
individual scientist is freed from any obligation to explain his theory
of the 'whole' since there are no 'data' to back up what would be mere
speculation.
We can already see that this position has consequences for the kinds
of intellectual activities which are generated within the framev/ork of
this paradigm. Since the root assumption exists that man (in this case
the disinterested scientist) and world (the particular aspect of social
reality being investigated) can be radically separated, it is argued that
one can produce, describe objectively, without judgment (and therefore
free from political bias or ideology) what the facts are. The ahistor-
icizing and absolutizing of these basic assumptions which underlie em-
piricist social science creates the impression that these 'scientists'
are really engaged in 'pure' science, that they, the scientists, are
somehow able to divest themselves of their position in society and in
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history, that the knowledge they develop is free from the taint of pol-
itics; i.e., that is has no political consequences, and that the activ-
ities of research, including the creation of 'instruments', 'experiments',
and behavior modification techniques are all in and of themselves neu-
tral, isolated and isolatable from history. In other words, these activ-
ities are not understood by the empiricists as within a specific cul-
ture, a specific kind of economic system, at a specific moment in his-
tory. They see no connection between their obsessive concern for 'opera-
tionalizing'
,
their distaste for 'abstract and impractical' theorizing,
and the kind of society which only rewards instrumental thinking, because
it thrives on marketable, usable products. The very fact that their
product is as well received on the market as it is is also seen as in
no way influencing on the objective, universal nature of their research.
The fact of the matter is that as a result of their lack of concern with
philosophy, the empiricists have come to assume that they are somehow
carrying out a 'natural law'. Without philosophy they are unable to
recognize that at the base of their paradigm are a set of ontological
and epistemological assumptions or principles which, when revealed, are
obviously liberal principles, and at least open to debate (see Chapter
II). Thus we are faced with a situation in which scientism has a hold
as powerful and forgotten and unacknowl edged as the liberal principles
discussed earlier. "Scientism means science's belief in itself: that is
the conviction that we can no longer understand science as one form of
possible knowledge, but must identify knowledge with science. Even
more basically than this, the following statement by Marcuse captures wh&t
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has been the thrust of my argument, that politics is all pervasive,
even entering the halls of 'disinterested' science, in a very specific
way: "...later positivism (empiricism is one form) which in fighting
metaphysical ideas eliminates not only their metaphysical character,
but their content as well. It thus links inevitably to the status quo ."^^
Lest this seem outrageous to any 'disinterested' scientist reading
this, perhaps the following quote from Horkheimer puts it more concretely:
"In recent periods of contemporary society the so-called human studies
have had but a fluctuating market value and must try to imitate the more
prosperous natural. sciences whose practical value is beyond question.
Horkheimer was writing in 1930 when he wrote this and lest he be accused
of spouting ideas independent of fact, the following story, as told by
David E. Easton and quoted by Sheldon Wolin, describes how the behav-
ioral sciences came by that particular name. The United States Senate
was holding hearings in the late 1940' s with the intention of creating
a national science foundation intended to 'stimulate' and provide funds
for scholarly research. The 'representatives' of the social sciences
were shocked to discover that the name the senators were using to des-
cribe their endeavors was 'socialistic sciences'. The term 'behavioral
science' was coined in order to identify those aspects of the social
sciences which resembled 'hard science'. The tactic proved successful
and "when by virtue of another 'accidental' turn of events the Ford
Foundation decided at about the same time to institute a 'Behavioral
Sciences' division, the name was well on the way to becoming a movement.
The particular intellectual operations established by this paradigm have
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indeed come to dominate the educational arena at all levels. We have
here an excellent example of how one form of knowledge (empiricist, value
free science) comes to be dominant as a result of the coincidence between
knowledge, politics, and history. However, this observation can only
be made from the perspective of another paradigm which, when understood,
provokes an entirely different set of intellectual operations to that of
empiricism. That paradigm is critical theory which will be discussed
more fully below.
The early part of this chapter explained that at the heart of a
paradigm lie a few elemental propositions which are linked together and
which generate a particular set of activities, of intellectual opera-
tions which ultimately only make sense when one understands the seed
propositions at the heart of the paradigm. In connection with scien-
tific or intellectual activity the paradigm establishes the way the world
is seen by the scientist. As Kuhn put it, "...the research problems of
normal science are set by its paradigm: the problems are to the paradigm
as pieces are to a puzzle. . .what may be an unsolved puzzle for one para-
digm may not even exist for another. When a paradigmatic revolution
occurs the shift that takes place in perspective is a revolutionary
shift. The world looks very different and the kinds of intellectual
operations one performs are going to be equally different:
A new theory embodies a new way of looking at phenomena rather than
thp Hi<;rnvprv of hitherto inaccessible data. It represents a break
ciding between' their respective merits, because^a_c
its own distinctive procedures, (emphasis mine)
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Critical Theory Paradigm
It is the essence of my argument that Freire is difficult to com-
prehend because he is speaking to us using a set of categories and an
intellectual style which live outside the intellectual processes with
which we are familiar. The categories he uses have implications for the
kinds of intellectual operations and activities in which one engages, and
are very different to the kind that abstracted empiricists employ. Thus
he stands inevitably in debate with this school of thought and practice
and can only be properly understood as such . I intend to point out these
specific points of debate in Chapter II, although some anticipation of that
argument will be necessary here. The reason is that critical theory does
what its name says it does: it criticizes. Indeed, its genesis can be
best understood as a continuing dialogue with closed systems of intellec-
tual thought. It was, of course, critical of these closed systems. In
order to understand the basic elements of the critical theory paradigm it
is necessary to understand the degree to which it stands in critical
relationship to the dominant categories of liberal thought.
Marx, the first of the critical theorists, spoke for all collec-
tivist thinkers when he said: "The image of the abstracted individual
is as great an absurdity as the idea of the development of language
without individuals living together and talking together. The notion
that at his essence man is a social being is at the heart of the
theory.
This is not meant in the same sense as gregariousness: monkeys
are
gregarious in the sense that they like each other's company.
Rather,
that the social is immediately and directlyit is meant in the sense
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implicated in the individual. One cannot speak of the individual on the
one hand and the social sphere on the other, or the private world on the
one hand and the public on the other, as if the two have nothing in any
way to do with each other. "The social does not influence the private;
it dwells within it."^^ says Russell Jacoby, and then quoting Marx,
"...The individual is the social being. means the same thing
when he says, "Individual psychology i_s at the same time social psychol-
ogy as well."^^ (as viewed by the psychoanalytic model). These examples
are not intended to indicate that the individual is to be collapsed into
the social at the cost of any individuality on his part. It is the ab-
stracted notion of individualism which is being critiqued here; it is
the radical separation of subject and object and all that this implies
that is false according to critical theory. Critical theory posits the
continuing dialectical relationship between subject and object, and al-
ways is critical of any efforts at splitting apart or collapsing one into
the other (as many positivist Marxists have done, and as B.F. Skinner
does; the two have much in common in that the subject is eclipsed in
their respective schemas.). The key to understanding critical theory,
then, lies in understanding the ramifications of its most fundamental
position, that the dialectic between subject and object must not be lost.
In order to understand this more clearly it would be useful to explain the
closely intertwining concepts ofi the v/hole in relationship to the parts,
the notion of consciousness, (a crucial one in Freire's schema); and
dialectic logic without which one would fail to be engaged in intellectual
operations which constitute this paradigm.
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Before going on, however, I want to emphasize that it is crucial
to the understanding of critical theory to understand that it has always
been fighting a battle with what has been dominant, and that is one
version of liberal theory or another. The result is that critical theor-
ists require an acute theoretical self-consciousness, an understanding
of how the very basic assumptions one holds have considerable implications,
including political implications; critical theory argues that it is only
being self-conscious about its inevitable political nature, when it sets
certain value-laden aims for itself. This is opposed to many other doc-
trines which set aims as if they have no political ramifications, which
pretend to be apolitical or 'value-free'.
Wholes and Parts
Before explaining how critical theorists conceive the notion of con-
sciousness, it is important to understand an even larger category of
critical thought: The whole has meaning over and above the separate
parts added together to make up the whole. The empiricist view maintains
that careful analysis of minute parts of the whole will eventually put
someone in a position to put the whole puzzle together, the critical
theorist argues that only via a comprehension of the whole can one come
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to understand the ways in which the parts reflect the whole.
Consciousness
The notion of consciousness can only be understood via
the accept-
iousness in the sense used
ance of the principle of totality; for consc
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here really means a seamless web of meaning running from mind to social
institutions and back again in a continuing dialectical relationship.
The categories of thinking which dominate the age are dominant in some
form in our own thinking, in the thinking that informs most publically
organized activities, e.g., much of mainstream social science and edu-
cational institutions, and in the social structures that are constituted
by these categories of thought, which are in turn constitutive of the
kind of thinking which dominates the age. There is a profound inter-
play between reflection and existence. Thus the following sentence from
Freire can make sense: "A knowledge of reality is indispensable for the
development of consciousness of self in the same way that a consciousness
of self is indispensable for a knowledge of reality. In the most
radical sense then (i.e., at the roots) man is a social being. Con-
sciousness is that point where biography and history intersect. The
notion that: "liberalism is all of a piece, not just a set of doctrines
about the disposition of power and wealth, but as a metaphysical concep-
tion of mind and society"^^— a notion which has informed much of the ear-
lier analysis in this chapter, is clear. The social scientist, the
educator, the layman are all imbued with categories of thinking and ways
of being in the world that are liable at the deepest level to reflect
liberal categories. This does not mean that one individual perfectly
reflects the liberal mind nor that there is liable to be an absense of
conflicting categories. It does mean that all educational activioies
in general are deeply embedded in their context, and hopefully eluci-
dates one of the concepts central to Freire's argument: that all
education
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is political: it either helps to maintain the status quo or helps to
develop alternatives. Only a theoretical self-consciousness will help
somebody choose wisely. (See Chapter V for a full discussion of this
concept)
.
Dialectics
It is crucial to my argument that it be clearly understood that the
notion of consciousness cannot be reduced to either of its parts, that is,
a set of ideas on the one hand, or social institutions on the other. If
one does this, one obtains an abstract view of the nature of social real-
ity. It is another way in which subject and object are abstracted from
each other. For one to continue to be able to work within the subject
and object relationship requires a different logic to that which is used
in mainstream social science. Unger explains this point concisely:
The division of the world into an order of ideas and an order
of events with their corresponding methods of logical analysis
and causal explanation must not be accepted as an eternal fate
of. thought. Between the order of ideas and the order of events
there is a third realm, the order of consciousness, mind, culture
or social life for the understanding of which neither the logical
nor the causal mode is adequate.
Jacoby puts the same idea in terms more familiar in this argument: "The
alternatives of pure subjectivity and pure objectivity are the alterna-
tives of positive thought itself. Marxist and Critical Thought must use
another logic, dialectical logic. In a nutshell dialectic logic con-
stantly attempts to comprehend the ongoing tension between subject and
object, the ways in v;hich biography and history radically intersect.
Dialectic logic attempts to be true to the contradictions inherent in
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the individual's relationship to society, rather than attempting to smooth
them away.
In addition to these reasons for the use of dialectic logic, critical
theory has always called for a capacity to see beyond the given, beneath
the surface, "to be able to penetrate the world of things, to show the
underlying relationship of persons. This requires a capacity to be
continuously aware of the relationship of the part to the whole, the
moment to history, the individual to society, the surface fact to the
concrete meaning underlying the fact. This has, as I have already said,
required that critical theorists be critical of those views which collapse
any of these poles in their analysis. It is not sufficient, however,
to merely maintain two poles in an argument. The critical edge can be
easily lost if other factors are not taken into account.
Critical theory maintains its cutting edge by its insistence on the
dialectic; the capacity to maintain this edge depended on the capacity
to avoid absolutist universal truths, independent of concrete subjects
in a concrete (i.e., material) society, within a specific period of
history. All critical thinking has a materialist base. But the mater-
ialism is of a dialectic nature; it is an ongoing process between subject
and object, not a methodological construct or a social scientific model
beyond the control of men. "Dialectics probe the force field between
consciousness and being, subject and object. . .remaining willing to operate
in a permanent state of suspended judgment. The concept of mediation
plays a crucial role in dialectic logic then; it is crucial for the cor-
rect theory of society: "No facet of social reality could be understood
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by the observer as final or complete in itself. There were no 'social
facts as the positivists believed. Instead there was a constant inter-
play of particular and universal ."51 History is seen as in process;
social phenomena of any kind cannot be described statically, but are in
relationship to the whole, to the totality, and are part of the movement
of that totality. 'Totality' here means grasping how epochal themes
intersect with themes typical of various societies, and further, in sub-
cultures within societies. Any analysis must show an awareness of how
the totality is reflected in the part. Awareness of the dominant themes
in any epoch must include awareness of those themes which are in dialec-
tical relationship to much of what is dominant. Any analysis which fails
to consider the totality is abstract . It offers a one-sided flat view of
social reality and is unable to account for process; it contains no theory
of history, and therefore explains very little. In contrast, all thinking
which points to the multi -dimensional and complexly mediated nature of
social reality is concrete. Critical theorists find the effort amongst
empiricists to be absolutely certain of the truth via statistical anal-
ysis of certain social phenomena to be abstract, particularly because
it usually stands in isolation from a theory of the whole society. It
also finds the need for intellectual certainty a reflex of personal in-
security. As Adorno put it: "Freedom is never given, always threatened...
the absolutely certain as such is always unfreedom. . .it is a mistaken con-
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elusion that what endures is truer than what passes...
The generating force behind all dialectic thinking is the power of
negative thinking'. "Thinking is indeed essentially the negation of what
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is before us. "53 Negative thinking searches for the truth by searching
for what is latent. It assumes that what is on the surface is appear-
ance. Reality and the greater truths lie beneath the surface, and the
task of thought is to bring the negative, that which is opposed by the
dominating order, to the surface. Negative thinking requires a critical
thinking and a dialectical logic.
The truths which are hidden (antithesis) must be brought to the sur-
face along with those elements of the truth which have already surfaced
(thesis), and thereby form a new synthesis . Hegel called this synthesiz-
ing process aufhebung . Adorno explains this process of aufhebung
,
and
at the same time displays critical theory's alliance with certain strands
of conservative thought, over and against mindless radicalism. He argues
that the true dialectic was not a search for the immutable (as in some
strands of phenomenological thought) but was "the attempt to see the new
in the old instead of simply the old in the new. "5^
Only dialectic thinking can help the person emerge from a world of
false consciousness into a slow unveiling of reality, and eventually into
being able to 'say his own word', a notion which is crucial to Freire.
However, this notion cannot be understood independently from the rest of
the assumptions crucial to the dialectical process. Some of these have
already been spelled out. Dialectic thought begins with a recognition
of the whole; it also, in total contrast to positivist thought, makes an
explicit value judgment to begin with, that "the world is unfree: that
is to say, man and nature exist in conditions of alienation, exist other
than they are." And thus the notion that, "the whole is true and the
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whole is false" is central to dialectic thinking and places the dialectical
thinker in a state of critical tension with all that is given, acceptable,
accepted, because by definition as with 'facts' these are all acceptable
to a power structure determined to maintain man's unfreedom.
The 'word' which one can only come to speak when one engages in crit-
ical, negative thinking, contains the potential for action as well as for
reflection. One without the other is an abstraction; critical thinking
rejects the radical divorcing of thought and action, so central to the
traditional paradigm. It is therefore in total opposition to the paradigm
which is dominant and to the intellectual processes which are reflective
of the dominant paradigm. This has implications for the role of the in-
tellectual, the intellectual processes which are undertaken within the
paradigm: research, teaching and evaluation. C. Wright Mills gives a
summary of how the two different paradigms generally referred to in this
chapter approach their work.
The social scientists study the details of small scale milieux;
Marx studied such details too, but always within the structure of
total society. The social scientists knowing little history study
at most short run trends; Marx using historical material .. .takes
as the unit of study entire epochs. The values of the social
scientists leads him to accept their society pretty much as it is;
the values of Marx led him to condemn his society lock, stock and
branch. The social scientists see their society as continuing in
an evolutionary way without qualitative breaks in its structure;
Marx sees the future in this society a qualitative break: a new
form of society--in fact, a new epoch... is going to come about by
means of a revolution.
Finally, but very essentially, critical theorists make a very strong
assumption about the nature of man along with all philosophical positions;
their position, however, is also very limited. They assume that man is
potentially a rational, self-defining maker of culture and history. These
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ideas are central to critical theory in general, and to Paulo Freire in
particular. All educational activity which does not begin with the know-
ledge that man is denied (and is denying himself) becoming fully human,
by a society structured in such a way that only a few benefit from it,
is essentially preserving the status quo. Marcuse presents the same idea
in discussing the obsession with discovering the facts so prevalent in
mainstream social science: "The power of the facts is an oppressive power;
it is the power of man over man, appearing as an objective rational con-
dition. The unresolved contradictions of power by the few over the many,
the continuous danger of atomic holocaust, mental impoverishment, inform
the entire universe of discourse and action. Only revolution, in the
etymological sense of the word, that is a complete turn around, a new
synthesis, can lead to freedom and an alternative mode of reasoning.
Paulo Freire and Critical Theory
Freire' s argument too is that all educational activity is political
and that the approach which dominates, 'banking education' as he calls
it, has at its roots the same notions which we have seen inform other
arenas of life in this liberal age. Freire puts it succinctly and at the
same time displays his close relationship to critical theory in general:
"Implicit in the banking concept is the assumption of a dichotomy between
man and world: man is merely in the world, not with the world or
with
others; man is a spectator not a recreator. Elsewhere Freire.
refer-
ring to banking education, reflects the sentiments expressed
in 'the
whole is false': "Those truly committed to liberation
must reject banking
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Gducdtion in its GntirGty, sdopting instGdd 3 concGpt of niGn 3 s conscious
beings, and consciousness as consciousness intent upon the world. In
other words, all radical dichotomizing must be rejected wherever it is
taking place, if one wants to be applying the Freire paradigm as opposed
to the 'banking' paradigm to educational activity (research, teaching,
evaluation). Presenting his model clearly Freire says, "the dialectical
relationship of men with the world exists independently of how these
relationships are perceived..." or "education as the practice of freedom
denies that man is abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached to
the world. Thus the objective scientist, the objective verification
or any form of neutral education is an impossibility for Freire. Educa-
tion is either a process where men and women become aware of their semi-
human condition in a world which militates against the development of full
humanity, or education perpetuates the status quo. Recognizing the exis-
tence of both man and the world makes it an impossibility to talk only of
an awareness and not of action on the world; it also recognizes the blind-
ness of action without reflection.
For reflection to take place theory is called for, and for ongoing
reflection on the theory, as action occurs. In the tradition of crit-
ical theory it has been argued that theory and action must remain in
tension in a world which is fragmented; only when, and if, true freedom
is attained can there be no tension between theory and practice, but
given the tension, theory must always precede action: "The divorce of
thought from action, of theory from practice, is itself part of the
unfree
world. No thought and no theory can undo it; but theory may help
prepare
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the ground for their possible reunion, and the ability of thought to
develop a logic and language of contradiction is a prerequisite for this
task."^0
Freire's books are a presentation of his theory; it is a theory that
begins at the roots--understanding the nature of the man-world dialectic,
and the implications this has for all other theorizing or action of any
kind. It is obvious that Freire wants to be understood at the roots of
what he is saying, and wants it understood why it is so important to
understand him at the roots. He also wishes to be understood as reject-
ing at its roots the principles which govern the paradigm he calls banking
education--the system which dichotomizes everything.
The evidence for this is manifest, but unless they are very careful
those who read his books with eyes formed from another paradigm will not
see or understand the significance of the following statements, taken
from different texts:
World and men do not exist apart from each other, they exist in
constant interaction. Marx does not espouse such a dichotomy nor
does any other critical realistic thinker.
As in other cases it is imperative to reflect philosophically.
One cannot avoid this... it is sufficient that that form of know-
ledge be under consideration for philosophical reflection to be
required.
Experience teaches us not to assume the obvious is clearly under-
stood. So it is with the truism with which we begin: all educa-
tional practice implies a theoretical stance on the educator's
part. The stance in turn impl ies--sometimes more, sometimes less
implicitly--an interpretation of man and world. 63
I have chosen these quotes and others which precede them for their
tone as well as their content. It seems crucial to me if we are
to under
stand Freire that we understand the degree to which we are unused to
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thinking in a fashion which is central to the dialectical, negative think-
ing of one who inhabits the critical theory paradigm. When Freire says,
"experience teaches us not to assume the obvious is clearly understood"
(see above), he is obviously aware that a notion that he has come to
take for granted is not clearly understood by people who are not steeped
in a certain philosophical tradition. Nor is it understood by those who
have little awareness of the degree to which thought is constitutive of
a particular kind of action in the world and vice versa; nor by those who
fail to see how intimately politics is tied up with our private lives
as well as our public ones.
The reason I have avoided simply summarizing the thought of Freire
is that I have wanted to communicate one essential point: that Freire
is speaking from another paradigm and that he has to be read with that
awareness. To summarize: the crucial elements of the critical theory
paradigm are as follows: The dialectical relationship between subject
and objects; the crucial relevance of theory which has implications for
action and vice versa; the importance of the dialectic mode of thinking,
which in turn implies the capacity to think negatively--to negate what
is before one because "the whole is true and the whole is false"; the
importance of v^holes over parts which implies that nothing exists in
isolation from anything else, thus the need to be able to see the par-
ticular in the universal, the process of history in the present, and
the fact that multi-determined, complexly mediated explanations of soc-
ial reality are the only ones which can come close to the truth, the need
to bring philosophy and history to bear on social analysis in order to be
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ablG to spGdk about what is not immediatGly beforG ohg's GyGs; thG SGlf-
conscious commitrnGnt to bG critical of what exists, which rriGans an ever-
growing commitment to the position that liberation is what must be striven
for in every field of intellectual endeavor; the belief that man is
potentially a self-defining being, capable of being a maker of culture
as opposed to an object of history— that this characteristic sets him
apart from other creatures in a fundamental way, and that he remains
dehumanized until these potentialities are being fulfilled.
Summary
Instead of presenting the summary in such a way that it merely
recapitulates what has already been said, I wish to put the critical
theory paradigm to work, so to speak. As I have said elsewhere, a
theoretical self-consciousness is crucial if we are to understand our
own intellectual activities or anyone else's, including Freire's; this
self-consciousness is equally necessary if we are to understand the pol-
itical implications of the particular theory we are working with or read-
ing about, or the educational alternative we may wish to put into prac-
tice.
There are many well-meaning people in the world; many recognize that
there is indeed 'something wrong in the state of Denmark', and laudable
efforts are made to improve matters, often by the creation of new and
different technologies, or better educational methods. However, because
many remain ignorant of the roots of the current problems, and the roots
of their own theories, too often 'alternatives' do no more than mimic the
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status quo. The counter culture is replete with examples of activities
which were anything but alternatives to the status quo, but were rather
the next logical step for the American culture as a whole to be taking;
the speed and ease with which the media subsumed the counter-culture is
excellent evidence of this. Again, only a deep knowledge of the roots
of our difficulties and a theory of history and society as a whole--a
theory which begins with an awareness of its roots will have any hope of
guiding us toward paradigmatic change, as opposed to a 'coping' within
the present under the guise of something substantially different. The
following is one effort to create an alternative within the field of
education. I intend to critique it, thereby following another tenet of
critical theory: "The critical theorist exercises an aggressive critique
not only against the conscious defenders of the status quo, but also
against distracting, conformist or utopian tendencies within his own
household. Hopefully this will also serve to concretize for the reader
what may so far appear to be abstract discussion with little relationship
to current educational practices.
Confluent education is one branch of humanistic education and has
been developed by George Brown and his associates in California as an
alternative to the dry, emotionless classroom which dominates to such
a large extent. The critique they make of what exists is considerable
and strong: "Are all classrooms dead? No, not all. But too damned
many are. And if nothing else, this is a pervasive, stupid waste of
our most important resource—our children. how they diagnose the
problem and the solutions they offer is interesting.
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When one reads gestalt theory as formulated in the original or as
adapted by confluent educators, for whom gestalt serves as a backbone,
one is immediately struck by the fact that they have a similar position
on the whole-parts controversy to the one which has been stated above.
At least so it appears: "According to the theory of holism, the part
can be defined only in relation to the whole. But the gestaltists'
discussion of the whole does not include the wholeness of the relation-
ship between mind and society; it postulates how the organism perceives
the world in wholes: not the dialectic between man and world. So for
instance the following: "I am proposing a Gestalt therapy as a neces-
sity for our age. Western man needs a new awareness of his wholeness.",
which again sounds interesting, but the author continues, "of his complex
union of body, mind and emotions. The world has disappeared. This
allows us to understand how gestalt practice is focused on getting think-
ing and feeling together, not under the assumption that this is a piece
of patchwork over a very bad tire, but rather a way to cure. Peris, one
of the founders of this modern form of cure said it very explicitly:
"Awareness-- per se- -by and in of itself can be curative. The very
basis, the theoretical basis upon which gestalt practice is founded is
the clue that explains how all of these statements are possible. It is
contained in the so-called gestalt prayer formulated by Peris: "I am I,
and you are you; I a not in this world to live up to your expectations,
and you are not here to live up to mine; If by chance we meet it's
beau-
tiful; if not, it can't be helped. Compare this to the quote
from
John Stuart Mill on page seventeen, and it will be obvious
how strongly
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gestalt stands in the tradition of thought which has brought us many of
the difficulties which we are now trying to combat. The lack of any anal-
ysis of what exists, the lack of any comprehension of the political im-
plications of educational activity, no matter how hard it attempts to
avoid the issue, leads to precisely the following educational praxis,
which is informed by gestalt theory and is written up as an alternative
to what exists.
The author, Sandra Newby, is hoping to combat consumer mentality
in her classroom. She writes a letter to her ninth grade English class
about responsibility: "At what point in your life will you take Total
Responsibility for how you are living, and not blame teachers, parents,
friends, or society in general?" (emphasis mine)^^ The important thing
to note is that her position makes complete sense, given the ground
assumption upon which gestalt theory is based--that the individual and
the world can be understood apart from each other, and that in this case
it is the individual which must be "fixed". In this particular example
the students are learning that any grievances that they have must be
directed at themselves, and any change efforts contemplated must be
channeled at internal processes, rather than at social and structural
processes. Thus the individual is kept isolated in his efforts to change
the world; the only time he would be with a group is when lie is looking
for warmth and trust.
These are not isolated examples from the field of gestalt or human-
istic psychology. Even though there are differences in approach amongst
different authors and different schools, their root assumptions are
similar
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and these always lead them to make very similar statements when they
take their theory out of the immediate realm in which they are thinking
and speak on a larger scale. Two very brief examples will suffice:
Roberto Assagioli, in the Act of Will is very explicit: "Only the de-
velopment of his inner powers can offset the dangers inherent in man's
losing control of the tremendous natural forces at his disposal and be-
coming the victim of his own achievements."^^ Everett Shostrum even
more explicitly reveals the political thinking that underlies 'human-
istic psychology': "...The manipulator. . .is the able-bodied man accepting
a $62.50 unemployment check rather than working for the $65.00 he could
earn."^^ It would be one thing if these commentators would keep what
might be very successful therapeutic techniques clearly within that
realm; it is another when they elevate these therapeutic techniques to
the realm of a social theory which has implications for social action,
and of which educational activity is one component.
Conclusion
It is my contention that Paulo Freire's works call for an educational
theory which will result in education intended to cause critical thinking
and action; but it is also critical of the paradigm in which educational
theory is now imprisoned. This paradigm is part and parcel of a larger
paradigm: the political paradigm which has been dominant for the past
two hundred years, broadly known as liberalism. Only a deep understand-
ing of the basic assumptions underlying liberalism, the degree to
which
current educational theory and practice match these assumptions
can result
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in a truly alternative theory and practice. Any effort at creating an
alternative which is not aware of the basic assumptions of liberal theory
and the concomitant concrete social actions, is liable to reproduce these
assumptions under the guise of doing something different. The power of
the dominant paradigm is, in other words, very great, and only a theoret-
ical self-consciousness can save us from mimicking and helping perpetuate
the existing order.
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CHAPTER III
I have so far attempted to interpret Freire's thought by showing
the tradition, the paradigm, in which his work stands. The elementary
principles at the heart of the paradigm have implications for the kind
of intellectual operations one would conduct if one worked within the
paradigm. This would be true for every area of intellectual endeavor;
understanding the nature of social reality (research), teaching, evalua-
tion, and writing. It is to be my argument in this chapter that the
epistemological and ontological categories which inform the empiricist
paradigm are profoundly at odds with Freire's thought. Not only are they
at odds, but the two cannot be adjoined. The cost would be to cut away
what is most radical in Freire's theory. It is to be my argument that the
empiricist desire to create value-free instruments which will provide
teachers or researchers with objective evidence of the nature of social
reality must fail. I will argue, too, that we are inevitably left witn
the task of interpreting , of making judgments; given this inevitability
we should make an effort to do what we can to make the wisest, best in-
formed, most lucidly argued judgments we possibly can. In order to achieve
this we should reestablish the primacy of theory for which a thorough ground-
ing in social philosophy and history are essential. This would also be
the correct translation of the Freire paradigm into American educational
contexts. This interpretation of Freire stands in direct contrast to
the empiricist interpretation. An example of such an interpretation and
its failures will be discussed in the latter third of this chapter. In
fact the first two thirds of this chapter should be understood as
a
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preparation for the argument that the empiricist interpretation funda-
mentally contradicts Freire.
Freire has written several texts and articles. These texts are sets
of words or expressions which have a meaning. But the meaning one gives
to the expressions depends upon how one interprets Freire's theory. The
meaning of what Freire is saying and the expressions he uses are not in
perfect mesh; if meaning and expression were in perfect mesh there would
be no need for interpretation, because everyone would immediately under-
stand the same thing when they read Freire. The fact is that there are
different 'readings' of the meaning of what Freire is saying. For ex-
ample, I am insisting in this dissertation that the only way to get inside
to the meaning of Freire is to grasp the far-reaching implications of the
notion that subject and object are in ongoing dialectical relationship;
or, to put it slightly more concretely, 'man is in and with the world.'
The problem inevitably is that you, the reader, either have begun to
comprehend the far-reaching implications of this notion, or else you are
only seeing the expression: "subject and object are in dialectical rela-
tionship" without grasping the meaning which I am trying to convey. My
task is to convey what I mean when I say that there are far-reaching im-
plications of this dialectical relationship.
My argument is that this way of interpreting the relationship between
subject and object is at the very heart of the Freire paradigm. The
evidence I can point to are the Freire texts; he is insisting at every
step that we, the readers, comprehend the implications of interpreting
the man-world relationship in this manner. Several other closely
related
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notions stand at the heart of the paradigm: one is that the human sub-
ject in Freire's system can only be understood as a whole; the human sub-
ject can and should only participate in educational activities as a whole;
the subject can and should be viewed by other subjects (teachers, research-
ers) as a whole. The human subject must never be reduced to a part of
the whole. This would be an act of objectifying the subject, and there-
fore immoral and oppressive, as well as a distortion of the human sub-
ject's reality. For Freire there is no compromise to this position: the
human subject, whether individual or community, must never be reduced to
an object. "In the revolutionary process the leaders cannot utilize the
banking method as an interim measure, justified on grounds of expediency,
with the intention of later behaving in a genuinely revolutionary fashion.
They must be revolutionary--that is to say dialogical --from the outset."^
Dialogical activity of this kind is the encounter between subjects who
are mediated by the world; the subjects seek to make sense of, and trans-
form, the world.
Subjects are whole in another sense. Whether one views them as
individuals or communities, human subjects are in a context-- in the con-
text of history and culture. The framework these subjects live within is
integrally related to history and culture. The social institutions and
the way individuals or groups refer to, speak about, interact with these
social institutions are in a complex dialectical relationship, making up
a whole; the parts of this whole cannot be understood, cannot
be made
sense of, in abstraction from this whole. In order to clarify this con-
sider the distinction I made earlier between expression, on the one
hand,
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and meaning, on the other. When a human subject is speaking he is ex-
pressing something; the meaning can only be grasped if the listener alreadj^
shares the framework of the speaker. In other words, a whole background
of shared meaning helps two individuals to communicate. When the frame-
work in which a statement or action is expressed is not shared by the
observing, listening subject, he is unable to grasp the meaning behind the
expression. He only hears or sees the expression (words, actions). Thus
any effort to deeply understand the expressions of another human subject
comes either as a result of implicitly sharing the meaning framework which
is usually unconsciously held, or by coming to know in detail the histor-
ical and cultural framework of the subject. If one is studying one's
own society one has to make a special effort at interpreting the frame-
work which a group inhabits; it means bringing to consciousness assump-
tions which have implications for oneself.
Freire is insisting that one way of objectifying subjects, of treat-
ing human beings as objects, is to isolate some part of them from the
whole without reference to the whole, and treating 'it' accordingly--! ike
an object. Freire maintains that the treatment of students as ahistor-
ical beings who do not have an ongoing framework of thought and action in
dialectical relationship, is one form of objectifying them; another is any
p
effort to study individuals as if they were 'anatomical fragments'. He
insists that any part of the educational program— from preparation to
evaluation—which objectifies the subject, is domesticating and support-
ive of the status quo . The critically conscious individual (the develop-
ment of whom is the aim of Freire's pedagogy), on the other hand, is able
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to think and act in terms of definite human subjects who are in and of
a definite world, in a definite moment in history. "Critical thinking
discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and men and admits
of no dichotomy between them."^ The critically conscious individual
attempts, via careful reflection
, to comprehend the implications of the
relationship between man and the world; in his actions on the v/orld,
whether it be research in an effort to understand the nature of social
reality, teaching or evaluating (to name a few possible kinds of actions),
he attempts to display the effects of this reflection: never to reduce
the human subject to an object by tearing him out of his personal, commun-
al, and historical context. If the task is the discovery of facts, either
for the purposes of research or evaluation, "the dialectical movement (be-
tween subject and object) is the fundamental preamble to understanding
the facts. This movement implies in the first place an acting subject
possessed of the theoretical instruments necessary to undertake the anal-
yses of reality and that he grasp the necessity of continuously re-adapt-
ing these instruments according to the results obtained."'^ Thus, critically
conscious thought begins to comprehend the meaning underlying the follow-
ing expression: "the dialectical movement betv/een subject and object."
At the most general level of his theory, Freire believes that *we are
approaching an age the style of which will be more anthropological than
anthropocentric. No longer will the universe be seen with man as the
center of things; rather it will be an age typified by the 'effort to come-
to know what constitutes fuller humanness. This involves understanding
more deeply how mankind differs from the world of animals, or more generally
61
what man's task is with regard to nature. What defines the human from
non-human is precisely the capacity, the potential to recognize that
there is such a thing as a 'not I'. It is the potential in all humans
for the world to become an object of knowledge which results in actions
intended to transform the world. (Knowledge and action are actually more
intimately related than this simple cause, effect statement indicates).
The capacity for reflection and action in an ongoing dialectic is the
potential which is unavailable to animals (regardless of their capacity
to successfully learn the symbols of A.S.L. speech for example; learning
these symbols can never include the capacity for reflection as it is
available to humans, and with which capacity human language is closely
tied). Thus Freire's insistence that the 'word' contains within it re-
flection and action in a dynamic unity. Only humans have the capacity to
come to recognize themselves as historical beings; this recognition makes
it possible for humans to distinguish between what must inevitably be
(nature) and what could be different (culture). Animals cannot tridi-
mensional ize reality--they cannot develop a sense of the present in re-
lation to the past and the future. Animals are driven entirely by the
demands of the present, by the demands of the body. No possibility exists
for an animal to recognize that the seat of decision making exists to
some extent within; this recognition can only occur in humans as they re-
cognize that they are both in the world and with the world, and are
capable of reflecting upon the significance of that fact.
Animals are thus 'beings in themselves'^ incapable of being anywhere
other than the 'flat atemporal present'^ and almost entirely dependent
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upon instinctual instructions for action. Man ^reflect upon himself
and his actions, can see himself as a being of history. As a result of
these reflections he has the potential to self-consciously act upon his-
tory on the basis of this historical consciousness. But, and this is
crucial, these are man's projects; they remain tasks to be performed.
The vast majority of mankind do not see themselves as in any way separate
from nature, as potential actors upon the world. It is the development
and fulfillment of this potential that defines the activity of humaniza-
tion— the process whereby man becomes more human. The development of
historical consciousness is not something that happens automatically as
a result of being human. The only possibility that it will occur for any
large numbers of people is if it becomes the project of educators whose
aim is to educate for the development of critical consciousness. There
is no absolute necessity that as man comes to recognize himself as a
potential actor upon the world, as not entirely at the mercy of natural
forces (inner and outer )--there is no absolute necessity that man set
himself in opposition to nature, or as absolutely apart from nature as
has occurred with such disastrous consequences in the advanced industrial
nations. These are apparently simplistic and superficial distinctions,
but assumptions about man's relationship to nature and culture eventually
must be at the heart of any attempt to educate for critical consciousness,
and thus a short diversion for further elaboration is crucial.
Some would say that these distinctions between culture and nature
contradict earlier arguments which oppose the setting up of dualities .
This is a good opportunity to also reiterate the nature of the dialectic.
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It is not in our tradition to think dialectically, and in order to do
so immersion in a tradition of thought not usually considered practical
or up to date is required. Careful reflection will reveal the degree to
which dualistic thinking and language are pervasive. Dualistic thinkers
either recognize two poles--the subject and the object--and see it as
possible to radically split the one from the other, or else they call
for a collapsing of the one into the other. The dialectic thinker argues
that "subject and object are not found dichotomized, nor are they in i-
dentity . but a dialectic unity, (emphasis mine)"^ There is a vast dif-
ference in these three positions. Liberal theory, closely tied to a
capitalistic economic system, has come to see man in a war with nature;
man's task has been to dominate nature. Efforts to dominate nature have
to some extent been true of all civilizations, but no other has come to
do so, so single mindedly. As the restraints imposed by religion slowly
faded in strength, economic rationale became the main criterion for ac-
tion, resulting in an uninhibited onslaught on nature. Obviously closely
tied to the advances of science and technology were the political inter-
ests of some, in opposition to others. This link was well expressed by
Marcuse;
The technology and technics applied in the economic process are
more than ever before instruments of social control. The satis-
faction of needs (material and intellectual) takes place through
the scientific organization of work, scientific management, and^
the scientific imposition of attitudes and behavior patterns which
operate beyond and outside the work process and precondition the
individuals in accord with the dominant social interests.
How to escape from these particular relations of domination and continue
to use the advantages gained from scientific and technological development
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is one great task of the industrial world. Educators, working to develop
critical consciousness with people who have grown up in the western world
must in some way deal with relationship of being dominated and the desire
to dominate as it exists among these people. The mark of oppressed con-
sciousness according to Freire, whose work was with peasants, is that one
sees oneself as totally one with the world. The world of nature and the
social world are in identical relationship with each other and with men;
both the social world and the world of nature are experienced as a huge
inalterable weight about which nothing can be done. Man's task is to
adapt, not to create, as the oppressed consciousness sees it. (I will
argue at length later in this chapter that it is also typical of main-
stream social science in this country to treat large chunks of the social
world as if it were identical to the natural world, i.e., inalterable,
free from the taints of history, power, interests and the like).
One group, critical of the dichotomies that exist between man and
nature ushered in by liberal consciousness argues for a collapsing of
the individual into the group, for civilization into nature. This argu-
ment was prevalent during the late 1960's and has received its most re-
cent boost from the book Earthwalk by Philip Slater.^ The sort of argu-
ment made by Slater has been so well received that a short diversion is
called for, to critically analyze it. Slater's argument rests on his
belief that Western culture has overemphasized individualism, that our
task lies in realizing that 'freedom is inherently illusory ' that we
should give up the fruitless effort to become individuals, but rather
should take our cue fv'om primitive communities where apparently "Inter-
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dependence exists, so dependency is highly muted. Narcissism is almost
irrelevant since no one views herself as an isolated entity, but only
(my emphasis) as part of a whole. According to Slater the "tribe
(the equivalent to simple community) has no centralized power, no chiefs,
or nobles, no exploitation, no cities, no civilization
, (my emphasis)"^^
Slater is convinced that it is civilization itself which is our prob-
lem. Civilization requires men to remove themselves several degrees from
reality (feelings, nature, the body). If only humans were better 'attuned'
to reality we would all be better off. He is particularly regretful that
Western civilization has so overemphasized the development of the intel-
lect, the acquisition of knowledge, the formation of complex conceptual
systems--all at an increased cost of our capacity to be tuned into real-
ity. The 'checks and balances' (between ideas and feelings, pleasure and
power needs) collapse in a "culture which values knowledge above feeling,
13
power above pleasure, and the mind over the body." We must do away
with the personality type who is so out of balance--the type who can suc-
cessfully postpone gratification in order to achieve individual power
and success. The way to do this is to join the feminist movement's 'as-
sault' on the nuclear family. Only those people who have grown up with
many adult nurturers (flat-gradient types) will not compulsively postpone
pleasure to achieve success. They will be far more willing to demand im-
mediate gratification, and to submerge within a group carrying out com-
munity goals, rather than individual aims.
Ironically at one point Slater quotes from Freud's Ci vilization and
Its Discontents (ironically, because in that book Freud 'scorns the
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distinction between culture and civilization* a position Slater obviously
does not hold; he seems to think approvingly of people who have 'no civil-
ization*.) Slater leads one to believe that his argument and Freud*s
can be equated when he says: "Freud once said that civilization is a
process of exchanging joy for security. Slater refers the reader to
page sixty-two of Civilization and Its Discontents where wo find: "Civil-
ized man has exchanged a portion of his possibilities for happiness for
a portion of security. Freud goes on in the same paragraph to say that
the instinctual life of primitive peoples "is subject to restrictions of
a different kind but perhaps of greater severity than those attaching to
modern civilized man."^® Freud, in the next paragraph says: "(We) are
not showing ourselves enemies of civilization..."^^ Slater's efforts to
ally himself with Freud's position is one example of his conceptual con-
fusion.
The psychoanalytic position is that we have never attained the 'indi-
vidualism* Slater would have us do away with. His argument is reminiscent
of B.F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity . We have never achieved
either the freedom or dignity he v^/ould have us go beyond. The bourgeois
notion of individualism which Slater is correctly critical of, is not,
and cannot be all there is to be said about what it means to be an in-
dividual. It cannot be the final stage of man's effort to achieve self-
consciousness. "The 'man in the street* is very remote indeed from the
ideal of himself projected by bourgeois individualism. He is group guided
in every facet of his affective attitudes, is satisfied with his role as
agent of various group requirements, and has neither inclination for, ror
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understanding of, making independent decisions."^® We have not even come
close to the ideal which Slater would have us overthrow. In fact, the
only hope for the species is if more and more people come to recognize
that only the life of the 'mind in service of eros', a phrase which cap-
tures perfectly Freud's life and work can save civilization from destruc-
tion:
Our historical period confronts us with special tasks. One of them
is facing on a reality basis new situations for which there is either
no historical precedent or--just as important--for which traditional
solutions are inapplicable if immeasurable disaster is not to ensue.
Thus the extension of our critical conscious is our most urgent need.
A larger proportion of our behavior must be determined by insight
and reflection than has hitherto been the case in social life as
a whole.
Slater, and so many others, believe that the development of the intel-
lect, increasing the strength of the ego, stands in inevitable conflict
with feelings and passion. The result is arguments of the sort Slater
makes: arguments which, if acted upon, v/ould result in regression--in
losing those few gains we have made as a species. It is not less thought
we need', but more and better thought--thought which by all means is pas-
sionate and fully aware of all dimensions of human reality; we certainly
do not need any more emotional logic— of that we have more than enough.
The position Freire is calling for is one that refuses to collapse
subject (man) and object (nature), just as it refuses to allow them to be
dichotomized. There is a difference between the social world and the
natural world; the difference is often very hard to discern, but very
crucial. Man to some degree is separate from the world of nature.
His-
tory is deeply implicated in his being, and he has the
potential of learn-
ing from it, and thus choosing more wisely. It is £os^bl^ for
im to
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come to understand the forces of nature as they work within him and
without in such a way that he will be able to use nature's energies so
as to enhance humanness. Going to war with nature intrapsychically or
in the environment brings disaster. Now that the constraints of religion
hold such little legitimacy, man s task is to transform nature from with-
in as much as from without, with a common purpose--that of the libera-
tion rather than the domination of men. There must no longer be judges
or oppressors but creators said Nietzsche and the task today remains the
same. Freud's famous and oft quoted statement is again quoted here in
full to show how the inner and outer tasks remain so similar and of course
so difficult, how inextricably man is tied to nature, but how necessary
it is for him to forge from nature, culture for the liberation of all men:
"Where it (id) was, there I (ego) shall be; it is a work of culture like
the draining of the Zuyder Zee." We see here two examples of man's
possible and sometimes realized projects. Psychoanalytic therapy attempts
to recover from the unconscious, repressed material, which, when success-
ful, makes available additional energy to the ego. The ego is, to a de-
gree, freed from irrational pressures and the possibilities for critical
consciousness are enhanced. The draining of the Zuyder Zee makes avail-
able badly needed resources, without damaging the environment.
These then are the principles crucial to any concrete educational
activity which claims to be Freirian in nature and content. One such
activity which Freire proposes be understood as one moment in the over-
all educational process, is the investigation of social reality. The
following sections are an elucidation of Freire's proposals with reference
to other similar proposals.
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Making Sense of Social Reality
"Because this view of education starts with the conviction that it
cannot present its own program but must search for this program dialog-
ical ly with the people, it serves to introduce the pedagogy of the op-
pressed, in the elaboration of which the oppressed must participate. "21
Herein lies the key to the specific suggestions Freire makes for
the development of an educational program, which is to be thought of
as one moment (aspect) in the teaching program and its evaluation. Each
moment is a stage in a single process; thus each one must follow the prin-
ciples crucial to the theory. Education must not be a reduction of sub-
jects to objects. Discovering where the 'students are at' is not a pro-
cess of isolating their stage of consciousness (a fragment), but a pro-
cess of learning from them what the nature of their thought-language is
(see below). Knowledge is not to be deposited, nor are the people to be
studied as objects, no matter how good the intentions. Freire's sug-
gestions for how to proceed must be understood as standing in total crit-
ical relationship to that which is socially and politically dominant, and
to any effort to objectify human subjects. The intensity of his convic-
tion in this regard is captured in the following:
The investigator who, in the name of scientific objectivity trans-
forms the organic into something inorganic, what is becoming into
what is, life into death, is a man who fears change. He sees in
change (which he does not deny, but neither does he desire) not a
sign of life but a sign of death and decay. He does want to study
change--but in order to stop it, not in order to stimulate or deep-
en it. However, in seeing change as a sign of death and in making
people the passive objects of investigation in order to arrive
rigid models, he betrays his own character as a killer of liie.
The specific focus of this section is the Freire approach to the
understanding of social reality. The following is a brief summary of
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his thought on the subject. In order to make certain concepts clearer
I will integrate examples from other closely-related fields of sociology
(ethnomethodologists and participant observationists)
, anthropologists
(new ethnographers) and, recently, educators. All the thinkers from these
schools stand closely to Freire's tradition. The following is an example,
serving to show how this is so, and also to introduce the Freire method.
Social science research often appears to produce a situation in
which a medical doctor tries to diagnose a patient's symptoms
from around the corner and out of sight. The social scientists uses
his 'instruments' to measure the response of the patient as though
they were a kind of long stethoscope. The focus of the researcher
has been on developing a better stethoscope for going around corners
and into houses, when the real need is for the researcher to walk
around the corner, go into the house and begin talking with the
people who live there.
An important concept in Freire's theory is that there cannot be an
analogy drawn between education and physiological processes; education
is a social process involving depth understanding of the whole. This
totality is one in which specific subjects (individuals and communities)
think and act, and where their reality on the level of the social can be
grasped only via a study of the thought-language reality of the people.
Ideally (given the resources), prior to the preparation of an educational
program, a group of investigators in conjunction with some of the program
participants, conduct a co-investigation of reality.
The co-investigation as described by Freire has three stages to it.
The first will be described here in full, and the other tv;o only very
briefly. The aim in this first stage is to probe slowly the
'living
whole' in an effort to reach the nuclei! of contradictions
true of that
reality. This process involves coming to know with the
people how they
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think and act. Each partial investigation is carefully discussed by the
investigating team in a continuing effort to divide and re-integrate the
whole. No effort is made to force values on anyone, but it is taken for
granted that the investigating professionals (as opposed to the local
investigators) have developed to some degree a critical perception of
reality, 'which implies a correct method of approaching reality in order
to unveil it. And critical perception cannot be imposed. "24 jhus it is
clear that Freire has a very strong conviction about the right way of
going about the study of social reality. An effort must be made to
understand how the people construct their thought. This in turn involves
an understanding of the notion of intersubjective meaning (see below).
As Freire puts it: "It is the 'we' think which establishes the 'I think'
and not vice versa. "25 Or describing the complex relationship between
man, world and meaning, Freire says:
From a non-dual is tic viewpoint, thought and language constituting
a whole, always refer to the reality of the thinking subject. Au-
thentic thought language is generated in the dialectical relation-
ships between the subject and his concrete historical and cultural
real ity
The investigation is an effort to understand both the deep structure
of a people's reality (their intersubjective and common meanings--to be
discussed later) and also an attempt to understand their gestures, modes
of speech and behavior, which comprise the obvious or surface structure
of reality. The two levels of reality, the surface and the deep structure
are in complex dialectical relationship. 2^ Unger explains this idea of a
deep structure of thought this way:
To grasp a way of thinking we have to understand the problems v/ith
which it is concerned and the methods it uses to solve them. The
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problems and the methods become in turn intelligible in the context
of an experience of the world. Problems, methods and experience
constitute the 'deep structure' of thought.
Schutz, who is primarily responsible for translating phenomenology
into social theory begins similarly to Freire in his insistence that
"consciousness is intent upon the world.", and this is why his contri-
butions are mentioned here. "Any of our experiences as they appear with-
in our stream of thought are necessarily referred to the object experienced.
There is no such thing as thought, as fear, as fantasy; every thought is
a thought every fear is fear of. "29 Believing that traditional science
starts at the level of second-order concepts, phenomenological analysis
attempts to see things as they are, to let the phenomena speak for them-
selves. This can only be achieved by the social scientist dispelling all
his preconceptions by an act the phenomenologists refer to as "bracketing."
This act Schutz refers to as a "radicalized renewal of the Cartesian
method." It is basically a suspension in the belief in the outer v/orld
(the world is put in brackets). In this way the world will come to be
recognized in its essence. "The essential characteristics of the v/orld
can be grasped via a suspension of belief in all presuppositions. it
is in this fashion that the level of meanings can be comprehended. Mote
how closely we approach empiricist categories here. The phenomenologist
social investigators offer some interesting ideas on how to go about re-
searching. Yet the actual reports they make contribute to the status
quo, because of their conviction that reality must only be descri bed.
Bracketing means one must not make judgments. Radical subjectivity is
at its roots only the other side of the coin to radical objectivity.
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Spradley and McCurdy's Mew Ethnography contains concrete examples
of what is involved in 'describing a culture in its own terms.' 31 j^e
aim is to discover "the characteristic way people categorize, code and
define their own experience. "32 jhe similarities to Freire are obvious,
"...instead of studying the people, the ethnographer learns from them...
he will ask those he studies to become his teachers and to instruct him
in ways of life they find meaningful ;.. .he will learn to speak and under-
stand the language of those he studies. "33 jhus the Freire approach re-
quires the educator to assume very self-consciously the posture of the
learner. The assumption here is that everyone, teacher and student, has
knowledge, but knowledge of a particular kind:
We were certain that a man's relation to reality expressed as a
subject to an object, results in knowledge, which man could ex-
press through language. This relation.
. .is carried out by men
whether or not they are literate. It is sufficient to be a per-
son to perceive the data of reality to be capable of knowing, even
if this knowledge is mere opinion
. There is no such thing as ab-
solute ignorance or absolute wisdom. 34
The knowledge Freire is referring to is not in the same realm as
the knowledge contained in Hegel, for example. It is not that one is
necessarily going to discover great truths from students (which was the
implication of much of the talk of the sixties, and thus the disappoint-
ment). Rather it involves the teacher recognizing that he knows little
of the meaning framework, the thought-language reality of the people.
This recognition will cause the teacher to become authentically a student
of the people's thinking. The teacher-student will really want to know,
both what the people explicitly know as well as what they know tacitly.
The problems the teacher poses, the questions he asks are legitimate.
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authentic questions; they are not asked as a way of feigning ignorance.
The process of asking questions and posing problems establishes dialogue,
in the process of which 'teacher-student' and ' student-teacher
' begin
to acquire a critical perception of a particular reality. The knowledge
referred to here is "the recipe knowledge of everyday life" revealed and
expressed in the language reality of a people. It is the world of lang-
uage which can provide us with the meanings inherent in the social know-
ledge the people have.
Ethnographic Semantics is an effort to understand the codes, cate-
gories, and meanings as they are revealed in the language of the people.
In order to understand how the people with whom one is working see the
world requires a continuous asking of "what do these people see themselves
as doing?" rather than "what do I see them doing?" "Impl icit. . .is the
premise that human beings act tov/ard things on the basis of the meanings
which these things have for them."^^ Thus in an effort to understand
'thought-language reality' considerable work needs to be done in the
area of language--definition, contrast and meaning. A good description
of an investigation of reality is one that occurs from the perspective
of the people living in it. It is, however, merely intended to be des-
criptive. Bruyn , a strong proponent of participant-observation, critiques
those who 'take a stand' and use their materials in order to defend a po-
sition. The aim should be merely to describe.
The insistence on description makes this approach potentially con-
formist. The problem lies in the very assumption that one can view soc-
ial reality, having removed all presuppositions. The
participant-obser-
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vationists and the ethnomethodologists make the same mistake here as the
traditional empiricist. And clearly Freire's statement that a 'critical
perception' should inform the professional investigator indicates his
distance from Bruyn, et. al . Freire wants to get to the nucleii of
contradictions . In this sense he is much closer to the psychoanalytic
approach to reality, which attempts to look for the pathological in the
normal. The analyst needs to be able to hear what the patient is not
saying as much as what he is saying.^^ The same holds true for the soc-
ial investigator. Freire in fact has referred to his work as a kind of
social psychoanalysis.^^ What keeps the investigator on track is a high
degree of theoretical self-consciousness. "The acting subject (must be)
possessed of the theoretical instruments necessary to undertake the anal-
ysis of reality."^^ It is his awareness of the implications of the par-
ticular position he (the theorist or researcher) is taking, that disting-
uishes him from the unawareness of the 'disinterested scientist', who
merely tries to describe reality in order to discover the truth. The
critical theorist knows that description and evaluation cannot be so
neatly separated. It is thus the critical theorists' awareness of the
normative impl i cations of his position and of what he is looking for
that establishes "objectivity" for him— an objectivity in an entirely
different sense of the word to that used by the empiricists:
The social scientist does not see himself as some autonomous being
standing 'outside society'. In common with most other people, he
does feel that he stands outside the major history-making decisions
of the period... At the same time he knows that he is among those
who take many of the conseguences of these decisions. That is one
major reason v/hy to the extent that he is aware of what he is doing
^
he becomes an explicitly political man. No one is 'outside society ,
the question is where each stands v/ithin it.
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The difference awareness of implications makes is simply that a choice
based upon clearer understanding of reality can be made. The scientist
who says "I am outside reality." is deceiving himself. The scientist
who says "I am aware of the political and social implications of the work
I am doing;--I had the courage to look at the normative implications,"
is no longer deceiving himself, but choosing to go ahead with eyes open.
Freire is very explicit about where he stands, and he makes it
known in various ways. One way is the following quote from Lenin which
Freire gives: "Without a revolutionary theory, there is no revolution-
ary movement. Revolutionary theory seeks to discover how men are
being dehumanized, and intends to make the content of education an effort
to deepen awareness amongst people of the extent to which they are de-
humanized and in the process provoke change for the humanization of men
and women.
Very briefly, in order to complete the picture, the following are
the final tv/o steps in the preparation for an educational program. The
discovery of a nuclei i of contradictions will include a discovery of
what Freire calls the 'limit situations' which in turn imply limit-tasks.
These are the areas which are taken as given; those situations where the
people do not see the potential beyond the given. Once these limit sit-
uations are clarified (which only may involve overtly oppressive role
rel ationshi ps--see Alschuler's narrow definition below) the task is to
find out what the people think about these situations, ihe results of
these investigations reveal the themes true of these people which could
include such notions as dependence, apathy, indifference, naive optimism.
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or fatalism. Themes contain their dialectical opposite which awaits birth
(e.g., dependence-independence). Finally, the preparation of the educa-
tional program takes place by 'representing' to the people what has been
learned from them, "always in the form of a problem, never in the form
of a lecture." A concrete example of this will be given in the next
chapter. To develop full understanding of these final stages Freire must
be carefully read in the original. It is not my purpose here to clarify
these two stages, since this would require too long a diversion. I do,
however, want to explain one aspect of Freire's system which he claims
is crucial, and one that is often missed.
I have already explained that Freire goes to considerable lengths
to argue that man is separate (but not radically so) from the world of
nature precisely to the extent that he succeeds in fulfilling his po-
tential as a maker of culture, a maker of history. The oppressed do
not conceive of themselves as separate from nature. This deeply held
assumption about man's relationship to the world is unconsciously held
and at the core of how oppressed people act in the world, according to
Freire. Typical of the way peasants see the v;orld is as follows: "There
is no difference between humans and animals; when there is the latter have
the advantage--they are freer than we are..."^^ There exists between
peasants (and I would add amongst all forms of oppressed peoples) and
their natural world (and obviously the cultural world) "a strong umbili-
cal cord which binds them."^^ This is an excellent example of what Tay-
lor refers to when he speaks of the fact that the intersubjective and
commonly shared meanings contain within them a perception of agent-other
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relationships (see below). It is also an example of the simple elemen-
tary generalizations at the core of the paradigm any people inhabit.
(In America the image of man as most like a machine competes with the
animal metaphor. Common-sense and computer intelligence are seen as on
two different points of the same spectrum.) Again, these are not insights
an observer of a culture will necessarily grasp immediately. Insight
can only come after carefully listening and problem-posing with the
people about their thought-language reality.
Crucial to the Freire paradigm is the assumption that man, and only
man, has the capacity to make a separation between himself and nature.
In this sense he is potentially a decision maker. This is meant in the
root sense of the term--decidere
,
meaning 'to cut'. It is man's capacity
to reflect upon his actions that grants him this potential, and that makes
it possible for him to separate himself to some degree from the demands
of nature.
For Freire reflection on these relationships between man, culture
and nature is central to an education for critical consciousness. In
dialogical education, the teacher-student is not only responding to the
themes he finds in the people's reality; he introduces themes too:
One of the basic themes ( and one which I consider central and
indispensable) is the anthropological concept of culture. Whe-
ther men are peasants or urban workers, learning to read or en-
rolled in a post literacy program, the starting point of their
search to know more is the debate of the concept (i.e., an anthro-
pological concept of culture). As they discuss the world of cul-
ture they express their level of awareness of reality in v/hicn
various themes are implicit...
With the experience nov/ behind me, I can affirm that the concept
of culture, discussed imaginatively in all or most of its dimen-
sions, can provide various aspects of an educational program.
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Given the level of importance Freire attaches to this particular aspect
of his theory it is surprising that so many interpreters miss it. In
Educatio n for Critical Consciousness he provides the only concrete
examples of his work that one can find. These examples consist of ten
pictures which he typically presented to illiterate peasants. All of
them are intended to provoke debate on this single issue: man's rela-
tionship to culture, nature and work. He was apparently able to pro-
voke sophisticated philosophical discussions amongst illiterate, for-
mally uneducated people. In addition, the results of his literacy train-
ing programs have apparently been remarkable. People were writing and
reading very quickly. They v/ere doing so boldly and confidently, over-
coming the natural hesitancy typical of most beginners. "Elza Freire
thinks this may be due to the fact that these persons, beginning with
the discussion of the anthropological concept of culture, discovered
themselves to be more fully human, thereby acquiring an increasing emo-
tional confidence in their learning which was reflected in motor activity.
This starting point v/as to prove a most interesting and productive
one in the experiment I conducted in order to see how Freire may be applied
in this country. It did take me some time to get to this starting point,
as the reader will see in the next chapter. Before describing these
efforts, however, I wish to study in some depth the empiricist interpre-
tation of Freire, and will begin by a discussion of the meaning of meaning.
II.
I would now like to make explicit the assumptions which are central
to the effort of making sense of Freire's theory, or any other text or
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human activity, for that mattor. I will arguo that W6 must unavoidably
make interpretations when faced with the task of 'making sense' of some-
thing, whether it be a text or human activity in general (e.g., evalu-
ating or planning an educational program). The specific focus of the
following discussion is the elucidation of the concept of 'meaning'; the
article by Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man"^^
has been seminal and the following discussion is based on that article.
I have already discussed how expression and meaning (or 'sense')
must be understood as distinguishable, otherwise everything would always
be understood in the same way by everyone. The fact that there is a
difference between sense and expression means that interpretation takes
place inevitably
,
sometimes more and sometimes less. When one is inter-
preting a text, the effort is to make meaning which may have been opaque,
clearer. In addition, one cannot speak of meaning, only of meaning of
something
.
When one speaks of the meaning ojF something, there is a difference
in the task of making sense of natural phenomena, such as glacier for-
mations, blood samples, or chemical reactions and the task of making sense
of human activity. The creation of a text, for example, is the creation
by a specific human subject, and in the act of making sense of it "we
are trying to make explicit the meaning expressed and this means by or
for a subject or subjects.
A
subject is in history, in and of the
world, partly the man-made world; thus he or she already participates
in the world of interpretation. The man-made world is not the same as
the natural world (gravity exists, for example, regardless of man s
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existence; social institutions such as the Court, do not). In addition
to participating in one interpretation of the human condition (the par-
ticular condition in which the human subject grows up), the human sub-
ject is necessarily a self-interpreting animal. "He is necessarily so
for there is no such thing as the structure of meanings for him inde-
pendently of his interpretation of them; for one is woven into the other. "51
When one speaks of meaning, then, it is meaning for a subject;
there can be no meaning suspended in thin air. Meaning is for and by
a human subject, and participates in a different dimension to that of
the natural world. Thus ways of examining the world of meaning of human
activities require a different orientation (and method) than those em-
ployed to make sense of the natural world.
Finally, "things have meaning in a field; that is, in relation to
meanings of other things. If we look at how we understand each other's
language this may be clearer. Our language makes sense because it dis-
tinguishes one thing from another for us. Thus, when I speak of being
terrified it is understood in contrast to a set of other emotions and
states which are not explicitly referred to. Thus being terrified is
immediately understood as in contrast to being afraid or scared; in
addition it is contrasted to a more usual state of affairs, that is, of
being calm and safe. Similarly, in order to make sense of actions or
words one needs to either automatically share what lies hidden in the
background or else make every effort to become very familiar with the
background.
Thus meaning is distinguishable from expression; it is of something.
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by a subject, and in a field. These elements make up a whole of what
constitutes meaning. Meaning can really only be understood in the con-
text of the whole, whether it be of a text or a set of actions, and in-
evitably, the interpretation which occurs falls into an 'interpretative
circle'. In order for me to get you to accept my 'reading* of something
I have to appeal to other 'readings'; in the end you either understand
along the same tracks I do, or you do not; either you 'get' the same
appreciation of the whole I have or you do not, and we must start over
again. Obviously if there is no way out of this 'hermeneutic circle'
one must forever be uncertain to one degree or another; one may indeed
be deceiving others as well as oneself. There is no guarantee that the
truth has been found, and this is an unfortunate fact of the human con-
dition. Freire would agree. He calls for a never ending process of
reflection/action/reflection.
Empiricist Interpretation
The desire to overcome this uncertainty and to break out of the
hermeneutic circle have been strong motivating forces behind the empir-
icist effort to explain and make sense of reality. We are fortunate to
have available to us the empiricist effort to 'make sense' of Freire.
The following is a critical summary of such an effort. (The words in
quotation marks not specifically footnoted are quoted from these empir-
icist studies— hereafter referred to under the rubric "Alschuler, et. al").
Dr. Alfred Alschuler and his associates have conducted extensive
'collaborative' efforts to put some of the 'vague' notions replete in
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Freire's thought and writings into a realm of certainty and objectivity.
Alschuler's reading of Freire is a substantial misreading, and in my
effort to make sense of Freire it would be very helpful to see what Freire
is not saying . In addition, I v/ill argue that the correct reading of
Freire is in fact the one that provides greater insight into the nature
of social reality and that it therefore makes sense to remain loyal to
the intellectual operations which are suggested by Freire's paradigm.
My intention, then, is to show that not only does the Alschuler version
misapprehend--it domesticates precisely what is most revolutionary in
Freire's pedagogy. This domestication has implications above and beyond
the fact that it is unfortunate and that it provides an interesting
intellectual exercise in showing how it domesticates. These implica-
tions are clearly suggested by Alschuler himself when he proudly asserts:
These intellectual extensions of Freire's theories have provided
the basis for a major project we are calling "social Literacy
Training". At present it includes cadres of teachers in over 30
public schools in four states, three university centers, and growing
national interest.
In addition, doctoral students from the School of Education of the
University of Massachusetts, who for one reason or another find Freire
interesting, are being led to believe that these particular 'intellectual
extensions' of Freire's theor i es (?) are indeed what they claim to be.
It is my argument that these intellectual gymnastics are anything but
'extensions'; rather they are a domestication of Freire's theory^. I
intend to critique the work being done here at length and at differing
levels of depth. I will move back and forth from direct reference to
their work, to Freire's thought, and Taylor's article referred to above.
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My hope is that in addition to understanding how Alschuler et. al . have
vitiated Freire's theory, understanding of Freire will have been deepened.
The Al schuler-Smi th Coding System
The thinking which underlies the entire project is captured in the
attempt Alschuler et. al . have made to develop a coding system to measure
stages of consciousness. These stages have been abstracted from Freire's
work and referred to as 'magical', 'naive', and 'critically conscious'.
These are explained by Bill Smith, one of Alschuler's graduate students
whose dissertation is one of the products of this collaborative effort
(see chart). The dissertation is called, significantly, "The Meaning
of Paulo Freire" (my emphasis).^^ The coding system is intended to end
vague, intuition-based 'consciousness-raising' efforts. Arguing that
Freire's 'vague, abstruse philosophizing'^^ (v) often containing many
value-laden words, has contributed considerably to the confused state of
the consciousness-raising movement with v/hich Freire supposedly has had
much to do, the authors hope to set things straight. The goal is to set
'clear objectives' for 'workshops' and clear 'training objectives' for
the 'training of trainers'. To ensure that we know for certain whether
consciousness has been raised or not, and to establish for certain how
long the learning endures, if at all, what needs to be done is to oper-
ationalize' Freire's theory. Thus the idea is to establish an instrument
which would 'measure' consciousness, or ' conscientazacao'
.
Why operationalize? The assumption throughout is that if the
theories can be operationalized, only then could one make a claim
that
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Freire s theories are true. This follows from the assumption that only
that which can be empirically verified is true. Also, only when the
'instrument' is sufficiently precise will we have available a 'diagnos-
tic tool' which will provide 'trainers' with accurate information as to
what appropriate 'techniques' should be used for 'raising' a particular
person's stage of consciousness. At some point in the future, then, enough
will be known about 'raising' consciousness at the different levels so
that a trainer will be able to apply the precisely appropriate technique
at the precise moment upon receiving the results of the test. "Unless
such a diagnostic procedure takes place, training experiences are just
as likely to hinder the growth of consciousness as to raise it."^^
We have here the first clue as to how Alschuler and Smith have
vitiated the meaning of Freire while trying to do away with ambiguity.
The image they have of the educational process is revealed when they
explain why they wish to operationalize Freire. Clearly an excellently
'trained' technician will carefully minister the appropriate texts; hav-
ing overcome any need for interpretation the technician will be able to
diagnose the appropriate piece of consciousness which needs raising by
him (or her of course). 'Diagnosis' need not necessarily convey images
of a doctor ministering to a passive patient; but when read in the con-
text of the whole of Alschuler and Smith's work it is clear that the
medical, technical metaphor dominates their thinking. Social reality,
and the consciousness of the subjects can be understood, according to
this view, in the same way one understands physiological processes and
can be treated accordingly. Alschuler, when talking of the coding system.
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frequently draws the analogy to the drawing of blood samples. From
the blood sample, the technician can gain a great deal of information
about the physical state of the human being which the doctor then uses
to make his diagnosis. The reference to the technique used in the nat-
ural sciences is quite to be expected. It is a great goal of the empir-
icists to elevate the human sciences to the heights attained by the nat-
ural sciences. Yet the failure to understand how this eliminates the
concrete human subject, objectifies him, turns him into an anatomical
fragment which is supposed to provide information about the whole, is
quite remarkable for one who purports to understand Freire's theory.
Many of the other words I have put into quotation marks above create the
same sense--that the developers of this 'tool' are nowhere near an ap-
preciation of how radical a transformation Freire is calling for. The
words 'operationalize', 'train', 'instrument', 'workshop' all reveal
the image the authors have of the educational process and the human sub-
ject: i.e., of a human subject being objectifiable, manipulable and
divorced from the matrix of social institutions.
A further example of this technical set of 'operations' is revealed
in the idea of 'consciousness raising'. Freire never ever uses the words
Yet the words seem so much a part of the authors' view of the process
that they attribute to Freire a central role in the 'consciousness rais-
ing movement' . The attachment to the words, along with the very idea
of the coding system and techniques to raise consciousness, are reveal-
ing of assumptions about the nature of the human being, as v-/ell as assump
tions about the nature of critical consciousness (the authors refutation
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of the role played by philosophy notwithstanding). The very idea that
consciousness can be raised by the appropriate carefully planned manip-
ulations from without is simplistic and naive. It indicates a conception
of the human mind as a complex machine; when one aspect of it is suffic-
iently understood the engineer can design the appropriate mechanism to
make things work better. Everything moves linearly; if you make the
program one that will move minds toward critical consciousness, and as
long as your knowledge is sufficient and correct, then you will 'produce'
critical consciousness. It is never the assumptions which are at fault,
if something does not work too well; it is always our knowledge that is
imperfect.
The sense that one gets from Smith's work as to the nature of crit-
ical consciousness is that when one's consciousness is raised there will
be an 'initial' period of anxiety. Smith continues: "Raising conscious-
ness often initially involves some confusion, uncertainty and anxiety as
a new way of viewing one's experience competes with the comfortable old
way. Unless each level of consciousness is defined clearly, trainers
are likely to misinterpret or just plain miss the significance of this
aspect of growth . When this initial period of anxiety is over and
consciousness is raised, and one has grown, things will be better in
some way. This implication is enhanced by the authors' combining Freire's
notion of critical consciousness vnth Maslow's theory of Self Actualiza-
tion. This is all part of the effort to add a little glamour to what in
the original (i.e., Freire) is hard, difficult work. Lest too many get
put off it is better to hold out some carrots at the end of the line.
88
so that people will be rewarded for their initial periods of anxiety; if
they expect growth to occur they may be prepared to tolerate this period
of discomfort. Needless to say, this is a distortion of the idea of
critical consciousness, which cannot be categorized in terms of 'growth'
or 'better'. The following depiction from Wittgenstein communicates the
'state' of critical consciousness:
It is, if possible, still more difficult to think really honestly
about your life and other people's lives. And the trouble is that
thinking about these things is not thrilling but downright nasty.
And when it's nasty then it's most important. 58
To classify realizations about the dismal realities of the past and the
present alongside the idea of growth is painfully absurd. The tone the
authors convey is captured in the following redefinition of Freire's
notion of conscientization : "a degree of consciousness in which indi-
viduals are able to see the social system critically. They are able to
understand the resultant contradictions in their own lives, to general-
ize these contradictions to others around them, and to transform society
creatively with others. Doesn't that sound attractive? Wouldn't
you like to join? To move toward critical consciousness is to compre-
hend what men have done and continue to do to other men. To equate this
kind of realization with self-actualizing peak experiencing of Abe Maslow
is to confound the meaning of critical consciousness to a point where it
is no longer recognizable.
The coding system must be designed so that any 'reasonably intelli-
gent persons'^^ can use it. No biases must enter into v/orking with it.
It is best used by a technician; in fact, it will be appropriately pre-
cise when people v/ho have no prior knowledge of the subjects who are
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providing the protocols, are able to get 'coder reliability'. The cod-
ing system itself is intended as an absolutely neutral technique. The
authors repeat in many contexts that this code can be used for ethical
or unethical purposes depending upon the motivations of the user. This
kind of thinking is an excellent concrete example of what Freire means
when he refers to the dichotimization of the subject and the object.
The authors are able to conceive of this man-made technique called the
coding system as somehow without meaning in and of itself. It stands
there, bare, simply a set of words (expressions); coders are able to
approach these words and classify the words from the protocol '.with a
minimum of interpretation--a problem that is anyhow taken care of sta-
tistically (as the original human subject who wrote those words disap-
pears totally from sight). Neutral technicians will be working with
neutral techniques. This is actually a typical American view of tech-
nology, and the rest of the world has been coping with the difficulties
presented by it ever since 'well intentioned' individuals have decided
to export American 'know-how'. If one understands Freire's notion of
the dialectic relationship between man and the world one cannot hold the
view of the neutrality of techniques. Technique as it is formulated by
a specific culture is an expression of that cul ture . It is not a neu-
tral colorless object which can be used in any way at any time, but
rather speaks of a certain way of doing things, of understanding the
world in a very particular v;ay. Above and beyond the expression (the
coding system) stands its implicit (tacit) meaning which can only be
understood in the context of the whole. Freire is explicit about this:
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"...technique itself as an instrument of men in their orientation in
the world is not neutral.
While on this level of discussion I wish to make one more point in
connection with the content of the Alschuler-Smith version of Freire.
In contrast to the interpretation presented in this dissertation, there
is virtually no mention of the man-world dialectical interaction. The
dozens of quotes as to what constitutes maqical
,
naive or critical con-
sciousness consistently leave out any reference to the subject/object
dialectic. Of course this is one of the keys to why Alschuler and Smith
have failed to understand Freire, and how they can ever conceive of pro-
ducing a coding system to operationalize conscientization
. They do not
grasp how wide ranging are the implications of the subject/object dia-
lectic; nor do they see how it is at the very heart of the theory. Thus
they develop an instrument which, in almost every respect creates subject/
object dichotomies, which is what Freire over and over again warns against.
They miss the point so entirely that their coding system's (which is re-
produced here) classification for the stage of critical consciousness
leaves out any mention of what is at the heart of critical consciousness:
the ongoing capacity to grasp the concrete manifestations of the fact
that subject and object are in dialectical relationship, which requires
the capacity to think using dialectic logic; action will follow because
it is so inextricably linked with thought, although in an unfree world
thei'e will alv/ays be a tension between the two. Smith does point out
that Freire argues for 'an interaction with man and the v/orld. (ital ics
mine).'^^ This recognition of the man/world relationship only comes in
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context of an argument to show similarities to the structural develop-
mental theories of Kohlberg (who, significantly, is a psychological
theorist), not in any other way. (The reduction to knowing only about
individuals, which is all the coding system can achieve, is a result
of the author's overuse of psychological methodology and thinking. This
will be discussed further).
My interest is not only in showing how Freire is misunderstood and
misapplied--that his very insistence that men should no longer be ob-
jectified at any point in the educational process is blatantly ignored.
It is also my intention now to show that the understanding of reality
which the coding system and other similar systems in the empiricist tra-
dition provide, is inadequate and sterile. In addition, the subject/
object dichotimization evident in the coding system is evident in other
efforts of Alschuler to 'apply' Freire, and thus they are equally domes-
ticating of Freire's theory, and equally fail to adequately interpret
the nature of social reality. Much of what has been said already will
become clearer, as will some crucial aspects of Freire's thought.
Although claiming neutrality, this coding system (like everything
else) does not stand in isolation from a tradition, and therefore from
history. Neither does it stand free from epistemological assumptions
(how we know what we know), which are closely intertwined with ontological
principles. Alschuler and Smith advise checking with works written by
political scientists such as Almond and Verba, and Easton. These par-
ticular theorists are representatives of the recent drive in political
science to model itself after the natural sciences; it's philosophical
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roots are older and go back to the seventeenth century. The basic drive
of the empiricists, like Alschuler and Smith, Almond and Verba, and many
others who represent mainstream social science in America is to break
out of the interpretive or hermeneutic circle I referred to earlier.
They want to establish knowledge that is absolutely and certainly true.
The truth must be beyond doubt. Crucially they argue that this is
achieved when it is possible to eliminate the human tendency to make
biased judgments and interpretations, an argument which is diametrically
opposed to the one developed in this chapter. Only that data which we
can be sure is not tainted by human judgment will be accepted as a build-
ing block of knowledge. Only that which can be seen or heard (and thus
measured) can be allowed in as a real (i.e., legitimate) building block.
Only 'brute data' is verifiable; only that which is verifiable can be
called true; and the truth is established eventually through the collec-
tion of more and more brute data and the correlations existing statis-
tically between them. The fact that bits of data are free from inter-
pretation and can be established in statistically significant correlations
confirms and establishes the truth of their interrelationship. Thus
brute data are attractive because they lend themselves to no other read-
ing or interpretation; in this way the interpretive, or hermeneutic cir-
cle is broken. It is this drive to know beyond doubt that leads inevi-
tably to a tradition--a way of going about the investigation of social
real ity—which numbers of social scientists have in common. It is to
Charles Taylor's critique of this way of knowin g that I now wish to return.
93
Critique of Empiricist Epistemology
Taylor, by referring to the work of political scientists such as
Lipset, and Almond and Powell, attempts to show the categorical grid of
the empiricist thought. In their search for brute data the empiricists
are forced to study aspects of reality in isolation from other aspects
of reality, with the hope of later matching them up or showing correspon-
dences. So, for example, the empiricist, in attempting to understand
political reality, studies the objective reality on the one hand (how
the government works, the allocation of resources, the judicial system,
the economic system) and the subjective reality on the other--the set
of beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and the values people hold in relation
to the political institutions. The subjective realm can provide accept-
able brute data only on the level of individuals . In order to be accept-
able as brute data something has to be seen or heard, which the instru-
ment helps us do to a greater depth than our mere eyes or ears. In
this way the problem of meaning, or the subjective realm of political
reality is accounted for. The idea is then to correlate these subjec-
tive beliefs, which have been obtained through questionnaires, with
some behavior in relation to political activity; if there is correspon-
dence then we know something.
The way Alschuler and Smith have come to feel optimistic about
the potential capacity of their code to tell us something follov-/s these
procedures exactly. It is enough in this context to knov/ that the code
is only able to find out the opinions, attitudes, feelings individuals
have about the social world. The demands of the instrument have caused
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Smith to translate Freire's definition of consciousness to a point where
it is no longer recognizable. In fact Freire's original definition
is quoted by the authors in another context of their discussion as:
"Consciousness and world are simultaneous: consciousness neither preceded
the world nor follows it."^^ The vitiated version is: consciousness is
"how participants see, feel, and understand their social reality.
These feelings can only be discovered by asking individuals their response
to a set of questions which are asked about an objectively oppressive
relationship in that individual's world. This picture must depict a
relationship between two or more individuals that is clearly oppressive.
Clearly A must be oppressing B and this must be clearly portrayed in a
picture which depicts the relationship. The responses individuals make
to the questions asked, are then coded, and a 'score' representing a
stage of consciousness is obtained. The whole process revolves around
what can be clearly seen (with the help of an instrument). Since in-
terpretation is forbidden one only looks for what is manifest. Having
begun the process to check its validity as an instrument, the authors
say that the code still requires much work, to avoid potential 'dis-
tortions' or 'error'. However there is cause for optimism about the
code's capacity to report out brute data.
Thus it is considered worthwhile by them to focus considerable
intellectual activity on the further development of the code. In fact
it is about to be used to measure the 'growth' which takes place amongst
participants in a $180,000 project funded by H.E.W. The kind of intel-
lectual activity people will engage in is determined by the initial in-
I
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sistence upon obtaining brute data. Subject and object will have to be
dichotomized, and in this fashion a whole world of social reality will
be missed by the empiricists engaged in such intellectual activity. This
is the realm of ' intersubjective meaning* as Taylor refers to it, which
cannot be broken down to the subjective feelings or thoughts of the indi-
it is simply not measurable or visible at the level of the indi-
yi6^. Rather, it is the taken for granted reality that is shared by
a people as a result of their growing up in the same socio-political
reality. I will clarify this notion now by referring to Taylor, after
which I will further take up some of the Alschuler et. al . efforts to
make sense of social reality.
Intersubjective Reality
There is a realm of practices which cannot be understood in isola-
tion from the vocabulary used to describe them. That is, the language
we use is constitutive of practice and vice-versa, the practices are
constitutive of the vocabulary. The one without the other v/ould com-
pletely change the nature of reality itself. Taylor calls on John Searle's
discussion of constitutive rules. Searle distinguishes between regula-
tive rules in a game of soccer for example, and constitutive rules. Regu-
lative rules are those which will keep the game going and even if these
rules did not exist the game could continue. In the case of constitu-
tive rules, rules are not separable from behavior. For example, in soccer,
one rule disallows the touching of the ball by everyone but the goalkeeper.
If this rule was done away with, or if everyone broke this rule, there
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would no longer be anything resembling a soccer game; something entirely
different would be occurring (perhaps a game of rugby). The whole range
of behavior recognizable as a game of soccer would disappear with the
disappearance of this single rule. This is to be distinguished from a
rule such as: "the goalkeeper must bounce the ball no more than three
times before kicking it." The game, or the range of behavior which make
up the game, would still be recognizable if the rule were removed.
Similarly with regard to practices human subjects engage in:
Just as there are constitutive rules, i.e., rules that the behav-
ior they govern could not exist without them, and are in this
sense inseparable from that behavior, so I am suggesting that
there are constitutive distinctions, constitutive ranges of lang-
uage which are similarly inseparable, in that certain practices
are not without them.^^
As an example Taylor focusses on the practice of negotiation, which is
one practice central to the way things are done in late capitalist Amer-
ica. Underlying the way negotiation takes place in this particular
society there exists impl icitly a "certain vision of the agent and his
relation to others and to society. In the case of negotiation as-
sumptions about the 'autonomous nature of the individuals' which enter
into 'willed relations' must exist. Corresponding to these assumptions
exist implicit norms "such as that of good faith, or a norm of rational-
ity... or the norm of continued freedom as far as attainable. These
practices require that one's actions and relations be seen in the light
of (these assumptions) and the accompanying norms, good faith, autonomy
and rationality."^^ These assumptions and norms are absent in many other
societies; the result is that the practice of negotiations as we under-
stand it is impossible in these societies.
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It is crucial to understand that what Taylor is referring to is
not a set of ideas in people's heads, which can be classified according
to one criteria or another. "The meanings and norms implicit in these
practices are not just in the minds of the actors, but are out there in
the practices themselves, practices which cannot be conceived of as a
set of individual actions, but which are essentially modes of social
relation, of mutual action . This is the essential point. When re-
ferring to intersubjecti ve meanings Taylor is referring to a realm of
practices and their constitutive language, which is not reducible to the
ideas, opinions, attitudes, a person has about negotiations, or any prac-
tices of a similar nature (i.e., those at the heart of the way a society
conducts itself). This does not deny that an individual does have thoughts,
feelings etc. about social reality, and it is justifiable to refer to
these on an individual level. People do bring these attitudes with them
to negotiating sessions for example, b]^
what they do not bring into negotiations is the set of ideas
and norms constitutive of negotiations themselves. These must
be the common property of the society before there can be any
Question of anyone entering into negotiation or not. Hence they
are not subjective meanings, the property of one or some individ-
uals but rather intersubjective meanings which are constitutive
of the social matrix in which individuals find themselves and
This is not a matter of consensus, of the convergence
of beliefs and
attitudes among individuals. Prior to the existence of
such convergence
(if it exists at all) must exist a common language which
is constitutive
of social practice. Again:
intersubjective meanings are not a matter of ^nverging beliefs
and values. When we speak of consensus v/e
speak of beliefs and
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Vfll UGS which could bG thG propGrty of a singlG porson, or many,
or all; but intGrsubjGctivG moanings could not bG thG proporty’of
a singlG pGrson bGcausG thGy arG rootGd in social practice. 71
Closely connected to this notion of intersubjective meanings is the
notion of common meaning. Again this is a communal concept. Vihen there
are a high number of intersubjective meanings in a given society there
is to be found a set of common meaning which is the basis for community.
Intersubjective meaning gives people a common language to talk
about social reality and a common understanding, but only with
common meanings does this common reference vyorld contain signifi-
cant common actions, celebrations and feelings. These are ob-
jects in the world that everybody shares. This is what makes
community. 72
Thus, for example, the celebration of the American Way, or of the Amer-
ican Revolution results in a celebration called the Bicentennial. It
is absolutely taken for granted by a large number of people that this
could happen and that particular kinds of celebrations are appropriate
as opposed to other kinds. The events have a common meaning for people.
The common meaning is not a sharing of values but that "this shared value
be part of the common world, that this sharing be shared. "73 a common
meaning is often a cause for the most bitter lack of consensus. It is
revealed by the counter demonstrations which occurred on July 4th, staged
by various groups who were infuriated at the interpretation of the Amer-
ican way revealed by the mode of celebration. On the other hand those
who did not participate in the common meaning at all are apathetic to
the Bicentennial events. "We can only be happy or guilty in our own
culture.
Since empiricists are searching for what individual
s
say and think,
and attempt to show correlations to behavior and institutions, their
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epistemology fails to take into account the world of intersubjective
meaning, which remains unarticulated and completely invisible to them.
This is a world of meaning on a communal level, a world, which if it
did not exist would result in a disappearance of the very ranges of
behavior which make up that social world. Since it is a world of mean-
ing, interpretation of the particular meanings is inevitable
. The
epistemological categories of the empiricists "lack the notion of mean-
ing as not simply for the individual subject; of a subject who can be a
'we' as well as an '!'. This exclusion from the communal comes again
from the baleful influence of the epistemological tradition for which
all knowledge has to be reconstructed from the impressions imprinted on
the single subject. "^5 j^e notion that there is a level of reality,
the communal, which cannot be reduced to single individuals is com-
pletely missed by empiricist epistemology.
The result is that all these studies miss what is most crucial to
comprehend, particularly if one is going to educate for critical con-
sciousness. A critically conscious person knows that revolutionary
education must tap to the core the implicit picture held in common by
people in a society, and engage in problem posing about this picture.
To focus on the explicitly oppressive, for instance (because it lends
itself to instruments) and the effort to measure consciousness (the
feelings and opinions people have in response to the explicitly
political)
in order to make changes in the individual's feelings and
thoughts about
the situation, is to forever miss the point. A critically
conscious
individual understands the notion that "we are aware of
the world through
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a 'we* before we are through an 'V.-76 Hence it is necessary to make
the distinction between what is known to individuals and what is part of
the commonly shared, taken for granted world, and the underlying assump-
tions which exist about the relations between the individual and the
world, which have vast implications for all ranges of social practice.
Alschuler's coding system simply cannot do this because, in the name of
breaking the interpretive cycle, he has created an instrument which can
only find out what individuals see, hear and feel about explicit pol-
itically oppressive relationships. This way of seeing informs other
efforts undertaken by Alschuler to make sense of social reality. It is
these to which we now turn.
The Social Literacy Project's Efforts to Understand and Act Upon Reality
The Social Literacy project (a name which allies the project with
Freire's work) is engaged in 'consciousness raising'! It is called the
social literacy project because "like all types of literacy we are inter-
ested in reading reality, understanding it better, and taking informed
action. These efforts are heavily informed by empiricist epistemolog-
ical categories and thus in every case will conform to failures others
in this tradition have displayed. So far I have only referred to one of
the products of this type of thinking— the coding system. The following
is a description of one effort to 'read' reality; following this I will
describe an effort to 'take informed action'.
The project personnel have been hard at work at a Springfield Junior
High School, where they have spent nearly four years. Two of these years
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were spent in an effort to diagnose the problem as they saw it. "Over
a two year period it has become increasingly clear that the central issue
in this school is the central issue in many schools. It may vary in de-
tail from place to place, but it falls under what is generally identi-
fied as the 'discipline problem'. Consequently as part of their effort
to educate for social literacy, techniques have been established for the
overcoming of the 'discipline problem', as well as for discovering
'stress' that people within schools may be experiencing. These techniques
are intended to focus on the system of interactions which occurs betv;een
student and teacher, teacher and administration and are hailed as vic-
timizing none of the above. When people have discovered how they play
according to the implicit rules of a self defeating game (ala Eric Berne)
they will concentrate on transforming the rules rather than blame each
other. In addition, other techniques are being developed (to be distri-
buted across the country) which, when properly used in accordance with
a good diagnostic instrument, will contribute to the overcoming of the
discipline problem, result in system change and hopefully raise con-
sciousness (as measured by the code). In making this diagnosis the
'team' divorced 'discipline' from the rest of reality. The problem of
discipline is treated as if there is no reality outside of the school
and classrooms in which the problem is occurring. Thus the solutions
which are developed all contain the result of this limited view of the
problem. It is the set of interactions between student and teacher,
teacher and principal which is called 'system change'. The failure
to
include in the consideration of 'how to solve the discipline
problem
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considGration of thG puGstion 'why doGS a disciplinG problGm Gxist at
all in AmGrica in 1976?' wipGS out potGntial for any roal 'systom chango'.
In pGriods likG ours wg must rGmGmbGr that thG bGst will to
crGatG somGthing usGful may rosult in its oppositG simply
bGcausG it is blind to what liGS boyond thG limits of its scion-
tific spGciality or profGssion, bGcausG it focussGS on what is
noarGSt at hand and misconstruGS its truG naturG, for thG lattGr
can only bG rGVGalGd in thG largGr contGxt.79
A singlG school participates in the larger social structure--Amer-
ican Education, which has a history; this history is part and parcel of
an ongoing American history. How is it possible to get a grasp on the
underlying meaning behind the discipline problem without referring to
the overall context of American society? What is the relationship of
this discipline problem to the peculiar fact that, even in the light of
nine percent unemployment (conservatively speaking), the American people
seem so well behaved (i.e., do not rebel)? What is the relationship of
the discipline problem to the apparent breakdown of the family in Amer-
ica--the disappearance of the father? What implications does the fact
of the distant or the non-existent father have for how children relate
to authority? Why is there such a peculiar raging against authority
amongst American youth, on the one hand, and distancing from it on the
other?^^ Surely in any discussion of discipline which purports to be
about 'social literacy', the issue of authority and how to interpret
it in America in 1976 needs to be raised. But none of these questions
lend themselves to a check list which will record how many minutes stu-
dents pay attention to the teacher, or how often the teacher raises the
voice, or how many referrals there have been to the main office. Thus
they do not t asked. Yet until there has clearly been some discussion
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about the interrelationship between a single problem in a small milieu,
and the larger social context, and its context in history, all we have
is flat analysis. The solutions which are developed are the product of
this flat analysis. I am not suggesting that because the whole should
be taken into account in developing solutions that one should not act;
it is possible to act as well as to reflect more deeply. I am saying
that any solution which wishes to bear the name of revolutionary educa-
tion or 'social literacy' must at least show that the solutions which
are developed are the products of reflective thinking which involve ex-
tensive coherent interpretation of the nature of social reality based
upon a theory of the individual in dialectic relationship to nature and
history. Solutions which do not show the product of this kind of think-
ing but which focus instead on solving the discipline problem, in iso-
lation from the world cannot pretend to be about the task of systemic
change or social literacy. Nor can they claim to be the work of critical
thinkers in the sense that Freire uses the term.
Social Literacy implies the capacity to think deeply about the
causes of a problem which is occurring on a social level. We are not
developing literacy on this level when we solve interactional problems.
If the authors were educating for social literacy there would be some
effort to educate people tov/ard a better understanding between the part
and the whole, an understanding that is entirely missing in the discus-
sion of the 'discipline problem'. Freire is replete with the same
mes-
sage:
When men lack critical understanding of their real ity , appre-
hending it in fragments which they do not perceive as interacting
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constituent elements of the whole, they cannot know that reality.®^
or
If we underestimate either the superstructure or infra structure
it will be impossible to explain the social structure itself.
Social structure is not an abstraction; it exists in the dialec-
tic between super and infra structures. Failing to understand
this dialectic, we will not understand the dialectic of change
and permanence as the expression of the social structure.
The study of the Springfield school is a fragment; it is an abstrac-
tion. Like the coding system it fails to appreciate the significance of
dialectic thinking, which does not lead easily and quickly to simple
practical solutions, and must make do with continuing interpretations.
This abstracted thinking stands firmly in the American empiricist tra-
dition; it shows no interest in history and social philosophy in an
effort to make sense of social reality. "To the literary empiricist
writing balanced little essays, first on this and then on that, any
attempt to 'see it whole' often seems an extremist exaggeration."^^ The
whole thrust of Freire's work suggests that education which has any hope
of leading tov^ard critical consciousness must make the effort to 'see it
whole', and understand the parts within the context. 'It is the whole
that is true, and the whole which is false.'
The response from the Literacy project to what I have said here
may well bei 'well we are after all achieving something, the number of
referrals to the principal's office is reduced; students and teachers are
both less victimized than they were before.' This would not change by
a single iota what I have argued here. I am insisting that the
idea that
'system change' is occurring is an illusion; in this case large
numbers
of people are involved in the illusion. There is a
difference between
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helping the victims of the social order cope better with the consequences
of participating in a social structure (schooling in America) that is
obviously in trouble, and declaring that the system has changed. The
notions of radical education, or 'pedagogy of the oppressed' or 'edu-
cation for critical consciousness' are emptied of their content. It
is crucial that the differences between helping the sick feel better or
cope better (therapy) and getting to the cause of the problem be main-
tained. The A1 Schuler message smacks of that too familiar American
technique of announcing to the world that techniques for the cure of
problems have been discovered, and that all we need now are willing and
eager participants, and a new age will be ushered in.
The final evidence (if any more is needed) of how radically Freire's
theory has been emasculated is contained at the end of one of Alschuler's
articles on the discipline problem. He argues that once clear objectives
have been established, the appropriate technique to use, since it has
been shown to work as well as the others, but faster, is Behavior Modifi-
cation (or IBM's Interdependent Behavior Modification) The only prob-
lem with Behavior Mod is that it has been used for the wrong ends before.
Now that we are developing the right ends it is to behavior mod that we
turn, to hasten the process. This is one among a number of techniques
which are being gathered together, probably soon to be published in the
form of a handbook, to aid in the development of social literacy.
The techniques are glossy games such as 'stress hunt' or a sequence
of different techniques under the headings of 'name it; frame it; aim
it;' and others. The argument for the use and development of these
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techniques is that teachers in the schools do not want theory, they
want practical techniques which will work; the theory would be presented
to them later almost certainly in the emasculated form of the coding
system. Thus Freire has been jazzed up so that people will never have
to think they are doing anything other than having 'fun'. Critical
consciousness will seep in while the fun continues. I am not being
facetious here. Freire's notion of co-investigation of reality (see
below) is reduced to 'stress hunt'; the image is one of a group of
people out hunting for stress. It is my conviction that the packaging
of Freire into a set of techniques, one day to become a handbook, is
the ultimate domestication of his work. In addition it will fail to
produce the results that a truer following of Freire might in fact
produce, although not necessarily on as grand a scale.
The world of intersubjective reality is never taken into account
because it does not lend itself to interpretive free data; this world
can only be 'seen' by those who are prepared to face up to the inevita-
bility of interpretation--interpretation which is based upon a theory
of the whole, which in turn depends upon a grasp of historical and
philosophical concepts. But something must happen to this intersub-
jective reality when empiricists attempt to 'read' and act upon reality.
It is too large a dimension to simply be ignored. What does happen is
that it falls into the taken for granted sphere and is seen as an in-
evitable fact—much like the natural world. The following is an example
of how this occurs, and what its consequences are.
In addition to helping people read reality better, the trainees
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in the social literacy project 'practice blaming the system for our
problems and exonerating all individuals who are victimized. One
of the ways these practice sessions take place is via a game called
the 'discipline game'. In the 'discipline game' one hundred frequently
occurring classroom conflicts are presented--and players, in the roles
of teachers and students, must attempt to resolve these in 'three minute
negotiating sessions'. Not only do players 'earn points' in this game
'in direct proportion to the effectiveness of their bargaining', but
the 'negotiations themselves often facilitate the discovery of under-
lying radical causes and solutions to these problems
,
(my emphasis)'®^
We even get more explicit information about the way in which players
earn more points by studying the rules of the 'discipline game'. The
following is taken directly from the rules:
-1 Any negotiations that result in increased misunderstanding,
anger, hostility or conflict.
0 Any negotiations which end in a stalemate, without apparent
willingness to bargain in good faith, seek compromise or
allow the other party in the negotiations any way to meet
their needs. Either party in the negotiations may produce a
"0" rating for the total negotiations by the unwillingness to
enter open, serious negotiations.
+1 At minimum, both parties in the negotiations must demonstrate
serious intentions to find a mutually agreeable solution by
their willingness to listen, to consider seriously the other's
point of viev/, needs and proposed solutions. The negotiating
parties do not need to decide on a mutually agreeable solution
to earn a +1 rating. However, if players abdicate their self
-
interests a s defined in the situation and basis for negotiation ,
the negotiations can only be rated 0 .
+2 In addition to the characteristics of a +1 negotiation, the parties
must reach a clear, mutually agreed upon solution to earn a +2.
Solutions must reflect a way to satisfy clearly stated different
needs of both teacher and students to earn a +2 rating.
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This is an excellent example of how the failure to take intersub-
jective meanings that are specific to this society at this time into
account leads the social literacy personnel to actually bring the heart
of the 'system' more deeply into the classroom than ever before. This,
in the name of uncovering radical causes of problems. I will now explain
this.
The reader is reminded of the earlier discussion on negotiations,
based upon the Taylor article. "Our whole notion of negotiation is
bound up, for instance, with the distinct identity and autonomy of the
parties, with the willed nature of their relations; it is a very contract-
ual notion. "88 These are the notions of the agent in his relationship
to society and to his fellows, implicit and at the heart of the social
practice called negotiations. These implicit notions, and the concom-
itant social practices, are precisely what we need to investigate, under-
stand, and do something about if v/e seriously want to talk of radical
causes and radical change. Since the empiricist epistemological grid is
unable to see this level of reality however, it is accepted as part of
the given; it is taken for granted much as one takes the natural world
for granted. But it is precisely "the vision of a society based upon
negotiations" which most needs examination, as well as the "attendant
norms of rationality and the definition of autonomy."®^ If, as a society
we are to make radical changes, we need to consider other kinds of visions
which have implications for altogether different kinds of social prac-
tices. There are societies, for instance, in which the social practice
of negotiations and the concomitant view of the individual in relation
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to society, do not exist. There may be ethnic groupings in the Spring-
field school for whom negotiation-based relationships are entirely anti-
thetical to an implicit agent/other view they hold of the world. Yet
Alschuler et. al . not only fail to take this aspect of reality into ac-
count; they encourage people to become proficient at it by having them
earn points if they do it well! So the token economy enters even more
deeply into the classroom as well. The students and teachers playing these
games are being perfectly prepared to accept, as given, late capitalist
America, where people will bargain in good faith, keep up their contracts,
and be desirous of earning (and buying) more and more goodies. And the
students in this case are going to be well-behaved, since they will no
longer be a discipline problem. What more could one ask especially of
an effort which is about education for social literacy?
And what has generally happened is that the interdependent pro-
ductive and negotiating society, has been recognized by (mainstream)
social science, but not as one structure of intersubjective mean-
ing among others, rather as the inescapable background of social
action as such. In this guise it need no longer be an object of
study. Rather it retreats to the middle distance where its general
outline takes the role of a universal framev/ork, within which (it
is hoped) actions and structures will be brute data identifiable and
this for any society at any time. 90
In schools around the country a social order has broken down. People
are literally not in any kind of organic communal relationship with each
other. A major breakdown of authority and generations is taking place.
The relationship between people is not one of a common purposes and prin-
ciples, with concomitant mutual respect. Rather the relationships are
of a purely instrumental and legal nature. A system change would es-
tablish some deep sense of mutuality in purpose, aim and relationship
no
between generations. Alschuler deepens and seals what is, with a stamp
of approval and good times to be had by all.
Method has been abstracted as if it simply hangs suspended and has
nothing to do with a specific culture and a specific people and has no
effect in and of itself on how people think. That is, we do live in a
society where technique and technology have a history. That history is
embedded in the way people view technology and in the kind of thinking
that a heavily technologized society has produced. In the case of the
United States 'knowing inevitably becomes know-how. It is instru-
mental thinking which has become the strongest buttress against critical
thinking in this country. It has resulted in the debasement of know-
ledge and critical reasoning power, and has led to an ever growing de-
mand for the quick easy, practical solution. Instrumental thinking
occurs at the level of intersubjective meaning in this country, it is
part of the social world which is the taken for granted reality shared
on a wide scale by American. "There is always an arrow which de-problem-
atizes the situation. . .they are among thousands of directional signals
in a technological society which, introjected by men hinder their capac-
ity for critical thinking. "92 To create more techniques for the devel-
opment of critical consciousness is once again to deny the possibility
for it to develop.
Technological progress has helped to make it even easier to
cement old illusions more firmly and to introduce new ones
into the minds of men without the interference of reason.
To respond to the demands for practical solutions to problems
teachers experience in the classroom by creating new brightly dressed
I
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techniques is not to develop critical consciousness. Instead we must
consider ways to show how theory, philosophy and history actually
can provide clues to our most difficult problems. Even though this
would not guarantee quick twenty minute solutions they would be the
only possible steps toward critical consciousness.
The rejection of computational reasoning does not mean and should
not mean rejection of reason, to be replaced by feelings or a
return to nature; it requires to resurrect an older and yet new
kind of reason, and also to concentrate our thinking in different
areas
or this time from Freire:
Philosophy is the matrix of the proclamation of a new reality...
cultural action for conscientization is always a utopian enter-
prise. That is why it needs philosophy, without which instead of
denouncing reality and announcing the future, it would fall into
the mystification of ideological knowledge. 95
The bureaucratization (packaging, technicizing, staticizing) of
everything and the concomitant mode of consciousness is at the heart of
our difficulties in America. Critical consciousness in this country
means, among other things, developing the capacity to escape the need
for looking to pre-packaged techniques, and developing instead the capac-
ity to see how problems are linked together; it means developing the
capacity to think to the roots of problems, which means being able to
recognize the world of intersubjective meanings in which we live, but
so rarely reflect upon. Setting up a package of techniques to facili-
tate this process must fail. Using these techniques may solve the im-
mediate difficulties people are facing, but again we should be under
no illusion that they achieve anything else.
It has been argued throughout that at the very heart of the problems
112
of the social literacy effort is the failure to comprehend the signif-
icance of the dialectical relationship of subject and object. This in
turn has caused these theorists to omit the importance of dialectic logic,
historical and comparitive analysis, philosophy, and the need for inter-
pretation. This failure on the part of the social literacy project per-
sonnel can be understood. Freire himself provides pertinent clues:
Distinct from specialities to which we are not opposed, special-
isms narrow the area of knowledge in such a way that the so-called
'specialists' become generally incapable of thinking. Because they
have lost the vision of the whole of which their 'speciality' is
only one dimension, they cannot even think correctly in the area of
their special izati on. 96
In this case the 'specialism' is psychology. The authors hardly ever
refer to any scholars other than psychologists. All references are to
individuals or interactional patterns (a close analogy would be patterns
as they occur between marriage partners). Discussion on the realm of
the social, or the historical is non-existent, as is any reference to
social theorists. Discussion on the level of the social must search for
intersubjective meanings; the 'subject' in this case is a community, not
an individual. Freire goes further:
The only authentic points of departure for the scientific know-
ledge of reality are the dialectical relationship between men and
the world, and the critical comprehension of how these relation-
ships are evolved and how they in turn condition men's perception
of concrete reality. 97
Freire is unequivocal here. One cannot claim to be applying his theory
without at least taking up this challenge. The only way to explain why
the project personnel did not take it up is that they literally did not
see these v/ords; phrases such as these are opaque to the empiricists
in
the same way and for the same epistemological reasons that they do not
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'see' the intersubjective world. When they read texts they also only
look for those phrases which can be proven or disproven. They abstract
these from the heart of the theory. One result is that people are no
longer making the considerable effort needed to understand the theory by
reading widely in history and social theory; rather the problems they
take up are how to measure consciousness more precisely, or how to hunt
for stress more excitingly.
Summary and Conclusions
I have tried to argue that Freire must be interpreted within the
intellectual tradition he so clearly stands--that of critical theory.
Critical theory is critical of particular assumptions about the nature
of man, the relationships between man and man, between man and history
and culture, which dominate liberal theory and society. These assump-
tions are constitutive of many different kinds of practices. One such
practice is empiricist social science. To attempt to incorporate
Freire' s theory into an empiricist framework in the name of doing away
with the ambiguity replete in his work, is to display an ignorance of
his intellectual tradition and its relationship to empiricism; it is
to display an ignorance of the nature of theory. One cannot simply
lift concepts from one framework and expect them to have the same mean-
ing v/hen placed in another, especially when that other is precisely
what Freire is trying to refute. The cost is to remove exactly that
which is most cutting about Freire's theory. Freire attempts to refute
the assumptions at the core of liberal mentality and practice. To use
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words taken from his theory, while continuing those practices is to
annihilate the meaning of Freire's theory—meaning which can only be
grasped through interpretation, based upon readings in social theory and
history (i.e., the kind of reading which so clearly influenced Freire
himself). What is lacking here is a 'theoretical self-consciousness',
a notion which is discussed at length in Chapter V.
I have made another claim in this chapter: that the empiricists'
effort to comprehend social reality fails in fundamental ways, and that
the hermeneutical effort is far more worthy of our attention. The em-
piricists' wish to break the hermeneutical circle, arguing that there is
too much ambiguity when one relies upon interpretation and insight. Ac-
cording to the empiricist one can only claim that something is true when
we know it to be so beyond doubt
,
i.e., unambiguously. The hermeneuti-
cal position does not claim that one can know the truth beyond doubt,
but does insist that their effort to knovy social reality is the more in-
sightful method, the one less likely to lead to delusion. I have attempted
to show how those efforts to make sense of the nature of social reality
from the empiricists' perspective misses what is most fundamental. The
criteria for what constitutes the better argument are of course devel-
oped from within the hermeneutical framework. One must accept the in-
evitability of having to make interpretations when engaged in the anal-
ysis of human activity, in order to accept the criteria. The following
from Charles Taylor sums up the point:
The superiority of one position over another will thus consist in^
this, that from the more adequate position one can understand one s
own stand and that of one's opponents; not the other way around.
It
goes without saying that this argument can only have weight for
those in the superior position. 98
115
FOOTNOTES
^Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed
, p. 74.
^Ibid., p. 86.
3lbid., p. 81.
^Postscript to French edition of Pedagogy, op. cit.
Spreire, op. cit., p. 87.
^Ibid., p. 88.
^Postscript to the French edition, op. cit.
^Quoted in William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (N.Y.; George
Brazil lier Inc.), p. 204.
^Philip Slater, Earthv/al
k
(N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1974).
^^Ibid., p. 58.
^^Ibid., p. 79.
^^Ibid., p. 78.
^^Ibid., p. 61.
l^Ibid.
^^Siqmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (N.Y.: W.W. Norton
& Co., 1961), p. 62.
16ibid.
17ibid.
l^Alexander Mitscherlich, Society Without the Father , translated by
Eric Mosbacher (N.Y.: Schocken Books, 1970), p. 47^
19ibid.
,
p. 42.
20sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (N.Y.:
W.W. Norton & Co., 1965), p. 80. (emphasis mine).
116
21
Freire. Pedagogy
, p. 118.
22lbid.
,
p. 100.
^
23Bud. L. Hall, "Participatory Research: An
in Convergence
,
Vol
. VII, No. 2, (1975) p. 30.
Approach for Change,"
24Freire, op. cit., p. 103. my emphasis.
^Spreire, Education for Critical Consciousness
, p. 137.
^^Ibid.j p. 14. emphasis mine.
Aaron Cicourel, "The Ethnomethodological Paradigm," in P
Dreitzel ed. Recent Sociology No. 2 (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1970), p. 26*.
^^R. Unger, Knowledge and Politics
, p. 8.
pq
Alfred Schutz, "Some Leading Concepts of Phenomenology," from
unpublished collection Hampshire College, Amherst, Mass.
30lbid.
Spradley and D.W. McCurdy, The Cultural Experience: Ethnography
in a Complex Society (Chicago: Aldine, 1972), p. 9.
^^Ibid., p. 8.
^3'lbid., p. 12.
^^Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness
, p. 43. emphasis mine.
^^A certain attitude is involved here which only few people are wise
enough to hold. The idea expressed by Freud captures the essence of this
attitude: "Only a man who really knows is modest, for he knows how insuf-
ficient his knowledge is." Sigmund Freud, Question of Lay Analysis (W.W.
Norton & Co., 1969), p. 73. Freire means the same thing when he says
"Knowledge begins with the awareness of knowing little." in Education
for Critical Consciousness
, p. 119. This attitude is close to the heart
of what it means to be critically conscious, c.f. to Alschuler and Smith's
version of critical consciousness appearing on p.84aof this dissertation.
Mention of this attitude is noticeably absent; it is not measurable.
^^Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of
Real ity : A treatise on the sociology of knowledge (Garden City: Anchor
Books
, 1967), p. 12.
117
^^Spradley and McCurdey, p. 68.
%everyn Bruyn, The Human Perspective in Sociology : The Methodology
of Participant Observation (N.J.: Prentice Hall. Tnr p 15°, 185^
on
"’^See Sigmund Freud, The Outline of Psychoanalysis fN Y • w w
Norton & Co., 1949), p. 3^ ^
^^See Michael Maccobby, "Literacy for the Favelas," Science, (vol.172.
May 14, 1971), p. 673.
^^Postscript to French edition of Pedagogy
.
^^See Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," from Connolly
and Gordon (eds.), op. cit., pp. 16-40.
^^C. Wright Mi 11s, The Sociological Imagination
,
op. cit., p. 184.
^^P. Frei re. Pedagogy
, p. 120.
^^Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness
, p. 163.
^^Ibid., p. 105.
47Freire, Pedagogy
,
p. 117. my emphasis.
48Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness
,
p. 55., footnote.
^^Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review
of Metaphysics (Vol . XXV, No. 1., Sept. 1971), pp. 3-51.
SOlbid., p. 11.
Sllbid., p. 16.
52ibid., p. 11.
S^Alfred Alschuler, Introduction to William Smith: The Meaning of
Conscientizacao : the goal o f Paulo Frei re's pedagogy (Center for Inter-
national Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1976), p. vi
.
S^William Smith, The Meaning of Conscientizaca o: the goal of Paulo^
Frei re's pedagogy (Center for International Education, University of Mas-
sachusetts, Amherst, 1976). All words in guotes appear at various points
in this work.
118
^^Alschuler, op. c1t., p. v.
56smith, op. cit., p. 5.
57
Ibid., p. 8., emphasis mine.
^^Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (London: Oxford
University Press, 1958), p. 39.
59Smith, op. cit., p. 2.
60lbid., p. 6.
\ ^^Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom
, p. 22. The views expressed
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tam Books, 1972), p. 143. Erich Fromm, writing about B.F. Skinner, could
have been speaking to Alschuler and Smith: "...his political and social
naivete can make him write sometimes more convincingly (and confusedly)
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Alfred Alschuler, unpublished manuscript. University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, Mass.
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"The School Game: Playing Without Losers,"
Social Literacy Project, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass.,p. 10.
This is an excellent example of the Alschuler team's inability to com-
prehend, or work within, the dialectic; they move here from one pole--
the focus on the individual only, to the other--the focus on the group
only. This position allies them with both the positivist Marxists and
B.F. Skinner. Both schools do away completely with the concrete human
subject; in fact they have no theory of the human subject (in the case
of behaviorism only behavior is seen, not the behaving person). The re-
lationship of this position and all else that constitutes the social liter-
acy project and the similarities to neobehaviorism make political and
historical sense:
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''Skinner believes that man is malleable, subject to social
influences, and that nothinQ in his 'nature' can be considered
to be a final obstacle to development toward a peaceful and
just society. Thus his system attracts those psychologists
who are liberals and who find in Skinner's system an argument
to defend their political optimism. He appeals to those who
believe that desirable social goals like peace and equality are
not just rootless ideals, but can be established in reality.
The whole idea that one can 'design' a better society on a
scientific basis appeals to many who earlier might have been
socialists... Is not Skinner's way particularly attractive
to a point in history when the political solution seems to
have failed and revolutionary hopes are at their lowest?"
(E. Fromm, op. cit., p. 63).
An example of a different position to the one adopted by Alschuler is
given by Allen Wheel is; the complex dialectic between subject and object
is maintained. Neither pole is collapsed into the other:
Wheel is has just seen a man strike his son in the face: "It's
not hard to understand him. We can fill in a twisted and vic-
timized life, can take a point of view from which he must be
seen with as much sympathy as we now see his child. But to
understand is not to forgive--not unless we regard that which
we understand as being inalterably determined, in which case
all is indeed absurd, for our reactions, whether of blame or
forgiveness, would then be as determined as those of him whom
we judge. However unfortunate his own childhood he yet is re-
sponsible, in the view of all who believe in freedom, for not
inflicting such a childhood on his own son." Wheel is. The Mor-
alist (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 18.
86ibid., p. 13.
^^From the rules of "The Discipline Game," (Social Literacy Project,
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass, 1976).
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CHAPTER IV
The epoch in which we live can count as one of its great achieve-
ments the creation of technology which has the potential of liberating
mankind from being totally absorbed by the demands of Mature. That is,
it is now possible for large numbers of people (in the west) to be lib-
erated from toil, from total involvement in making sure that there is
enough food on the table and a roof overhead. In many respects the prob-
lem facing those of us who inherit these possibilities is how to make
them count . For at the moment they do not. We only have achieved one
part of the equation. We have the technological capacity for a life
that is less miserable. Yet we are prisoners of the purposes, prin-
ciples, assumptions which are at the heart of this era's achievement.
Problems of boredom, dull routine jobs, overpopulation, are the products
of our 'advances'. More of the same will not help us respond to these
diff icul ties
.
Yet we continue to act as if each new technological achievement should
be greeted with the same acclaim as the first. So the Mew York Times
speaks of the 'Viking miracle', and a scientist intimately involved in
the Mars project speaks disparagingly of those who are apathetic about
the accomplishment. Of course it is a great achievement, but the nature
of the achievement is equivalent to Pele the brilliant soccer player
scoring yet another brilliant goal, and receiving yet another accolade
for his achievement, including an increase in salary. It would be an
entirely different kind of achievement if Pele suddenly became a chess
champion. The western world similarly could only really claim profound
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achievement if there was a recognition of how limited an achievement
the technological miracles in fact are--unless another achievement of a
completely different sort is attained.
The technological advances we have made must be seen in their proper
light. They are painfully small. There is a real question whether the
telephone operator s daily activities are an advance over the Indian's
daily preparations of an animal trap. As a result of our technological
advances we no longer need to spend all our time getting food. Neither
can many of us go back to the Indian's way of life. There are too many
of us as a result of our discoveries in birth control and death control.
The real happiness our technological age has brought us is succinctly
described by Freud:
The voice of pessimistic criticism makes itself heard and v/arns
us that most of these satisfactions (of technological advance)
follow the model of the 'cheap enjoyment' extolled in the anecdote--
the enjoyment obtained by putting a bare leg from under the bed-
clothes on a cold winter night and drawing it in again.
1
Freud goes on to give a concrete example of the apparent rather than
real advances we have made:
What is the use of reducing infant mortality when it is precisely
that reduction which imposes the greatest restraint on us in be-
getting children so that taken all around vie nevertheless rear no
more children than in the days before the reign of hygiene, while
at the same time we have created difficult conditions for our sex-
ual life in marriage, and have probably worked against the bene-
ficial effects of natural selection. And, finally what good to us
is a long life if it is difficult and barren of joys, and if it is
so full of misery that we can only welcome death as a deliverer.*^
A new era which hopes to make our technological advances count for
something vn‘11 have a very different set of purposes, principles, and
assumptions which dominate it. These assumptions would attempt to solve
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the problems of equal i ty of life, of how to more equitably redistribute
resources; it would have as one of its central purposes the education
of the civilized human being, not conforming, consuming human beings.
The civilized man would strive to live the life of the mind, a notion
that is broader than intellectual activity. It is a life not divorced
from passion. The use of the critical intelligence would be a highly
valued attribute in such a society. A society governed by an aim to
educate its people for critical consciousness would hold a theory of
the human subject which recognizeed latent as well as manifest aspects
of the person, unlike liberal theory which only recognizes what is mani-
fest. Obviously we are terrifyingly far away from a society committed
to such a theory. We remain giants in our degree of technological mas-
tery and pygmies in our knowledge of how to build such a society. The
point is that so much of our effort is geared toward increasing our tech-
nological know how and hardware, and relatively so little toward the es-
tablishment of the kind of society of which I talk. If there is to be
the conquering of radically different frontiers then there would be no
time, no effort, no resources available for finding out whether there
is life on Mars or not. This does not mean that we do away with tech-
nology. It means that the continuous output of more and more gadgetry
would no longer occur. It means that technological production would
not be the motive force of society.
Yet most Americans believe that their society at basis is fine;
they cannot conceive of a society ordered along fundamentally different
lines. The assumptions and principles driving American society are
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taken as given by the great majority of Americans. Many of these Amer-
icans have graduated from American colleges. In their four years (or
more) as students their propensity to conform has been assured. The
research that has been done on the effect of colleges on American stu-
dents overwhelmingly confirms this fact.^
But, paradoxically, one of the few institutions in the United
States which can do a great deal to keep alive a questioning, non-con-
forming critical group is the University. The task must always be how
to enhance this aspect of the University. This becomes especially obvious
and necessary in the light of what has been said above. The liberal era
is dying a slow death. The end may be sudden or catastrophic. A new
age may be heralded by a series of revolutions. It is obviously impos-
sible to predict what form or forms this ending will take. As an educa-
tor one must attempt to set the seeds for the kind of era which will e-
merge. As an educator one must try to educate for 'critical conscious-
ness', because only critically conscious individuals have much hope of
coping with the profound tensions of a transitional age. And hopefully
it will be critically conscious thinkers who will be laying the theoreti-
cal groundwork for a new and different kind of era. There are various
ways of nurturing the development of critical consciousness among stu-
dents. Some of them may have nothing to do with the explicit study of
social issues whatsoever.^ Freire's educational theory provides one
seminal way to develop critically conscious students. In this disser-
tation I am focussing on two different groups for whom application of
Freire's theory could have radical implications. The first group is
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the large number of relatively unsophisticated students, particularly
Freshmen who typically come to the University and it is this group which
will be the focus of the next chapter. Another group are educators them-
selves and some ideas about how to educate for critical consciousness for
this group will be presented in the final chapter.
Freire's successes came as a result of his conducting literacy
training programs for formally uneducated peasants in Latin America.
His aim was to help peasants to learn to read and to write from the in-
side out . That is, by beginning at the core of why they could not read
or write and developing ways to dialogue about these core issues, insights
would be precipitated which sometimes produced dramatic results. Start-
ing from the inside out meant knowing the basic assumptions these pea-
sants made about man, his relation to nature, culture, history, and his
fellov/ men and women. It also meant knowing how these assumptions were
articulated--the thought language reality of the people. By re-present-
ing to the peasants (using pictures for non-literate groups) some of
these assumptions in the form of a problem to be solved by them
,
they
(the peasants) could begin to make their own connections about complex
phil osophic issues such as the relationship between thought and action,
the historical and situational forces responsible for one's situation
in the world, the differences between nature and culture, man and animal.
These insights produced radical changes in how the peasants viewed them-
selves, and produced great changes in the way they wrote (and thought)
and the speed with v/hich they learned to read and write. Freire's v;ork
with these formally uneducated people provides a powerful model for a very
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similar group who come to college.
Freshmen who come to college do so at a significant time in their
lives. They have lived for too long under the wing of their parents, and
in the midst of stultifying small town and high school cliques (one major
exception which comes to mind are the inner-city freshmen who attend city
colleges). College represents a chance to finally break from home and
enter the larger society. It is also a time of transition between adol-
escence and adulthood, a time of flux and potential reformulation. "It
stands to reason that late adolescence is the most favorable period, and
late adolescent personalities of any age group the best subjects, for
indoctrination; because in adolescence an ideological realignment is
by necessity in process and a number of ideological possibilities are
waiting to be hierarchically ordered by opportunity, leadership and
friendship."^ As I have already said, for too many this is a time when
the potential for reformulation is rather hopelessly missed; the forces
which most strongly socialize most college freshmen are peer forces.^
Contact with challenging ideas from more mature adults who share at the
same time a degree of adolescent unfinishedness, is virtually entirely
missing. In addition, instead of providing the freshmen or sophomore with
a range of possible ways in which he or she could take on large doses of
responsibility, the University presents a finished, hard set of rules
enforced by a distant bureaucracy. The Hazen report on the entering
freshmen is testimony to the missed opportunity for minds to be truly
opened.^
One of the highest achievements of the liberal era is the id_e£ of
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a democracy. A democratic state was to be one where injustice propogated
upon the many by the few was going to be halted forever by granting re-
presentation to the people. But the idea was predicated upon tv/o assump-
tions: that the many would participate substantially in the affairs of
society, and that they would have to develop the critical intelligence
to do so. Those who took the idea of a democracy seriously realized that
if the idea was to maintain its cutting edge, the people would have to
be educated to be critical, to resist the various forces which would
attempt to re-establish rule by and for the few. A true democracy has
sufficient belief in the notion of government by, for, and of the peo-
ple that it would wish its socializing agencies to graduate people whose
critical faculties were alive. A democracy in the true sense of the
word requires that its populace be political beings in the traditional
(Aristotelian) sense of that idea. That is, they are not true citizens
if they are not intimately involved in how their society goes about its
activities. In contrast to this, and as has been stated so often, we
have a society in which the dominating principle is to find ways to
make sure its citizenry do not achieve critical thought and action. The
aim is to create a populace which will consume more. For consumption
of the sort required for the American economy to grow, to take place
at all, requires that minds not be critically sharp and alert, but
dulled and receptive.
It is this attitude to the world that one is likely to find amongst
a typical group of college freshmen. It is liable to be one of those
aspects at the heart of their fram.ework of reality. Yet an education
129
which would address the set of assumptions that underly such an attitude
must not at one and the same time simply change the subject matter, while
still maintaining and hardening consumer passivity--(for a group of stu-
dents whose passion to learn has already been awakened, this argument does
not apply. I will describe the approach appropriate for such a group in
the final chapter). It is not enough to start berating the students for
being passive and consumer-like, urging them toward alternative action.
An example might capture my meaning more clearly.
I was once teaching a special group of 'gifted' high school stu-
dents, mostly from white middle and upper class suburbia. The class was
ostensibly about community studies . One morning after struggling for
weeks to find some way of getting beyond the dulled, but hopeful faces,
I showed a video tape of one segment of Bronowski's The Ascent of Man
,
which has recently been shown on the educational television network.
This particular segment ends with Bronowski ankle deep in the mud of
Auschwitz; he ends his long discussion of the dangers of absolute cer-
tainty by saying, "We must learn to touch each other." I watched my
students closely at this point, and nearly all of them had a look on
their face that was vaguely familiar to me. Suddenly, and with shock,
I realized that this was the same look that came over them when they
watched Hogan's Heroes every evening before dinner. Most of the stu-
dents were watching just another television show. In order for me to
establish dialogue with these students, in order for me to make myself
more clearly understood, I would need to know much more about the mean-
j ng of having grown up in v/hite middle class suburbia, the meaning of
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being an adolescent both in the psychological as well as the social
sense. And above and beyond this I should know first hand exactly what
the thought language reality of the students is. I know now that it
makes no sense to show a television show to such a group, no matter what
the content of the show. (It woul
d
make sense to view a television show
if the explicit purpose was to discuss passivity and its effects).
So we cannot simply present to the students an alternative way of
viewing the world. They will not understand what we are talking about.
Most would sit passively and wait for the class to end not knowing why
these issues were being discussed, assuming (if we asked them), that
they were learning by osmosis. They do not know that when we say 'do you
know that you make the assumption that you learn something by simply
going around the university waiting for things to happen?' that we are
in fact addressing them. They have no awareness of holding that assump-
tion about how learning happens, even though that is the assumption they
hold. Indeed they are not av/are that they hold assumptions at all. The
only way they will really have learned what we are trying to tell them
is if they can come to that insight themselves. (The apparent contra-
dictions in this argument will be discussed in the final section of
Chapter V and Chapter VI).
Is then one to do nothing? Freire challenges us to do what is
historically possible, and offers one way of coming to knovi these students.
His proposal is that a co-investigation of reality should precede any
program development. When one can really speak to people from inside
their worlds, address them, while referring to language and thoughts
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they have heard themselves express, we are liable to be probing to the
intellectual roots of the people with whom we are working; in addition
we will be addressing issues on the level of a set of taken for granted
assumptions— assumptions which are seen as inevitable, as part of the
way things are. In the case of our group of freshmen such an investi-
gation is liable to reveal assumptions which are typical of an oppressed
consciousness as described by Freire, as well as assumptions which are
at the heart of the liberal paradigm, i.e., positivist assumptions. The
way these assumptions will be articulated, the form in which they appear,
can only be known as a result of a co-investigation of reality. When
the specific form as used by Freshmen students in a university setting
is known, it would be possible to re-present to them some of the words,
expressions ,thoughts they have heard themselves express ( and thus these
expressions would have meaning for them ) in the form of a problem to be
solved.
The following is a description of my effort to put some of these
thoughts to work. In a condensed form I conducted a co-investigation
of reality with a group of college Freshmen, and then re-presented to
them some of their thought in the form of problems to be solved. Hope-
fully these examples will represent further clarification of Freire's
theory. The context in which this work took place was a writing class;
thus I had the chance to see whether some significant changes in the
action of writing, at least, would occur. The material is organized
in the following way: First a description of the background--the living
situation these students inhabited; there follows a description of the
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way I thought about approaching the class; then a brief overview of the
linear sequence of the events which occurred in the class; finally a des-
cription of three aspects— the co-investigation and what I learned from
that; the teaching I did; the re-presentation in the form of a problem.
The past two chapters have been an effort to point to the heart of
the Freire method. It has been my argument that if the heart of Freire's
theory is left out or misunderstood, then one will be doing something
other than applying Freire. It has also been my argument that one reason
Freire is so difficult to comprehend is because he speaks to us out of
an intellectual tradition with which many of us are unfamil iar--one that
is imbued with a philosophical and historical sense. One reason I have
chosen to explicate his theory is precisely because it is so easy to
misunderstand and misapply his work. There is a second reason for my
attempt at explication. All Freire's work has been done with Latin
American peasants. Is there a way in which his theory can be translated
to formal American educational contexts at all? I have already argued
that one such effort at translation was a distortion of Freire. What
would a correct translation look like? Freire seems to have had consid-
erable success in literacy groups (reading and writing) with peasants.
Would there be similar successes in a formal American educational con-
text? In other words would the students begin to write and read better
while partaking in an educational effort to develop critical conscious-
ness? The two efforts (developing critical consciousness and literacy)
must take place simultaneously according to Freire s theory.
Background
The setting in which I did this work was Southwest Residential
college, located within the University of Massachusetts. Southwest
consists of five high rise towers each of twenty-two floors in height,
and several 'low rises'. When the University of Massachusetts built
Southwest between the years 1964-68, it waxed enthusiastically about
its hopes for this college:
From the shape of the student rooms to the comfortable modern
furniture they contain, everything about the new Southwest
Residential College was planned with student convenience in
mind and with academic excellence in the forefront. . .During the
regular sessions of the University, each of the three 'houses'
in each twenty-two story building has its own Head of Residence,
Counselors, and student government, as well as its own Faculty
Perceptor and faculty Fellows who bring to Southv/est Residential
College new Augmented Learning Programs which are intended to
make the entire college a new and exciting 'classroom' of the
University.
9
Three years after completion, the following is an extract from a letter
a student v/rote to the college newspaper, calling for some way of clean-
ing up the mess in what had become an urban slum:
It was the Sunday after--after a rather ordinary weekend which
once again has left Southwest a teeming pile of garbage and debris.
I woke early... only to be hit by the stench of urine and beer and
the eyesore of cans, papers, broken bottles and toilet paper...
This is a fairly mild description of what is an overcrowded, concrete
complex, housing five thousand people in close to a quarter square mile.
Sometimes three students inhabit a small dormitory room; drugs and al-
cohol abound amidst a group of very bored students, most of whom have
not the faintest idea why they are at a place called the University .
As for the 'exciting' Academic program which was intended to be a
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'living learning' experiment, its history is equally inauspicious. The
University has not had the courage nor the finances to really provide
the resources for an experimental college; the result is that the kinds
of educational offerings have to be those which students would not find
elsewhere. A collection of unrelated 'experimental' courses are offered
year after year. Modeling the liberal university perfectly, this alter-
native has been unable to generate a clear set of purposes which would
generate an integrated program with a beginning, middle and end to it.
Rather, what it has achieved is to provide students with more choices
than ever (part of the problem for students is that there is already so
much choice, and no foundation to make any choices exists), provided
them with classes that are in close proximity, and also 'easier' than
most other courses in the University (thus keeping enrollments up).
Students seem to enjoy this aspect as well as the greater informality
which apparently exists in Southwest courses.
The Southwest community participated in an act of courage in 1972.
They recognized the degree to which the University is implicated politi-
cally at the very core of its being. Students who have passed through
the large bureaucratically organized multiversity have learned how to be
well-behaved cogs within a large institution; they are perfectly well-
adapted to living in late capitalist America. The myth of the liberal
university which enforces Academic freedom, insisting that it takes no
position, that it allows all options to be presented, is just that, a
myth. This recognition by the Southwest community caused them to
take
the profound step of committing themselves explicitly to
political
135
education. Their decision was to make the focus of their educational
program the 'combatting' of racism and sexism. However this laudable
decision has not been followed through with intense discussion and prac-
tice as to what constitutes a 'real alternative' to what exists. There
has been no discussion as to the nature of the students who are being
reached, and how come so many were not being reached (these were just
written off as 'reactionary'). Implicit in the notion of combatting
racism and sexism is the assumption that people are going to be changed.
There has been no discussion as to what assumption people are making as
to the nature of the human subject, and what constitutes effective,
'change' procedures that do not objectify these students. "The way to
combat racism and sexism is to deal with racism and sexism;" there is a
linear thinking which underlies this analysis that comes very close to
the empiricist mentality which also sees one effect trotting neatly be-
hind one cause. The failure to give radical consideration to these ques-
tions and to larger ones, such as what theory of human liberation is
held, what vision of the ideal do people hold, has resulted in a new
church rapidly growing up with all believers required to toe the line
or else suffer the consequences. The people who launched into explicit
political education cannot be faulted entirely for their mistakes. There
is very little literature available as to what would constitute a human-
istic (in the true sense of the word) liberating pedagogy. This is why
Freire's work may be interesting and relevant for a community such as
Southwest, a community which has already taken the kind of step they
have taken.
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Two years ago in the ongoing effort to seriously apply the 'living-
learning' philosophy Southwest initiated a first year program. This
program could only be run by using the available resources at the Uni-
versity (i.e., there was no more money to be had with which to launch a
new program). One such resource was the Rhetoric program. This program
constituted the University's effort to overcome the communication dif -
ficul ties (broadly defined) which students were experiencing. All stu-
dents are required to take two Rhetoric courses. Both of these are
focussed on helping students develop their writing prowess. In South-
west it v;as arranged to hold special Rhetoric classes for Southwest stu-
dents. These classes v/ould try to focus on issues which were of clearer
relevance to the students' lives than the typical and much despised
(by students) Rhetoric classes. I was employed by Southwest to admin-
ister the first year program and 'facilitate' the training seminar for
teaching assistants from the Rhetoric departments. During these seminars
we would make an effort to think through what would constitute a good
Rhetoric course within the Southwest context. What better group for
me to try this Freire project out on than a group of Freshmen who would
be registering for a required Rhetoric course?
There were all kinds of difficulties associated with this decision.
The students' attitude to Rhetoric was similar to the one most people
hold when they visit the dentist. Many students who register for dor-
mitory based courses do so because it is the fastest route from bed to
classroom. I had never taught a writing course before. I had never
taught a required course before. I had never been with a group
who were
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exclusively Freshman. There was one element about the situation, how-
ever, which made it most amenable to my project. The students were re-
gistering for a course, the only requirement of which was that writing
take place. This was not the normal situation in which an agreement
of sorts exists before teacher and students meet. Generally, students
register for a course they are interested in; they come to the course
with some prior expectation as to what the content of the course will
be. In this Rhetoric course the only expectation the students had was
that writing would occur, and that it would probably be boring. This
was perfect for me since it provided maximum latitude to discover whe-
ther my knowledge of the theoretical principles underlying Freire's work
would serve as a guide in essentially unfamiliar territory. Knowledge
of the principles would be deepened as the experiences wore on, and
would serve as the guiding force whenever new situations or new decisions
presented themselves. This fits completely with what I have been argu-
ing all along. It is not techniques we need to pass along to each other,
but an appreciation for and an understanding of the role of theory.
Knowledge of theory, and an awareness of some of its implications would
allow one to think creatively on the spot when confronted with new sit-
uations; it would provide teachers with knowledge of underlying principles;
only with knov'/ledge on this level does anyone have the appropriate tools
with which to reflect upon their actions. Only with these tools can one
begin to work outside of the dominating and dominant paradigm. (The
question 'How do we pass the theory on to other teachers?' will be taken
up more fully in Chapter V).
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The following is a report on the nature of my decisions in regard
to this Rhetoric class. This report is intended to reveal how the
awareness of the central principles underlying Freire guided me in an
essentially strange situation. My aim is to reveal a process of thinking
here, not a static set of techniques to be replicated by others. The
process of thinking I wish to reveal covers all of the following areas:
How I prepared for the class; what I did in the class; what the students
gave back to me and how I interpreted this information. All of these
dimensions are important including the failures (which are included in
the appendix). Some of the results of the application of Freire to a
formal educational context in America will also hopefully be revealed.
Preparation
There are at least three ways I could have approached the task
while still in the preparation stage. The first would have been to
be one hundred per cent prepared in the sense that I would know fully
what I was looking for. If this were the case I would be able to know
fully what I would like to end up having achieved. I could for instance
have decided that I would like to see these students make advances in
their level of consciousness. I v;ould then have spent considerable
effort identifying 'scenes' which v/ere representative of the oppression
of these students. I would show pictures of these scenes, ask the 'ex-
istential' questions, code the resultant protocols, make a diagnosis,
apply the appropriate medicine, and test again to see if there had been
a movement (of consciousness, that is). If everything went smoothly I
139
would presumably be able to draw a graph to show the upward curve in con-
sciousness taking place amongst a 'significant' number, and I would
then know that I (they?) had been successful. Such a study fits neatly
into place, can be written up clearly so that it can be duplicated quick-
ly and easily elsewhere. Requests for workshop presentations would
probably come in and so on. However, at the start of this venture it
seemed impossible to me to attempt application of Freire's principles
using such an approach. It would have been a distortion along the Al-
schuler lines. Pre and post testing students with whom I was trying
to establish dialogue seemed absurd.
One alternative would have been to approach the whole enterprise
as a phenomenologist who would let the phenomena speak for themselves.
I would then merely describe all that I saw, and attempt in some way to
organize the data so as to successfully describe the 'perspective' of
the students. Although I began with very much this kind of perspective,
it quickly became apparent, while engaged in the act of teaching as
opposed to 'pure researching', that I could not maintain the detach-
ment required for this approach to be successful, if it ever could be.
But some of the ideas that phenomenological theorists have expressed
helped considerably.
The particular aspect of Freire I was sure was most relevant for
my purposes was the co-investigation of reality section and his dis-
cussions about the anthropological concept of culture, which I described
in the last chapter. As I have said there was no prior agreement as to
what would constitute the content of the course; it made absolute sense
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to me to ask these students to write about their experiences here as
students in the university. I intended to ask questions from the students
as I went through their written work intending to provoke them into going
deeper and deeper into a description of their social reality. My hope
was that several problem themes would emerge, perhaps three or four; the
students would see how their private troubles are actually social issues.
We would form small discussion groups and begin to reflect upon the causes
of the problem with the intention of acting upon the problem in some
way. Since the course could only last fifteen weeks I would actually
have been quite content to have achieved the breakdown of three or four
problem themes. This was as far into the future as I could see. Beyond
that I had to trust that whatever knowledge of the theory I did grasp
would act as some sort of a guide line for me when I was in difficulty.
E. H. Carr's way of going about the writing of history is similar
to the approach I was adopting here. In his book What is History ^^ Carr
describes his rejection of the effort to search for the objective facts
of history, an aim of British historians in the late 1800's. Nor did
he agree with the more recent efforts which emphasize the role of the
historian in making history; his argument is that this approach leads
to almost total skepticism. If the first approach split subject from
object by hoping to objectively describe the outer world, the second
approach did so equally by arguing for near absolute subject! vity--as
if the outer world didn't exist at all. Carr's approach on the other
hand is as follows:
For myself as soon as I have got going on a few of what I take
to be the capital sources, the itch becomes too strong and I begin
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to write; not necessarily at the beginning, but somewhere, anywhere
Thereafter reading and writing go on simultaneously. The writing
is added to, subtracted from, reshaped, cancelled as I go on read-
ing. The reading is guided and directed and made fruitful by the
writing: the more I write the more I know what I am looking for,
the ^better I understand the significance and the relevance of what
I find... the relation between the historian and his facts is one of
equality, of give and take. As any working historian knows, if he
stops to reflect what he is doing as he thinks and writes, the his-
torian is engaged in a continuous process of moulding his facts to
his interpretation and his interpretation to his facts.
The same relationship to this project was held by me. I had a plan
that extended for a few weeks; the rest was vague. Only the ongoing
relationship with the students would determine where we would end up.
The other half of the equation was my reading of Freire's theory; it was
to be the guide to the kind of decisions I made; it was the set of spec-
tacles through which I was seeing the facts for which I was searching.
Before I begin the description I must say a word about the difficulties
involved in writing down and making sense for the reader what in fact
occurred over the fifteen weeks in which the course was held.
The Project
Writing down what happened presents problems. The linear narrative
history of what happened and how I thought about what I was doing day to
day to day would be both boring and would fail to convey much meaning
to the reader. So what follows first of all is only a very brief summary
of the linear progression of the class, to put the reader fully into the
picture. Following this I will explain how I interpreted and applied
several categories of Freire's theory.
From a linear perspective the course can be broken down into the
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following three stages:
!)• Floundering Around
. I was searching for a way to ground the theory.
My main mode of investigating reality was to ask students what bothered
them, annoyed them, worried them about their lives as students at the
University. My main role following their written responses was to ask
guestions about the meaning of what they were saying. So for instance
if a student wrote that she was at the University to learn, I would
write on her paper "Please say what you mean by to learn." The resis-
tance from students to this was strong; they were suspicious of me.
In addition their writing was so bad that I was eliciting very little
information. They were essentially doing assignments while I was con-
ducting an investigation of their reality. I had told them that together
we were going to try to discover what common knowledge they held, but
failed to convey my meaning to them. I essentially failed in my goal
to find three or four problem areas around which groups would focus in
order to reflect upon, with the intention of taking action upon these
problems. I ended up with multitudes of problem areas that range from
alcoholism, to the problem of death, from golf tournaments to the prob-
lem of boredom. (See Appendix one and two for my first two communications
to the students). I did find out about their attitudes to the issue of
how they think they learn, though, and I will describe this in more de-
tail below.
2 ) , Tea c h
i
ng about assumptions and recognizing some core assumptions
held by students . I realized that I must do some teaching. At the same
time I realized that the students were profoundly distrustful of me, and
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what I was doing. Some of the latter problem was overcome when we all
traveled to Boston by bus to see the play Equus
. The former problem I
resolved by recognizing that we had to start from the beginning—with
assumptions. I had to teach about this issue--assumptions, super assump-
tions (see below) and their implications for action in the world. In
the process of teaching about assumptions I made some discoveries about
assumptions they held about the world, and I experimented with two forms
of re-presenting these assumptions they made to them, in the form of a
problem to be solved. The first onefailed to produce any insight, (Ap-
pendix three) the second resulted in some real breakthroughs. Finally
I re-presented the whole course to them in the light of my reflections
on it, asked for some difficult writing assignments to be done--and got
back some outstanding writing from about one third of the class.
Before the midterm and in context with my teaching of assumptions
I asked students to write to me on a multitude of subjects. 'Pretend
that I am an old man, the wisest man on earth, and I am about to die.
You have twenty-four hours to ask me any questions you like.' I was
hoping this would be a way to discover some questions which were on
people's mind; instead most said that they would not ask me any serious
questions, because 'they could only learn from experience.' But the
students did discover that when they changed some assumptions about who
they were writing to their writing behavior changed. We were able to
talk about a relationship between assumptions and actions; a seed was
set. Continuing along this line I asked them to write about an ideal
day ten years from now, and the worst possible day ten years from
now.
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My aim here was again to approach finding out about their reality in a
different way. 'Change any two assumptions you might be holding about
who you are when you write, go ahead and write.' In every case and using
various gimmicks (e.g., write in class uninterruptedly for thirty min-
utes non stop; just keep going), I would write up the following on the
blackboard: 'say your own word', and we would talk a little about what
this phrase means.
3). Co-investigation of Reality . After the midterms I attempted an am-
bitious project. I attempted to organize the class for a co-investi-
gation of reality of a very specific but broad ranging topic--their
world of sexuality (in the broadest sense of the word). Their writing
assignments were now to be about their investigations. I was fully aware
that the most I could hope for was some crude idea of this world, and I
was confirmed in these expectations. It took an inordinately long time
to make myself understood, but in my efforts I learned a good deal. Fi-
nally as I have said I re-presented the entire course to them, and in
this context attempted to re-present to them in the form of a problem
some aspect of this work; their writing assignments did not reveal that
this re-presentation was appropriate though.
Finally I v/as in a position to describe those aspects of the course
which I thought would throw most light on how Freire was applicable to
educational contexts in this country. I have left out entirely any des-
cription of the first aspect of the course--the 'floundering around .
The next section concentrates on the main 'successful' grounding of
Freire' s theory--the thread that runs from the teaching about assumptions
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and their relationship to action, to the discovery of central assump-
tions held by the students, to the one successful problem re-presenta-
tion. A good deal of other material will be reserved for the appendix,
and the careful reader might well want to peruse that section carefully.
(A brief description of the effort at co-investigation appears in the
appendix)
.
During this effort (co-investigation) the team will recognize
the need to include some fundamental themes which were not dir-
ectly suggested by the people during the preceding investigation.
The introduction of these themes has proved to be necessary and
also corresponds to the dialogical character of education. If
educational programming is dialogical, the teacher-students also
have the right to participate by including themes not previously
suggested.
I found this to be quite to the point one third of the way through
the course and the following is a description of the actual content
of what went on, as well as a description of the process of thinking
which influenced me.
The Real Beginning
The particular things we see or hear in the world, are determined
very much by the particular assumptions, theory we hold. I was at this
time reading and re-reading Freire. More and more his insistence that
the anthropological discussion of man must be included in every education-
al program stood out from his work. One of my Teaching Assistant
col-
leagues who was. teaching a Rhetoric course at the same time
as I, men-
tioned that she was focussing on assumptions in her class
and having an
interesting time doing so. Suddenly I knew that we, my
class and I, had
to start at the beginning--wi th assumptions^ , leading
to the assumptions
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people were making about man, nature, and society (what Charles K. Smith in
his book Styles and Structures calls super assumptions
, a name I
adopted for my class). Freire's genius lay in his capacity to hold dia-
logue with formally uneducated peasants, about complex and seemingly
abstract philosophic assumptions. He describes this most clearly in his
Education for Critical Consciousness . By showing to peasants a sequence
of pictures about animals, man, and man having made things, eventually
pictures of men making the kinds of things they (the peasants) made any-
way, the peasants began to make a distinction between man and nature:
that one crucial distinguishing feature between man and animal was man's
capacity to make culture. Man need not be as driven by nature as ani-
mals are; when confronted by problems posed by the natural environment
man began to develop technology to intervene, to help him somehow trans-
cend this limit situation. Eventually the structures (the cultural arti-
facts) man has invented have come to determine him almost as much as na-
ture. However his/her inner and outer task is to somehow make more and
better culture--not culture which acts in opposition to man (see Jules
Henry), but culture for the permanent liberation of man. The fact that
so many did not see themselves as potential makers of culture and his-
tory was one symptom of the problem. The fact that so many took it
for
granted that this was a normal state of affairs was another symptom.
It
is on this level of discussion that perhaps some vital
changes could oc-
cur.
The discovery of the importance of assumptions is
nothing new to
long time Rhetoric teachers, and to philosophy teachers.
Probably both
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make a considerable effort at all times to communicate precisely this
point to their students. But Freire's notion is that there is a poli-
tical consequence which results from holding some assumptions as opposed
to others. Thus the task here was to introduce the importance of look-
ing at one very specific assumption: man as a potential creator of cul-
ture, and to find out where people stood in relation to that idea. In
addition my effort here (following Freire) is to use the students' own
thought-language for analysis, not other textual material. In these two
senses are Freire's efforts novel, and of significant political consequence.
The Teaching About the Importance of Assumptions
The task was to do some teaching about assumptions. There were a
series of facts about assumptions that I wanted to bring home sharply.
1). that they exist at all. 2). that they are mostly unconscious
(hidden, implicit). 3). that they have implications on a number of
levels for all our thinking and acting (and also obviously for how one
wrote). 4). that only by uncovering them and holding them to the light
of critical analysis would one become free to choose wisely, instead of
being blindly driven by unexamined assumptions. 5). that there exists
a whole set of so called super assumptions, such as the nature of man's
relationship to nature, culture, and change; that these super assumptions
have super implications for the actions and choices we make in our daily
lives (or to put it in a different way, that there is a profound rela-
tionship between how we think and we act). 6). Finally I wanted the
students to grasp the notion that one way of defining a culture is as a
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set of interrelated super assumptions, and that all of us carry around
the set of interrelated super assumptions which dominate the culture
into which we are born. The point finally was to show that only by ex-
amining these assumptions and beginning to choose which to hold onto
and which to reject could one begin to make a move from normalcy to
sanity; this latter state was not necessarily a state of 'happiness' by
any means. (The particular categories of thought normalcy, insanity,
and sanity emerged from the Equus discussions and were formulated by
David Cooper in his Death of the Family ).
I worked on the teaching of these six facts about assumptions in a
variety of v/ays, which I will only briefly mention here. Various simple
exercises such as sitting on the floor instead of on seats revealed the
fact that assumptions exist in relation to what is supposed to happen
in classrooms. Comments in the class that were made about different
people were used to show that assumptions are held about different peo-
ple. Showing a series of numbers 1-3-5 and asking what comes next al-
lows discussion about how getting to the assumptions underlying a set
of 'data' allows one to make sense of it, and make predictions as to
what will happen next given those set of assumptions, (in this case that
the number 7 will come next). Obviously there are an endless variety of
ways of approaching the task of having people come to realize that assump-
tions exist, and that they have implications.
Then I launched into another area: changing assumptions results in
changed thinking and acting. I asked the students to play around with
assumptions they made about who they were when they were writing and
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who they were writing to. First I asked them to write to me as if I
was the wisest man on earth about to die; it had already proven very
difficult to find out what questions these students were asking. At
least in this assignment they began to ask questions; many did say that
there was no point in expecting any answers which would have any rele-
vance to their lives, that this could only be learned by each one of
them 'through experience'. This was to prove an interesting theme which
held true for many of the students; they did not see very much relation-
ship between the world of knowledge and their day to day lives. Issues
they faced in their day to day lives they could only learn about 'through
experience', not through reading or writing or talking for instance, i.e.,
reflection. Once they had asked their questions I asked them to now pre-
tend that they were the old man and to respond to the questions they had
originally asked. Finally I asked them to play around and change any
two assumptions they normally operate under and to go ahead and write
self-consciously having chosen who they were when they were writing.
Students wrote some remarkable pieces, many from whom I would not have
expected it. It is not to the point here to share these writings. The
point is that slowly it was dawning on people that changing assumptions
radically altered the action of writing at least. Many did not see what
difference this made. At the same time that this insight was occurring,
we had begun to break through the 'writing for assignments' syndrome,
which got in the way so badly before. (At this point I must interrupt
this narrative and explain that another set of activities (the co-investi-
gation) was begun alongside these teachings and discussions about assumptions.
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I want to very briefly outline what these activities were so that the
reader can make sense of what follows. In the appendix I will explain
in more detail. Some students began their co-investigation by examining
the Blue Wall, the student dischotheque; another investigated single-
sex living as opposed to co-educational ; another few individuals re-
ported on typical conversations they heard amongst dorm-mates. I was
hoping to both gain in-depth insight into a single area of student life,
while at the same time have the students learn a great deal about their
reality. I also wanted to balance the seemingly abstract discussions
about assumptions which was continuing in the classroom and which was
therefore frustrating for a large number of the students). In the pro-
cess of both teaching and participating in these investigations I was
slowly learning to hear some central assumptions which informed the
thought/language/reality of the student world. Before explaining these
in more detail, we had reached the point late in the semester where the
students had grasped on some level that there was such a thing as assump-
tions and super assumptions and that these made some sort of a difference,
but none of the students were translating these ideas into their own lives
none saw very many connections between assumptions and their lives as
students. My effort to confront this problem is the topic of the next
section.
Recognizing Student Assumptions and Re-presenting to Them
Intertwined with the teaching of assumptions I came slowly to no-
tice a connected strand of assumptions these students made
about the
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ndtuTG cf iTiQn. It took tirnG for mG to mdkG thGSG conriGctions GVGn thouQh
thGy had boon rovGaling thorn all along. Yot it was vital in torms of tho
procGSS that I took tho timG to havG thorn omorgo; that I spGnt tho titriG
attompting to olicit from thorn what thoir assumptions woro. That is, I
intorminglod toaching with quostioning, not tho sort of toachor-studont
quGStioning ono has como to oxpoct. Not ovon ' highor-ordor
'
quostions
of tho sort thosG who would turn toaching into a scionco would havo us
ask.^® Thoso woro quostions and oxorcisos gonuinoly intondod to find
out what tho 'ovoryday knowladgo' studonts hold. It was crucial to tho
procGSS that tho students actually came to hear themselves make the state-
ments they did. Later when I re-presented to them aspects of their
thought- language reality in the form of a problem to be solved, they
knew that this was a part of their thought, and perhaps were now devel-
oping a glimmering of understanding that thought has implications for
action.
The assumption that most dominated here, that revealed itself most
consistently and strongly, had to do with the students not seeing them-
selves as potential actors on the world. This revealed itself in various
forms and on various levels of generality. The first and most concrete
form was quite to be expected. It emerged during the first third of the
class when I was concentrating on the asking of numerous questions about
aspects students took totally for granted. This was one of the occasions
when the writings of the students revealed how clearly they sav/ them-
selves as consumers of learning. (Before I give some quotes as exam-
ples some clarification is called for. In a sense the writings of the
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students revealed all along that they saw themselves as incapable of
'making culture' in the broadest sense of that term. These students
like many, many others throughout the country write deplorably. The
December 7, 1975, issue of Newsweek cover story asks "Why Johnny cannot
write," and is filled with various answers to this que’stion. One answer
that was not discussed was that in a time when a sense of powerlessness
is particularly pervasive people see little reason to do anything, and
certainly little reason to concentrate on writing well). The following
then are some quotes from the students which reveal how they see them-
selves in relation to learning.
"My personality is constantly absorbing new experiences." "The
mind obtains knowledge from its surroundings by receiving information
through the person's senses. This information is transformed into know-
ledge and is stored in the person's mind. Receiving and processing infor-
mation into knowledge is learning."
"I am not aware of anything I make happen; everything in school is just
happening to me."
"My classes are big; some have over 100 people in them but I'll get
used to being a number."
"I have paid a lot of money to attend here so I want to make the best
of it. The first semester I was a little disappointed because I did not
like my classes." (Emphasis mine)
It must be stressed strongly that simply to have debated these ps-
sitions with the students, to have argued that their thinking about them-
selves was incorrect, would, I believe, have produced little insighjt, and
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thus littlG chance that change could take place. The opinions the stu-
dents held about how learning happens were part of a string of assump-
tions the students held about man and his relationship to nature, culture
and history. These assumptions are part of a full blown 'knowledge' the
students have, albeit knowledge on the level of magical, or naive con-
sciousness. A statement of Freire's I quoted earlier is appropriate here
again:
Human actions in the world, are conditioned by their own results,
by their own outcome. Thus there are different degrees of rela-
tions to the world, different degrees of action and perception.
Nevertheless whatever degree of action on the world, it implies a
theory. Even those actions called magic are governed by theory ,
(emphasis mine)iy
On the level of naive opinion these students have knowledge; the
knowledge they hold is constitutive of particular actions they take on
the world. If there were no organizing principles underlying their know-
ledge their actions would be chaotic, would make no sense. The know-
ledge they hold is of a whole; it (like all systems of knowledge) con-
tains basic ontological and epistemological assumptions which are closely
intertwined. The knowledge these students have has 'come to them' as a
result of their participation in a specific culture, a specific ethnic
and class background, a specific era in which they live. The concrete
assumptions they hold about learning are connected to other equally
basic assumptions.
One very strong assumption, on this level, held by the students v;as
revealed during a class discussion about the question: "What is human
nature?" Again my role in this discussion was one of asking
questions,
and I focussed these questions strongly on the issue of
whether we could
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make any real distinction between humans and animals. And the almost
universal response was that any distinction worth talking about was so
slight so as not to warrant any discussion. In fact one of my students
repeated verbatim a statement Freire quotes one of his peasants having
made: "If there is any difference, then the difference is that animals
are better than men." (See the similar Freire quote in this dissertation
p. 77). (It is interesting to note by the way that one of the descrip-
tive terms by which Southwest is known is as a 'Zoo'.)
I still only had a glimmering of how these assumptions were strung
together. It became clear to me in another discussion that took place
several weeks later. It was during this discussion that for the first
time I was able to begin to make connections, to point out to the stu-
dents connections between apparently abstract assumptions and concrete
reality; for the first time I had the language to do so; I now knew
enough about the students' thought-language reality to be able to
speak to it and about it, in a language with which they were familiar.
The discussion in which this occurred came after I had initiated various
investigating groups (last third of the class) and there had been some
talk about what was happening between the sexes; there had been a small
group visiting the Blue VJall (or 'meat market U.S.A.' as it is known in
student parlance). I have decided to quote directly from my notes here
so that the reader can get a better idea of the process which was occur-
ring. Preceding the class in question two students entirely independently
of each other had asked me to express some of my opinions about issues.
These students said they were anxious to hear from me instead of being
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questioned all the time. I agreed saying that I would devote the next
class to doing precisely this. I was sure as a result of these two inter-
actions that many in the class shared this wish. A proviso I made was
that I would only respond to specific questions the students asked of me,
but that I would express my opinions about anything at all. At last I
was going to have a chance to get a glimpse of what is was that the stu-
dents wanted to know more about. "For the dialogical, problem-posing
teacher student, the program content of education is neither a gift nor
an imposition--bits of information to be deposited in the students--but
rather the organized, systematized, and developed 're-presentation' to
individuals of the things about which they want to know more."^^ The
following then is taken directly from my notes:
'I launched the class with: I have a feeling based upon two inci-
dents which occurred last week, that people here would like to find
out what my opinions are about various issues; I am prepared to speak
on anything you like--but first there must be questions; I can't
simply speak off the top of my head.' I was intrigued to hear what
the first question would be, and it proved to be very revealing:
'What are you hoping to do with your life?' I was prepared to
speak frankly and did, explaining that I had come to expect inse-
curity; that I did not imagine it would suddenly vanish, that the
task is to learn to live with it, rather than endlessly and com-
pulsively attempt to gain security, that my goals had slowly changed
and were now focussed on developing knov/ledge about how human beings
come to do what they do, both psychologically and socially, that
in fact knowledge was power in the midst of insecurity, and that only
now that I was really in a position to make judgments about what I
was reading and learning about, and that it seemed foolish to
suddenly throw it all away because an attractive but demanding job
was in the offing, and finally that I hoped to attain my goal via
a systematic and prolonged study of psychoanalytic theory and prac-
tice. There followed a spate of questions: 'What is psychoanalysis?
I heard that Freud was into sex and that he was a pervert.' 'Hov/
strongly determined are you to reach your goals?' 'How come you
have goals such as these?' The discussion that then took place
revealed a fairly large assumption the people hold, one which I
had been vaguely aware of for some time: that human processes and
natural processes were one and the same thing. That is, for example,
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that historical change is very similar to natural change (such
as the growth of a tree is the way it was put in the class), and
that there is no important distinction between man and animal. It
is precisely the revealing of these super assumptions that I have
been hoping for. I am convinced that one of Freire's outstanding
contributions is to show how reflection on the level of these basic
assumptions can lead to change in thought and action. Discussion
of history being similar to tree allowed me to introduce during the
course of the discussion the idea of man as potentially the maker
of a culture, and slowly we began to discuss the implications of
holding such an assumption--the implications for writing, speaking,
(Freire argues, and I think correctly that the culture of silence
is a form of dehumanization) and for far less exotic acts. For
instance in my jaunt with the students to the Blue Wall one of the
students had said to me that there was no place to meet, other than
discos and drinking places. Thus I was able to speak of the Blue
Wall as an act of culture; i.e., that human beings had made a deci-
sion to set up Blue Wall--that this was different to the existence
of a mountain, and an alternative meeting place was a potential act
of culture. At long last I was able to take these abstract concepts
and bring them to bear on the concrete reality of students' lives;
this possibility only occurred as a result of my forays into the
students' world; I was beginning to speak their language, but bring-
ing reflective power to bear on it.
In the context of the discussion as it was taking place I knew that the
great majority of students were not understanding me; they were missing
entirely what I was getting at. I was beginning to learn how absolutely
necessary it was to move slowly and carefully. Also it was necessary
for students themselves to have a chance to grapple with the debate about
man as either totally one with nature, or potentially a maker of culture;
it would only be as a result of their grappling with it, that some may
begin to make their own connections to areas of concern to them. At
last I felt that I had a manageable even though difficult re-presentation
to the students. The difficulty factor could be overcome I felt because
I was presenting something they would so clearly recognize,
unlike the
far more enigmatic problem re-presentation I had tried
earlier (see
Appendix three). Freire's criteria for problem re-presentation
is.
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"(they) should be neither overly explicit nor overly enigmatic. in
addition in this 'humanistic time' we provide the students a real dis-
service by making things easier in the many ways and for the many reasons
that are currently popular. Before I give the verbatim problem as I pre-
sented it to them, recall that throughout the writing assignments I had
a phrase on the board 'say your ovm word'. Occasionally we had talked
as a group about what this means and why it was such a difficult thing
to do. The following then was the re-presentation:
" Rhetoric 100$, April 1976
Very often the task of trying to figure out what the meaning and
implication of 'super-assumptions' is, can be a complex, difficult task--
as complex as a mathematical problem, and I think more intriguing. The
following task I am asking you to do is difficult; therefore the first
part of the class will be devoted to allowing you to meet in small groups
to talk the problem over, and attempt to make some sense of it. Take
as long as you like; allow yourself to ask as many questions of each
other as you like, and when you are ready, begin to write your thoughts
down. You may take the whole period for discussion. Either way, get
the writing part done as soon as possible and please hand in the writing
no later than 4 p.m. tomorrow. Do not get into a panic because this appears
difficult; rather take the opportunity to let your thinking powers go to
work and make an effort to 'say your own word', v-/hich would include giv-
ing any concrete examples from your ov/n life to make any points you wish
to make.
"To say your own word is to transform the world."
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is the same as saying...
"Man is different to animal or tree, precisely in that he/she is
potentially a maker of culture." (Remember in the class discussion, I
defined this very broadly).
These are super assumptions and have huge implications (please note)
for every one of us in every aspect of our lives. For example, they have
very considerable implications for our lives here at the university. At
least two areas come to mind: the attitudes to and the choices one makes
about learning and knowledge; the attitudes to and our behaviors in the
area of sexuality (with regard to oneself--one' s own actions--as v/ell
as one's attitudes and behaviors towards what others do, as well as with
regard to the kinds of social activities that are available, or are not
available for people here). You may wish to focus on only one of these
two areas. Go ahead and discuss; simply make the effort to make sense
of this. When you get home read the article by Booth; it is a good
example of how to let your assumptions lead you to implications."
I am convinced that this re-presentation resulted in a significant
breakthrough for a number of students. Convincing evidence of this is
of course hard to give. Some would argue that the only acceptable evi-
dence would be that which resulted from a carefully controlled experi-
mental process, using one 'instrument' or another to test for change.
I have already argued at length that the kinds of information we could
gather using this approach would be specious. Ultimately there is
no
way I can claim beyond any doubt that these students achieved
some sig-
nificant breakthroughs. An interpretation of the evidence is
inevitable
159
as I have also argued at length. I can, however, present evidence
beyond what I saw in the students' faces and what I heard them say even
though we don't thereby break the interpretive circle. The evidence
I wish to present is of two kinds. The first will be some samples of
the students writing v/hich immediately followed the re-presentations
(following the discussion I re-presented the entire course to them in
the form of a long written statement to be found in the appendix, and
then asked the students to choose one final paper, also to be found
in the appendix). This evidence is ultimately less convincing than
the second kind which is the quality of the writing itself.
The following are examples of the content of students' writing.
In each case I have chosen examples which to my mind were clearly not
simple mimicing of what I had said or written to them. I am convinced
that students were making some profound connections of their own--con-
nections of a fundamental nature such as the relationship betvyeen thought
and action; the significance and the importance of thought and knowledge
as potentially making a difference to their lives; the fact that if man
is in some way partially differentiated from nature that this could
change dramatically how humans conceived of themselves and others. If
most of these students were presented with a lecture about most of these
topics they would grasp very little. The fact that these students had
to themselves grapple with these apparently abstract notions in a domain
and a language which was familiar to them made a great difference. Many
students have no awareness of what the act of reflection is, let alone
that there is a possible relationship between thought and action. Many
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hardly ever look at the world of knowledge as a potential source of
wisdom which may affect their everyday actions. (It should be clear that
this is not the students' fault). Many hold fast to the conviction,
albeit unconsciously, that the social world and the natural world are
driven by the same principles and laws. In this respect they are very
similar to the Latin American peasants with whom Freire was working.
These assumptions of theirs are a few of the set of interrelated assump-
tions which lie at the heart of their world of everyday knowledge, which
I discovered as a result of a serious effort to understand the nature
of their thought language reality.!^ If I am right that the following
quotes represent real insights as opposed to mere mimicing, then I
believe for these students the re-presentations did result in a real
breakthrough. (I have not broken down the quotes into any specific
order. I merely present quotes which came from individual students;
the numbers refer to different individuals).
i) . "We were learning from each other instead of just from the instructor...
People were thinking and listening to each other and what they were say-
ing were affecting each of us."
ii) . "To say your own word you must question things and look at all angles
before you speak." (This after saying that the discussion of 'say your
own word' was boring and going nowhere, and from a student who v/as prone
to speak glibly all the time).
iii) . "I as a human have a responsibility to myself to know what as-
sumptions are influencing me; how they affect every little thing
I do.
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Otherwise I am sacrificing part of a full life-the ability to see the
interrelationship of assumptions on my daily life."
"If we don't know what is influencing us, how can we know how to deal
with it? How can we separate what we feel is inevitable and what we
actually can change."
iv). "...For two thirds of the semester I was completely baffled as to
the intent of my instructor. I couldn't grasp what it was he was try-
ing to convey to us. Then one day our class was split up into a number
of discussion groups. Our teacher distributed a paper consisting of two
quotes. . .Little did I know that these two quotes were the answer to the
meaning of the course. . .What have I learned? Well the two above quotes
state exactly what it is that I have learned, but it takes more than just
reading them to understand them, though, a whole new way of living may
arise... My attitudes to academic learning have changed also. I have a
greater thirst for knowledge of all types. I feel that the more I learn
the more I can contribute to the molding of my culture. I really want
to hear what my professors have to say... I used to feel all my classes
were totally irrelevant. Maybe they v/ere but I was in no position to
tell... Now my position has changed. I think more deeply and clearly and
I can usually decide whether or not a course is relevant to my life. I
still think most are not relevant, but now I am sure of why I think this
way."
(And the following represents an excellent example of what Freire calls
a 'critical insertion into reality'. The connections the student makes
here are entirely his ownj I never made mention of any of these impli-
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cations or any like them. Note also that he is defining 'culture'
in a different way from anything I had done).
"I saw my ideas change the culture of another. I, therefore, realized
that the opinions of my peers may affect the culture that is within
me, as well as the one that surrounds me. But then again it is not only
the views of my peers that are able to effect me. Most all opinions
expressed, whether they be from teachers, books, parents or television,
are attempting to change my views. They all have potential to create
new cultures and beliefs within me... Through the realization that others
are gifted with the 'power', I am compelled to listen and analyze all
that I hear... The analysis of what I have heard requires deep and hope-
fully objective thought on my part. I must decide whether or not the
words I have heard are valid."
v). (The following is an example of one student having recognized how
she sets up limit situations for herself. I had come to recognize
that when many of these students said "I don't know" to a question of
mine they v/ere expressing an unwillingness to go beyond the limit sit-
uation; by pointing this out a number broke new ground; see the example
following this one as well).
"I was told that assumptions are hidden. It's like putting toge-
ther a puzzle. All the pieces are there, but the main idea is to fit
them altogether. . .struggling through the course by talking and
talking
and prying and prying out of us what was inside our minds,
pulling out
those hidden assumptions that were there but were protected
by the ex-
'I know what I mean but I just can't say it.'cuse heard many a time:
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Well no more of that bologna for this kid... I've not only gotten to
write better, but I find I can talk better when it comes to explaining
something. Again, I get my thoughts clear in my head and then it comes
much easier to say exactly and clearly what is on my mind. This has helped
as well at home with my parents, when it comes down to those 'heavy'
talks with them. I find it no longer difficult to say and write what
is going on in my mind... And this is a great feeling."
vi) . "One of the big reasons for my progress in my writing and in con-
versation was the meeting I had with Ron Goldman. I walked into a small
room in the John Adams Lobby where I greeted him at a small wooden desk.
We talked for a while about living in Southwest. Every time Ron would
ask me a question I would say 'I don't know.' He finally said 'come
on man you do know.' I felt a bit dumb because I did know, I was just
taking the easy way out by saying that I didn't know. While we were
talking he made me feel important, because the only thing that he was
concerned about was v/hat I thought. He made me realize that I was a
great deal smarter than I let myself think; what I had to say was as
important as what others said.
"
vii)
.
(The following comes from a student who wrote mindless essays
throughout the first part of the semester. This paper and his final
paper are quoted in full in the appendix along with one example of his
earl ier v/ork)
.
"To influence people with your thoughts you must learn to think.
I find most people are a product of their society and don't
think for
themselves. They seem to go on and on, their minds seem stagnant...!
am
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tired of learning straight facts; to me the value seems insignificant.
I don't want to learn the same things in college as I did in high school.
How to memorize and forget. These two statements (the two in the re-
presentation) have questioned my values and assumptions. I must decide
what learning and knowledge mean to me."
viii). "I look at other people in the class and see the same things
happening to them as have happened to me. People were concerned, cur-
ious, bewildered at our class and what was happening in it... The class
was discussed outside of class time. I heard people begin to clarify
their ideas, so that they were understood. Now I listen to others and
realize how little is really understood or heard. I realize how little
deep thinking is done. I find myself realizing that when I figure out
what assumptions people hold, I understand them and I question myself
and instead of as before just accepting no answer I find answers in
myself. I hear other people talking and saying real concrete state-
ments instead of wishy-washy flexible statements."
Probably two more students out of the class of twenty had insights
on the level described in these quotes. It is a number which far ex-
ceeded my expectations. One of these students who was 'academically
suspended' because he failed all his science courses wrote to me three
months after the course ended: "I enjoyed the first Rhetoric class
very much and as I told you it helped me learn more about myself in
teaching me how to think more clearly, with some organization.
Anyway
I am interested in the things you said, the things that others
in the
class said. . .Listening to those people talk added new
dimensions to my
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world, to my thinking. I still can't figure out if all that went on as
a result of your instigation and your prodding, or if it just happened."
The critic who states that these examples remain naive and poorly
written fails to understand that the University simply has to respond
to the new student who has entered academe. This student no longer
comes anxiously wanting to learn. It is now the universities' respon-
sibility to respond to people who are thinking and acting on magic and
naive levels, with the aim of making the life of the mind seem like a
worthwhile endeavor. The Hazen report makes the point succinctly:
The present dilemma in American higher education comes from the
seeming contradiction of two propositions: 1) everyone has a
right to a college education, and 2) the bright must be given
an opportunity to get ahead because a modern society needs its
highly trained elite. The committee contends, however, that the
dilemma is only an apparent one and that the two propositions
can be resolved by adding a third: Everyone--or at least far,
far more than we previously thought--has the potential for criti-
cal thought and intelligent enjoyment of the riches of the Western
cultural tradition. If American higher education cannot make as
vigorous a commitment to the third proposition as it has to the
first two, it is heading rather rapidly toward disaster. 22
A careful reader of Freire would challenge me and say that everything
I had done took place in the realm of reflection and not in the realm
of action. Freire argues that revolutionary pedagogy must continuously
move back and forth from reflection to action and back again, a process
he calls praxis. There is no radical dichotomy between thought and
action. The thought-language reality of any person or group of people
is constitutive of the actions they take on the world. "The concepts
with v/hich we apprehend the world either limit or expand our ability
to make sense of, and to transform its apparent givenness. Wittgenstein
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asserted that the limits of his language were the limits of his world. "23
(Thought and action must however not be seen as synonomous but as two
different moments in a single process; it is possible to get stuck at
either pole-activism or verbalism). The real test as to whether changes
in fundamental aspects of a thought~language reality are occurring is
if changed action occurs in a realm, not immediately and linearly re-
lated to the abstract thought. For example, in my re-presentation to
the students I asked them to unravel the meaning of the super-assump-
tion "man is potentially different to animal precisely to the degree
that he/she is a maker of culture." I also reiterated that super assump-
tions have super implications for every aspect of our lives although I
did not spell out in any detail what these aspects may be. Freire's
work with peasants produced some astonishingly rapid changes in the
peasants' capacity to write . Trying to explain this phenomena Freire
quotes his wife: "Elza Freire thinks this may be due to the fact that
these persons, beginning with the discussion of the anthropological
concept of culture
,
discovered themselves to be more fully human, there-
by acquiring an increasing emotional confidence in their learning which
was reflected in their motor activity. (my emphasis) The discussion
groups Freire refers to discussed in a fuller and more complex way than
I did man's potential to be a maker of culture, his separateness from
nature. The peasants were making the leap of recognition from the ap-
parently abstract ideas expressed in the discussion groups to the con-
crete action of writing. Would my students in their last writing exer-
cizes— in this particular form of action, reveal similar kinds of change?
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I had come to expect very little, so perhaps my surprise at the
quality of writing which did emerge from about ten students was exag-
gerated. I showed examples of their earlier writings to various people,
who were equally astonished. For the reader I can only reproduce the
most striking examples, and this I have done in appendix V . Most sig-
nificantly for the first time these students did not view the ten page
paper I had asked them to do as an assignment; many wrote three drafts
before they handed it in. Their excitement about the work they were
doing as being a singularly human activity and potentially a vehicle for
transformation seemed to grip them. None of the outrageous mistakes in
spelling and grammar were to be seen, and this from the worst students.
There is no way to convince myself or others absolutely that the strong-
est motivating force here was not the hope for a good grade. My only
evidence for a contrary belief is the way people spoke about the work
they were doing and their pride in doing it. Freire explains on a
general level what I think occurred here and what I think his method
makes possible.
Through this process the peasants progressively recognize that
it is they who transform the world. If cutting down a tree,
chopping it into sections, making planks of it, and using them to
make tables and chairs previously meant little more than just
physical work, these acts with the aid of 're-entering into' now
take on the true significance they should have: that of praxis.
Table and chairs will never again be just table and chairs. They
are something more. They are the products of the person s work.
S/he would have to begin by this discovery if s/he were to learn to
make them better. 26
It is impossible to know what this one, isolated, very short and
so nearly failed experience means for these students in the
long run.
For some, it is possible to imagine them listening to a
lecture on the
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importance of theory with an understanding which may elude many Grad-
uate students. Others may make entirely different educational plans as
a result of insight into the potential role knowledge may play in one's
life (one student wrote to me claiming this was the case for him). Others
may decide to experiment more widely as a result of taking this course.
For many the course will have no long lasting effect. For all, the only
way it could, is if they participated in an in-depth educational program
based upon the same principles which underly this single course. I
am convinced that a group of educators with a common commitment to the
importance of theory and a concomitant theoretical self-consciousness
could produce an educational program which would go a long way to meet-
ing the Hazen Committee's urgent cry quoted several pages back.
169
FOOTNOTES
^Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (N.Y.: w.w
Norton & Co., 1961),"p. 35.
2lb1d.
%ee Robert Paul Wolff, The Ideal of the University (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1969).
^See Philip Jacob, Changing Values in College: An Exploratory Stu^
of the Impact of College Tekhing (1st edV). (N.Y.: Harper, 1957),
and Nevitt Sanford, The American College (N.Y.: John Wilev and Sons,
Inc., 1962).
^See for example Wolff, op. cit., p. 78.
^Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther (N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co.), p. 134.
^Nevitt Sanford, "Developmental Status of Entering Freshmen," in
Sanford (ed). The American College: A Social and Psychological Inter-
pretation of the Higher Learning (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1962), p. 277.
^Hazen Foundation: The Student in Higher Education (New Haven: The
Hazen Foundation, 1968).
^University of Massachusetts publicity brochure. University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass. (1962).
lOfhe Daily Collegian , University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass.
(September 22, 1971).
l^Howard Becker et al
. ,
Making the Grade (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons,
1968).
l^See C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination , op. cit.
l^dward H. Carr, What is History (N.Y.: Knopf, 1961).
l^Ibid., p. 28.
l^Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed , p. 114.
170
^^Charles Kay Smith, Styles and Structures: Alternative Approaches
to College Writing (N.Y.; W.W. Norton & Co., 1974).
^^See Jules Henry, Culture Against Man (N.Y.: Random House, 1964).
l®See for example Benjamin Bloom (ed.) Taxonomy of Educational Ob-
jectives the Classification of Educational Goals: Handbook I. Cogni-
tive Domain (N.Y.l David Me Kay Co.
,
Inc.
, 1956)
.
^^Frei re. Education for Critical Consciousness
, p. 112.
^Opreire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed
,
p. 82.
21lbid., p. 107.
^^Hazen report, op. cit., p. 56.
^^Jean Elshtain, Manuscript in preparation for publication . Chapter 2,
page 1 (University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass.).
^^Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness , p. 55. my emphasis.
^^Ibid., pp. 63-81.
26ibid., p. 162.
CHAPTER V
starting points persists, the critique
0^ thought will never break the circle that arrests its
Introduction
A number of ideas have been hinted at throughout the dissertation
without ever being explicated fully. The first two sections of this
chapter are an attempt at explication. The overall argument of the
chapter is that an 'education for theoretical self-consciousness' is
an essential step towards establishing educational alternatives which
educate for critical consciousness. Since it is important that the
meaning underlying the idea of a 'theoretical self-consciousness' be
clear, I have, at the risk of repeating myself, elucidated the concept
slowly and carefully over the next pages.
Section One develops the argument that alternative efforts have
tended to replicate and deepen what i_s rather than succeeded in trans-
cending or being truly critical of what is. Section Two is a long di-
version intended to show how a lack of theoretical self-consciousness
leads to a failure to appreciate what is most cutting in a theory--in
this case psychoanalytic theory. The discussion provides the oppor-
tunity to show what has heretofore only been hinted at-- that there are
vital inner links between psychoanalytic theory and critical theory.
Section Three speculates about the nature of an educational program
intended to nurture theoretical self-consciousness amongst teachers
and first year students. (I have focussed on these two groups because
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of my own involvement in first year college education, and in teacher
training. I know most about these two groups, but hope that my discus-
sion is significant for other groups of students and teachers).
Section One
Why a Need for Theoretical Self-Consciousness?
Paulo Freire is concerned that, amongst other things, an educa-
tional program develop a critical consciousness amongst students. This
is a political concept; it is not the same thing as saying students must
develop critical thinking skills, or that they must learn to think, or
that they must be active participants in the classroom. These three
latter ideas may be good and important, but they are a part of a dif-
ferent conceptual scheme of things from Freire's notion of 'critical
consciousness'. What would an educational program intended to educate
for critical consciousness look like? The answer depends upon critical
interpretation of what needs to happen in a particular society at a
particular time, as well as who the educational program is for, and
will be ansv/ered explicitly in section three of this chapter.
We are now in a position to stand back from the various educational
innovations which have occurred over the past decade and to expose
them to critical examination. In general, one can say that these efforts
have not only failed to provide true alternatives, but, to the contrary,
have succeeded in both mimicking that which they proclaim to supercede,
and in further entrenching and supporting the values and the norms of
the status quo. If it were possible to understand how and why this has
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happened-how so many efforts at progressive innovation have actually
led to a hardening of what already exists, then perhaps we will have
uncovered what most needs to be done by those administering educational
programs.
One effort at an alternative has aimed specifically at pol i tical
education. Its analysis of the current political status of educational
programming is very similar to Freire's analysis. All education is pol-
itical; it either educates people to become more tolerant of the status
quo or it educates them self-consciously to become critical of what is.
The anti-racist sexist alternatives explicitly try to educate the un-
educated about the racist-sexist society in which they live and in which
all are implicated either through daily activities or via involvement
with institutions engaged inevitably in racist-sexist policies. The
racist-sexist analysis contains some truths; yet when truths which re-
sult from the social analysis that is made are translated into educa-
tional programming, fundamental errors are committed. Essentially a
new group of 'knowers' has been created (those who are the experts on the
issues of racism and sexism), and these knowers see themselves as charged
with bringing the word to the ignorant.
When I have seen them in action, except for a few, this new elite
display all the behavior typical of any group that sees itself as in
some way superior--arrogant and dogmatic, harboring the attitude of
'we know it all', and any counter critique is seen as essentially re-
actionary in nature. The question arises: why has this tended to happen
to the extent that it has? One reason is that the social analysis does
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not contain with it an educational theory; the result is that without
theory educational efforts duplicate exactly that which already exists.
The 'knowers' deposit knowledge in the minds of the ignorant, and banking
education is occurring again, this time from the left instead of the
right end of the political spectrum. Typically this group sees any ef-
fort to establish dialogue as an effort to undermine them, as an effort
to divert energy from 'the struggle'. Their minds are so absolutely
made up that any effort at dialogue is conceived as a necessary evil,
done only to ensure that they can carry on their work. They often
sound, at these moments, like the busy technocrats who have no time for
dialogue with the peasants about the changes they (the technocrats) have
decided to institute. The possibility that there can be a position crit-
ical of the one they hold, one which is more radical and all encompas-
sing in its analysis, is inconceivable. A critique is always seen as
coming from the right. The same single-mindedness and absol ute convic-
tion produced the Soviet-State and its 'psychiatric' treatments of
those insane enough to differ from what is so obviously the truth. The
truly radical position in contrast is stated as follows by Freire:
The radical committed to human liberation, does not become the
prisoner of a 'circle of certainty' within which he alone im-
prisons reality. On the contrary, the more radical he is the
more fully he enters into reality so that knowing it better, he
can better transform it. He is not afraid to confront, to lis-
ten, to see the world unveiled. He is not afraid to meet the
people or to enter into dialogue with them.
2
The radical educator is unafraid to speak what he thinks is true, but
also takes his opponents absolutely seriously; when there are
no op-
ponents to be heard his main task is to encourage that this
culture of
silence be transformed.
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Another example of an alternative effort is that which seeks to
multiply options within education as widely as possible. The main pro-
position which seems to underly this approach is that students' needs
must be met, that these needs are varied and multi-dimensional, and
that especially in a large state-university every effort should be made
not to fit students into the Amherst College mode (i.e., ivy league-
like). Rather, if it will help them get jobs later on courses such
as 'Hi-Fi systems' are appropriate; if it will make them feel good,
courses on altering consciousness are appropriate; if it will prepare
them better for a war against potential rapists, self defense programs
are appropriate. Even further, students should be allowed to construct
their own educational program: no requirements, no essentials, no
explicit statement or theory is needed to unify their choice of courses.
Primarily and essentially needs must be met, and in this view, as a
result, we find that the market place has entered the world of academic
knowledge with the same results which corporate business has had out-
side the academic world: namely, that there is a gradual proliferation
of choice with the concomitant illusion of greater choice creating
greater freedom--or in this case a better or broader education. Thus if
there were not enough choice before, there is more now. 3 If there were
not enough demeaning of the world of ideas by the University via the
introduction of such fields as landscape gardening, home economics, fashion
marketing and the like, then the new alternatives make certain of the
degradation. If there was not already a lack of anything resembling
a
community of scholars, then encouraging everyone to simply follow
their
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own impulses will guarantee absolute atomization. (At the luxurious
Hampshire College, which has adopted this model entirely, one central
complaint from students is their isolation from each other).
There is amongst those who hold 'the needs must be met' position,
a self-righteousness and certainty as to the inherent justice of their
position which matches that of the anti-sexist, anti-racist educators.
Any critique of their position is seen as elitist and neanderthal -like.
This educational position is really a non-position. Its proponents
seemingly never have given serious thought to, or made public, their
arguments, ideas and assumptions about the purposes of education. One
to one relationships are drawn between their beliefs in a sort of par-
ticipant democracy and the way an educational establishment should be
run. There is no recognition of the fact that the real model they are
mimicking is that of the economic system of advanced capitalism which
would like nothing more than a populace without a center, without a
backbone, who are used to having their needs quickly and easily met.
It suits the purposes of advanced capitalist society that people do not
have a grasp of the whole, that they have many bits of unrelated in-
formation at their finger tips; it would be much too dangerous if peo-
ple could understand how parts fit together, how apparently isolated
'facts' have a deep inner relationship.
What is required is that educators have the courage to articulate
what they stand for and v/hat they do not. As things stand the critique
of the 'needs must be met' school was v;ell made by Robert Hutchins
as
far back as 1940: "The crucial error is that of holding that
nothing
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is any more important than anything else, that there can be no order of
goods, and no order in the intellectual realm. There is nothing central
and nothing peripheral, nothing primary and nothing secondary, nothing
basic and nothing superficial .. .the course of study goes to pieces be-
cause there is nothing to hold it together."^ The 'humanism' the edu-
cators in charge of these systems espouse is often a disguise for a lack
of courage or a disguise for the lack of real commitment to anything
other than their own careers. In very direct ways comments one hears
from these humanists reveal a deep seated anti -intellectual ism or per-
haps better a total miscomprehension of the nature of the enterprise
called the pursuit of knowledge. It is quite likely that within edu-
cational settings these humanists will make statements such as: 're-
member intellectual izing is a luxury' or 'gone were philosophic yawns'^
(which in this case refers to the need to speed up the 'problem solving'
process and the introducing of twenty minute 'nuclear solutions').
Often these anti -intellectual positions are stated as if the intel-
lectual endeavor were valued so highly as it is, as if, in other words,
the anti-intel 1 ectual position was revolutionary in some way. The
particular form the anti -intellectual ism takes is, at its roots, that
it makes little difference vjhat people learn about so long as their
needs are being met. Mari tain in his Education at the Crossroads speaks
to us of ' such persons '
:
(They) are afraid to face reality, especially when reality is in-
tellectually difficult and stringent, deep or dire, and they replace
the personal effort to grasp things as they are with a ceaseless
comparison of opinions. Youth taught according to this pattern
may furnish excellent specialists in the field of technique. .
.
For the rest in all that has regard to understanding of man and
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culture and the highest and the most urgent problems, not only dothey develop a nominalistic timidity, but they are absolutely lost
in the midst of matters of knowledge and discussion, the inner
value and importance of which they cannot and do not want to dis-
cern and recognize. For if we begin by denying that any subject
matter is in itself and by reason of truth more important than
another, then we deny in reality that any subject matter has any
importance in itself, and everything vanishes into futility.
6
It is no surprise that the modern version of persons such as these
have been heavily influenced by the humanistic psychology movement, the
third force as it is called, for here anti -intell ecu tlaism comes into
its own. Fritz Peris, whose position on the subject is representative
of one that can be found amongst many who argue that they represent an
alternative (e.g., representatives of the men's movement, parts of the
women's movement, the humanistic education movement), expresses it thus:
I know you want to ask why, like every child, like every immature
person asks why, to get rationalization, or explanation. But the
why at best leads to clever explanation, but never to understanding.
Why and because are dirty words in Gestalt Therapy. They lead only
to rationalization...! distinguish three classes of verbiage pro-
duction: chicken shit--this is 'good morning', 'how are you?'--
bullshit— this is 'because', rationalization, excuses. . .el ephantshit--
this is where you talk about philosophy, existentialism, gestalt.
7
This statement, even though intended to apply only to the therapeutic
situation obviously comes to mean much more. And indeed it has. Today
the humanistic movement with its concomitant anti -intellectual ism has
made a strong impression upon numerous social groups and professional
communities. One is quite liable to hear statements which are very sim-
ilar to those expressed by Peris. It is all this thinking and analysis
which has gotten us into trouble; our task must be to get in touch with
and express our 'feelings'. The spirit implicit in this position is a
seemingly revolutionary one, the conviction being that the way to a more
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humane society is via less thought and more expression of feeling. It
is no accident that the 'meeting everybody's needs group' and the 'get
in touch with your feelings' and 'raise your consciousness' groups share
comfortable alliances and are often comprised of the same people. There
are compelling inner connections in the thought which they use to ex-
plain and act upon the world. It is a thought which is ahistorical in
nature and which most often manages to hide the ugly facts; it is thought
promoted by people who try to be 'nice' and to deny the facts of power,
and who ultimately are most concerned about themselves, their careers,
and far far less about the obligations to the next generation and there-
by to history.
The critique inherent to a greater or lesser extent by these various
positions of what is properly called 'abstract thinking' (over-intel-
lectual i zing, to use the vernacular) is I believe correct. It is the
mode of thought which dominates academia to a large extent--abstract,
instrumental, and ahistoric in nature, which concerns itself with issues
independent of concrete concern to students (a good teacher can easily
show how the questions which the Great Thinkers throughout history have
asked continue to be relevant for our time). It is thinking concerned
with issues abstracted from a material and concrete theory of history
and of the person, and the dialectical dynamic between the two. It is
thinking divorced from passion--a mode of thought typified by a refusal
to face up to the degree to which it is implicated with a political
structure; this is the effort to be 'objective'. It is a mode of thought
often concerned about technical matters--how to construct a code for
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instQncGj s bGttGr GxpGrirnGnt» d morG GXdct rriGthod. ThG G'f'fGCt on thG
studGnts is not to GncouragG crGativG, passionatG indopondont thought.
This is an impossibility sincG there Gxists a virtual VGto on thought--
ir\ thG SGnsG of dGVGloping thG capacity to reason substantively rather
than instrumentally. Only that which is experimentally verifiable or
has been experimentally verified is permissable in discourse. Thought
equals elephantshi t— or to put it more pol i tely--any thought or set of
statements which cannot be shown to have been experimentally proven
to be true, is essentially speculation (and thus to be reserved for the
last chapter of a dissertation or book). However, the general critique
of thinking (as by the alternative groups above) makes no distinction
between this dominant mode of technical thinking and substantive reas-
oning. The sheer dominance of technical rationality in mainstream aca-
demia probably accounts for the fact that so many are in reaction against
thought in general, and also why they are so sure of the revolutionary
nature of their position. However, as has been said before, the rejec-
tion of this mode of thinking does not mean we throw out thought alto-
gether: 'it requires us to resurrect an older and yet new kind of reason,
and also to concentrate our thinking in different areas. Substantive
reasoning attempts to deal with the essential nature of reality; it con-
cerns itself with ends, as opposed to means, with theory, rather than
method.
The question now arises: what, despite ostensible differences of
concern and emphasis, unites the so-called alternative modes of educa-
tion which I have mentioned with this latter mode which so dominates
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the University? What causes so many efforts at alternatives to either
mimic what actually exists or become part of a movement toward repres-
sion which seems everywhere to hold sway ?
One fundamental reason this occurs is the same reason why A1 Schu-
ler's effort to translate Freire turned out to be a domestication of
his theory: namely, a fundamental lack of a theoretical self-conscious-
ness. Both in the mainstream, and in the alternatives there is little
display of an understanding of the nature of theory, its relationship to
history, to social institutions and to practice
. I include myself here.
I have received my education in three different centers of higher learn-
ing in America. In none of them was there very much discussion about
the inner nature of knowledge and its relationship to reality. This is
not just an enterprise for philosophers.
To the extent that this question is not being asked in connection
with all the various 'little theories' people are teaching or working
with--to that extent will all those intellectual operations remain ab-
stract, blind, and will almost certainly mimic or deepen the status
quo. Abraham Kaplan has said: "Philosophy is culture made self-con-
scious."^ When philosophic questions are applied to the 'experimental
method' or the experimental mode of education, then we begin to uncover
the theoretical positions underlying these operations v/hich hitherto
have been unknown, but have been playing a considerable part. In the
case of the alternative efforts, no clearly articulated critique of
what exists is ever made with an understanding of the role of epis-
temological questions in theory. Yet the only possibility of ever truly
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developing an alternative is, if a critique uncovers the roots of the
problem of what exists. To the extent that the roots are not uncovered,
they remain part of the natural, given world, part of the order of things.
(See the discussion of the social literacy project in Chapter III). Re-
flecting on the core assumptions underlying our theories is, of course,
time consuming and not conducive to getting grants or developing an aca-
demic career, or making the revolution happen in five years time; it is
thus rarely engaged in academic departments or in alternative educational
settings (interestingly everybody is always 'too busy' in both kinds of
settings)
.
The reason that theoretical self-consciousness and the reflective
mode do not hold greater sway is complex and tied closely to an economic
and bureaucratic superstructure which does not support such activity.
It is also tied to an American phenomenon whereby various intellectual
positions and schools of thought are conceived of as being somehow free
of ideology, free of bias, or political implication. Evidence of this
is widespread. It extends from books such as Daniel Bell's The End of
Ideology to the frequently heard statement: 'politics has nothing to do
with me' or 'my position is free from political bias or consequence'
(the disinterested scientists' position). According to vast numbers of
Americans, in fact, ideology is only true of others--e.g. , radicals or
communists
.
Behind the apparently value free objective activity of both social
and natural science lie a set of assumptions about the nature of man, the
nature of mind, the relationship between man and society, a theory of
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history. Often these assumptions remain unreflected upon, are never
brought to the surface and examined. Any unreflected position can be
classified as ideological in nature (see footnote) Often those who hold
unreflected positions are the first to reject philosophy and social
theory, claiming that philosophy is nothing but 'speculations upon
speculations'. The essential point I wish to emphasize is this: there
is a central underlying unity between the many efforts at establishing
alternatives in education and the status quo
,
which among other factors
includes a lack of theoretical clarity, a suspiciousness and devalua-
tion of the meaning and role of theory. Russell Jacoby' s critique of
the neo Freudians and the humanists, both of whom saw themselves radi-
calizing and updating what exists, is relevant here.
As eagerly as they welcome the philosophy of existentialism they
know little of social theory or philosophy. For this reason they
turn out to be enthusiastic exponents of the prevailing ideology
even as they intend to oppose it. Because they are unacquainted
with theory, philosophy or history of positivism, their critique of
behaviorism--ul timately their raison d'etre- -does not resist behav-
iorism but complements it. They add soul and values to the facts,
thereby fantasizing that the facts themselves change. Misconceiv-
ing the essence of positivism, they conceive of the alternative as
as renamed more-of the-same. Unable to escape the dilemmas of
the non-dialectical
,
non-theoretical thought, they are forced be-
tween bad materialism and bad idealism.il
To repeat, my effort is to understand why so many efforts at conduct-
ing what are called alternatives actually tend to reproduce the status
quo, often more drastically. My argument is that a lack of theoretical
self-consciousness makes a critique leveled at the roots impossible.
Only v/hen the roots are knov/n is it possible to avoid snipping at some
of the top most branches, v/hich served to encourage a greater flourish-
ing of the weed. The roots can only be known via a knowledge of the
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history of positivism, the rise of capitalism, the image of the human
mind which dominates, the degree to which the dominant view as to the
nature of knowledge is intertwined with economic, social and psycholog-
ical factors.
Alschuler's domestication of Freire (see Chapter III) can also now
be understood as a lack of understanding of the nature of theory. Al-
schuler, because he has failed to understand the roots of Freire's theory,
has skimmed the surface of Freire's work and transplanted Freire's words
and phrases onto another set of ontological and epistemological roots,
which are unself-consciously held by Alschuler. Thus, the work he is
doing has the label of Freire on it, but is actually a set of intel-
lectual operations in a different tradition entirely than that intended
by Freire. The same lack of theoretical self-consciousness prevents
Alschuler's critique of what exists to probe to the roots; the result is
more of the same in a better disguise than ever.
Developing a self-consciousness as to the nature of theory would
be a first essential step toward the development of critical conscious-
ness. Only a deep knowledge of social theory and its implications
would make it possible to escape delusions and self deception. 'Theory'
here is meant as that which attempts to comprehend 'the relations among
the economic life of society, the psychological development of the indi-
vidual and changes in cultural life.'^^ This idea of theoretical self-
consciousness is so crucial to understand clearly that further dis-
cussion elucidating this concept is necessary.
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The Meaning of 'Theoretical Self-Consciousness'
T.W. Adorno, in reflecting about his experiences as a European
scholar in America writes: "No continuum exists between critical
theorems and the empirical procedures of natural science. They have
entirely different historical origins and can be integrated only with
the greatest effort. Contained in this short phrase is the key to
one main argument of this dissertation: there can be no continuity
between Freire's work which stands within the tradition of critical soc-
ial philosophy, and empirically based social science research such as
that conducted by Alschuler.
An explanatory theory can be thought of as analagous to a language.
Like a language it has vocabulary and a history and stands in relation-
ship to other languages. One may learn the vocabulary of a new language
and still use the words one has learned incorrectly. One could hope to
use the words correctly only if one came to know the tacit dimension of
the language, if one had been immersed in the context in which the lang-
uage was used. Polanyi captures the essence of the relationship between
theory and language, as well as some of the dilemmas which result from
the co-existence of different languages and different explanatory frame-
works:
Different languages are alternative conclusions arrived at by
secular groupings of different groups of people at different per-
iods of history. They sustain alternative conceptual frameworks,
interpreting all things that can be talked about in terms of some-
what different allegedly recurrent features. .. .Different vocabu-
laries for the interpretations of things divide men into groups
which cannot understand each other's vyay of seeing things and of
acting upon them.^'^
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...Theological accounts of God must of course appear meaningless
and often blatantly self contradictory if taken to claim validity
within the universe of observable experience. Such a result isinevitable whenever a language that is apposite to one subject
matter is used with reference to another altogether different
matter.
Explanatory theory then is context laden. Contained within a full-
blown explanatory theory is a set of fundamental propositions about the
nature of man, the relationship of these to history, society and other
cultures. These fundamental propositions take the form of a complex set
of interrelated statements, and can only be understood in the context
of the whole theory, including its tacit dimension or its mode of dis-
course. One can claim to know a theory when one can speak in its mode
of discourse, when one can face hitherto unknown situations and address
them in a way which would be familiar to one who shared this mode.
There is a 'line of influence' from the fundamental propositions one
makes, to the conceptual system one is employing, to the procedures one
uses to test the truth of one's hypotheses, to the normative implications
of the theory. One is always liable to hold some aspects of a partic-
ular explanatory system with which one is working, unconsciously; this
is the meaning of a tacit dimension. If one has not participated in
or immersed oneself in a theoretical system, one is likely not to know
its tacit dimension; one is liable only to know the vocabulary, not the
• deep structure. To continue to probe for the tacit dimension, for the
roots of one's own theoretical position and the normative implications
of these roots, is to be on the never ending road toward theoretical
self-consciousness. Connolly makes clear in the following quote how
important a deep understanding of the deep structure of one's theoretical
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position is; even though two fairly similar concepts may seem to mean
the same thing, it is only the theoretical context which they inhabit
that these concepts can be understood in any depth.
To share the same vocabulary is not necessarily to share exactly
the same set of concepts. And in fact these shared items tend to
mask significant differences among perspectives in the definitions
followed.!/
For example there is actually a vast difference between the following
fairly similar sounding statements: "Man and world are in dialectic
relationship," and "there exists a dynamic transaction between man and
world," and "it's a question of nature or nurture." The two latter
positions have participated in an entirely different intellectual tra-
dition to the first, and individuals holding either of these two latter
positions would, for example, argue that psychoanalytic theory is an
'individual psychology' and therefore not the appropriate psychologi-
cal theory to deploy if one wants to understand man/world dynamics.
They could not understand how the first position (man and world are in
dialectic relationship) would argue the contrary. (I will make this
clear in the discussion about psychoanalytic theory below).
All individuals implicitly or explicitly hold a body of theoreti-
cal knowledge. This knowledge consists of a body of interrelated funda-
mental propositions which inform a conceptual system, all of which re-
sult from certain kinds of historical and social experiences and which
in turn influence what they see and how they act upon the v/orld. The
more clearly one can bring to light the deep structure of thought
in-
fluencing one's beliefs and actions the more one can choose, rather
than
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be driven by a particular conceptual system. In his "Theoretical Self-
Consciousness" W. Connolly explains the point succinctly:
I approach theoretical self-consciousness as I attain awareness
of previously unexamined assumptions atthe center of my theory
and I attend to its conceptual contours and to the test procedures
it supports, as I probe the inner connections among these three
dimensions and explore the normative implications of the entire
system. 18
Connolly goes on to urge social scientists to familiarize themselves
with conflicting explanatory theories so that
even if my theory emerges from this process unscathed, I will
now understand its depth grammar more fully; I will now have a
solid grip on the range of its application, and the reasons and
evidence which support it; I will adhere to it less blindly and
dogmatically, and I will be better equipped to communicate ra-
tionally with critics, adversaries and potential converts. 19
Connolly's recommendations helped sharpen understanding of the precon-
ditions necessary for dialogue in the Freirian sense. The critically
conscious educator must have some clarity about his own theoretical
position, which means having subjected it to critical debate with other
theoretical positions. It means having sufficient theoretical and his-
torical knowledge to be able to hear, to discern the lines of influence
running from fundamental propositions to a conceptual system and action
and back again, as it is expressed amongst the student/ teachers with
whom he is working. Without a considerable degree of theoretical clar-
ity the educator is likely to miss what is most fundamental in his dia-
logues v/ith students and leave it unexposed, because he, like the stu-
dents, conceives of these unreflected dimensions as part of the natural
order of things. The educator's theoretical clarity must be such, so
as to make it possible for him to be somewhat detached from what is
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dominant (i.e., the status quo), but never to depart completely from the
culture; rather to come to know it in a way that is only possible for a
^enzmensch (a person who lives on the outskirts) to come to know the
society which he inhabits.
My intention is to go beyond the mere description of what a theo-
retically self-conscious individual needs to do, but rather to argue
clearly what kinds of errors one falls into if one does not comprehend
the role and meaning of theory--theory now hopefully understood not as
a simple vocabulary but rather a complex, context laden set of explan-
ations, with a tacit dimension, as crucial as the specific vocabulary.
I have already asserted that a failure to critique what exists at the
roots results in a continuing repetition of the worst aspects of what
exists. The inability to understand the deep structure of any organized
activity or body of theoretical knowledge means never to understand it,
and to always either miss vital truths, or make a caricature of whatever
it is one claims to know.
Unaware of his own perspective (the investigator) is unlikely to
probe opposing theories deeply. Translating opposing claims into
themes more comprehensible within his own perspective, he refutes
a caricature of that theory; and thereby encourages in himself an
easy confidence in the superiority of his own position.
This can serve perhaps as a partial explanation of the arrogance of so
many who are both in the heart of the current academic mode, as well as
those who are actively refuting, while actually mirroring that which
exists
.
In order to make my position clearer I wish now to provide one
further set of concrete examples of what I mean v/hen I refer to the
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deep structure of an explanatory framework. At the same time I wish to
take the opportunity of making clear what has been vaguely hinted at
throughout the dissertation-that is that psychoanalytic theory is
central to critical theory. Psychoanalytic theory is no longer a body
of knowledge one can study systematically at most American Universities.
It is reviled from the left, the center and the right, liberated men
and women, sophisticated psychological theorists and naive college fresh-
man. Freud's name evokes snarls and sneers, grimaces and groans. It
has been my argument throughout this dissertation that a critical
theory requires an explicit theory of the human subject as well as a
theory of history. There must be a satisfactory explanation of how the
outside gets inside and then once again gets outside again.
Most 'progressive' theorists who speak grandly of man and world in
interaction with each other would recoil at the thought of psychoanal-
ytic theory helping us explain this movement, since according to such
persons psychoanalysis is an 'individual psychology'. Yet it is the
argument of most theorists in the tradition of critical theory that
Freud's work and the work of those who have followed in his tradition
is an essential part of the critical science of society. It is not pos-
sible in the context of this work to argue this position fully.
I
do,
however, want to focus upon certain aspects of the theory I would con-
sider part of the core of the theory, without which we would have some-
thing other than psychoanalytic theory, even though parts of its vocab-
lary may still be used. So rather than concentrating on the actual
content of the theory (such as the details of the oedipus complex, the
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nature of repression, the unconscious and so on), I want to focus on the
more tacit dimensions of the theory, and, in the process, hopefully
elucidate more clearly what I mean by tacit dimension or a mode of dis-
course. Simultaneously I hope to at least provide the outline of the
argument why psychoanalytic theory is crucial to the critical theory of
society, and thereby elucidate what some of the absolute requirements for
a critical theory of society are.
Section Two
Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory
The following interrelated areas will be the focus of the next
section: the particular way in which psychoanalysis conceives of the
relation between the individual and the world and the 'progressive'
critique of this position; the genetic nature of the science; efforts
to test psychoanalytic concepts; psychoanalytic view of man, and mode
of discourse.
Psychoanalysis--the individual and the world. Psychoanalysis
posits that the weight of history is a heavy one--one that weighs on
every individual and, as a result, on all cultures. This weight is
both ontogenetic and phylogenetic in nature. That is, the mental repre-
sentatives of the earliest childhood conflicts and the resulting repres-
sive energy put to work exert a considerable influence over all later
relationships. Much more than this: all humans in a very basic sense
are influenced by a form of racial memory; that is, Freud asserted the
existence of a primal guilt as a result of the primal murder of the
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father, the memory of which requires continuous working through via
ritualized cleansing actions. ^3 History at its core is the expression
of man's aggressive urges directed at the memory of the oppressive
father; in close competition with these aggressive urges are the forces
of Eros--those forces which are work to bring man into relationship
with other men.
Man's history is one of conflict and that conflict is rooted in the
fundamental contradictions between instinct and world. This conflict
manifests itself in specific ways in mental life: there exist mental
representations of the early clashes between instinctual drives and
society; these mental representatives remain alive and charged with
energy in the unconscious, and these in turn conflict with and press
upon the ego. The developing ego is itself, then, in perpetual struggle
with demands of the id and the world. It mediates inner and outer.
Neurosis exists as a result of the inherent contradiction between bio-
logical demands that seek immediate gratification and civilization
(culture's) demands that they be postponed, often indefinitely. Only
humans, of all the creatures, can become neurotic.
The world lives inside the individual; it functions in the individ-
ual in very specific v/ays. One way is via the oedipus complex. The
oedipus complex is a social event taking place within the mind of the
individual. It is a description and an explanation of how the outside
world becomes translated into the inner life of the individual and how
its forces continue to exert influence. Ernst van den Haag, a contem-
porary practicing psychoanalyst expresses it this way.
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What is psychoanalysis concerned with if not the relationship
among people? Is Freud supposed to have thought of the oedipus
complex as an intra-uterine relationship? Psychoanalysis is
centrally concerned with ' interaction'
The superego and ego form different functions in the mind. These
too are social categories. But these are not social categories 'inter-
acting' loosely with individuals— they are social categories at work in
very specific ways within the mental life of the individual
. The super-
ego is almost entirely formed as a result of the impact of the social
world on the individual; the ego is that part of the psyche which mediates
between the demands of the social world and the demands of the id. Iden-
tification and introjection are two functions of the ego that explain
the specific way we 'take the social inside', and how these inner mental
representatives exert force both inside and, as a result, outside our-
selves. These two functions, introjection and identification, are tied
to bodily processes, particularly oral processes. Indeed the develop-
ment of the ego as a whole is at base tied intimately to the body. In
a profound sense it can be said that vie come to know the outside world
through different parts of our bodies. The radical departure this im-
plies from the subject object split as posited by the English philoso-
phers who have so influenced empiricists' modes of knowing is made clear
by Bakan:
To understand the psychoanalytical view of human development we
contrast it to the view associated with classical English phil-
osophy: that development is the increase of knowledge through
the informative senses--the eyes and ears, primarily, and to a
lesser degree, taste, smell and touch... In contrast Freud
stressed
the noninforma tive sensations from the oral, anal, and genital
regions of the body ... (These) regions are related to the ingress
and regress of the material substances associated with
the actual
physical existence of the being and the material production
of
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other beings. What (the Freudian view) does show is that there
is a significant place in the psyche for the psychological coun-
terpart of the physical continuity of persons with one another
expressed most sharply in sexual yearning, and biologically cen-
tered on those parts of the body most materially continuous with
the rest of the world.
The point of this lengthy quote from Bakan is to re-emphasize how
radical an interpenetration between mind and world is in fact posited
by psychoanalytic theory. Whether one agrees or disagrees with Freud's
view of the nature of the human mind is one thing which is not at issue
here. To argue that his psychology is an individual psychology is to
display a naive reading of a complex body of work. One absolutely es-
sential strand of psychoanalytic theory is the interpenetration and
ensuing conflict between biology, mental representations of instinctual
life and environment. Man has a mind, a mental life which is part of
nature and can be known by him. There are very specific and observable
patterns to man's mental life which have come to be known by this natural
science, psychoanalysis. As a result, some profound observations of a
radical nature can be made about the relationship between civilization
(culture) and human subjects.
Because psychoanalysis has made a study of the instincts it was
in a position to explain the origin of character traitism as
collisions between environmental influences and those instincts,
partly as expression of various instinctual demands, partly as a
reaction formation against them. 26
Or as Russell Jacoby puts it succinctly capturing in a sentence the
profound degree of radical subject/object interaction posited by psy-
choanalytic theory:
Critical theory drawing upon psychoanalysis sinks into subjectiv-
ity until it hits bottom: society. It is here where subjectivity
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devolvp into objectivity; subjectivity is pursued till it issuesinto the social and historical events which preformed and deformed
the subject. This constitutes the subject/object dU^9cf^F~77-T;^ emphasis
No better statement of the meaning behind the idea of 'subject and object
are in complete dialectic interaction* could be made. The inner con-
nection to psychoanalytic theory leads us to understand how different
a logic is at work here, to the logic informing positivist inquiry. It
is not simply a matter of positing that there exists a 'transaction'
between man and world and arguing that we need a psychology that takes
this transaction into account. The kind of relationship which occurs
is extremely complex; man and world are not loosely tied together but
intimately so. Man is not a vacant tabula rasa when he enters the
world who is then 'conditioned' by society. We do not need a psychol-
ogy which takes the social into account; we have one. What is required
is the considerable intellectual commitment and time needed to under-
stand psychoanalytic theory and then to be able to work within its
mode of discourse and to historicize it, (i.e., to be able to use its
conceptual categories correctly without removing the 'cutting edge',
and at the same time apply these categories to the world of 1977).
A 'progressive' critique of psychoanalysis . Our critic of psycho-
analytic theory from the standpoint of its being an individual psychol-
ogy divorced from a comprehension of the influence of environment, his-
tory and culture, posits another position which (and this is crucial)
he or she sees as the more radical position. The following is a para-
phrasing of a typical argument. It is in the social organization of our
lives that the real problem lies; it is in the reorganization of the social
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world that our energies must be put; it is in the study of sociology
that our intellectual efforts must be invested. Our critic would insist
that the whole point is that there is a 'transaction' between man and
world, or that the social 'influences' the individual enormously. A
typical statement of this position is to be found in a radical critigue
of our society and of psychoanalytic theory, as espoused by Shulamith
Firestone, 28 whose work seems to have had considerable impact on both
the women's movement and others who call for fundamental social adjust-
ments of a certain sort, (e.g., John Holt^^ and Philip Slater^O). She
sums up her critique in this way:... 'a therapy that has proven worse than
useless may eventually be replaced with the only thing that can do any
good: political organization. '^1
Firestone, like many in her camp, posits no mental life whatsoever.
They may be prone to classify Freud's formulations as metaphors, rather
than concepts which are based upon observation of material reality, and
which attempt to explain mental phenomena. On the one side, according
to these theorists, we have the social world, which somehow and in some
way (never clearly articulated) has entered the individual; on the other
side we have the individuals who are oppressing and being oppressed. The
main dynamic between individuals is one of power. Alter the relationships
of power and relationships in general will be altered for the better.
I am not arguing that vie must concentrate only on the treatment of
individuals; social structures, purposes, principles must undergo ex-
treme change for a more human society to be established. The point is
that the nature of the changes one would propose will be fundamentally
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determined by the particular theory of the human subject one holds. If
one posits an essentially blank mind whose inner working mirrors the
social, then one will develop social solutions of the kind proposed by
Firestone, Slater and Holt (examples given below). If one posits on the
other hand that the human mind takes in the social in a complex and
difficult way as a result of some fundamental biologically rooted con-
ditions which can never be ignored, then one is liable to come up with
some very different solutions. One may argue for instance that the
superego and its appropriate development can represent one hope to
overcome aggression, and free us to set our sights on more noble goals.
The development of the superego is both a great achievement and a great
problem for mankind. How to enhance the achievement and lessen the
problematical aspects is a task still far from accomplished.
Clearly it would be impossible however to 'do away with the family',
or 'allow children to become free if they so desire, no matter what their
age', or 'to flatten out the intensity of mother, child, father relation-
ships, so as to prevent neurotic oedipal searches later in life' (these
solutions are condensed versions of those presented by Firestone, Holt
and Slater, respectively). Each of these solutions is proposed as a
more radical, more progressive version of what exists. They are actually
regressive in the most fundamental ways, liable to contribute further to
the already weakening superego and thus make it necessary for either harsh-
er community (state) repression of aggression, or a greater outpouring
of aggression amongst individuals. (This is a condensed
statement of
a long and complicated argument which cannot be explained
fully in this
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context)
.
Psychoanalysis— a genetic science . Psychoanalysis contains, then,
at its core a set of fundamental propositions about the nature of the
human mind. At its core too it is a genetic science. That is, psycho-
analytic theory urges the investigator to uncover the roots of the matter
at hand. Only by understanding the human subject at his/her roots are
we liable to understand him or her in a radical way. This genetic posi-
tion must be understood as dynamic in nature.
The central puzzle about which the genetic explanation is con-
cerned involves a question of change--change in state, condition
or location. . .tracing out connections between present and future
states... it is concerned with antecedent or future states of the
subject in question, and more particularly with such states and the
subject's present condition. 32
An understanding of the roots allows us to be able to distinguish what
is absolutely given, and what is as a result of accident. Without a
genetic explanation, and a resulting genetic understanding, the whole
can never be understood. The whole does not mean being able to see
everything --requiring all the facts before we can claim to know any-
thing. It means being able to perceive underlying essentials, how they
inform prevailing and dominant patterns, and how these stand in rela-
tionship to what is latent--what is not on the surface, but making its
presence felt nevertheless. (Just as critical theory is concerned with
genesis, so is psychoanalysis at its core a genetic science). It is
impossible to hold as true one aspect of psychoanalytic thought, while
at the same time giving up its genetic nature, and still call what
one
is doing or writing about psychoanalysis, as Karen Homey does.
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My conviction expressed in a nutshell is that psychoanalysis should
outgrowthe limitations set by its being an instinctivistic and
a genetic psychology .. .we (will) recognize that the connection
between later peculiarities and earlier experiences is more com-
plicated than Freud assumes. 33
The position is that eventually, by concentrating less on the instinctiv-
istic elements, we will be able to concentrate more on the 'sociolog-
ical orientation'. The position Homey takes will not be disputed at
any greater length than has already been done. Her position is no
longer within the framework of psychoanalytic theory, and is thus cer-
tain to depart in the most fundamental ways, and have implications of a
sort that could never be condoned by a psychoanalytic point of view.
Fenichel's response to Homey is instructive because it establishes the
parameter of the debate and insists on the maintenance of the core of
the theory, for without it "psychoanalysis remains like a knife without
a blade that has no handle. He goes on to say in direct response
to the Homey statement quoted above: "My conviction expressed in a
nutshell is that the value of psychoanalysis as a natural science is
rooted in it being an instinctivistic and a genetic psychology
.
The arguments about and insistence on remaining true to the core
of the theory is not intended as intellectual nit-picking. The long term
differences between one seed and another is considerable even if at the
beginning two young plants may look very similar. A theoretical self-
consciousness attempts to grasp what is at the core of a theory and
understand how the root and the resulting conceptual system are bound
together. One cannot simply lift the conceptual system off its roots
and attach it to another set of roots (usually unconsciously held)
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without doing radical damage to the original theory (plant). Naturally
remaining true to the core does not mean that there is nothing to be
done, no further puzzles to be solved within the framework set by the
theory. On the contrary, particularly with a theory of the dimensions
of psychoanalytic theory a great deal has to be done extending far be-
yond the confines of the therapeutic environment.
Psychoanalys i s--and efforts to test
. It is relevant to mention
here that various efforts have been made to test psychoanalytic con-
cepts experimentally. David Rapapport discusses these attempts and his
comments are worth quoting in full for two reasons: the first is that
they sum up so well what has been argued here, this time in connection
with research and 'testing'. That is, the mode of research and testing
is directly implicated in the entire mode in which the theory partici-
pates; the one cannot simply be abstracted from the other. The second
reason is that Rapapport's comments on the interpretation of Freud are
so similar to those made in this dissertation on when analyzing Alschuler's
interpretations of Freire, (i.e., Alschuler took one mode of researching
and knowing and attached it to another). Here are Rapapport's comments:
Thus Freudian terms and crudely analagous observations invaded
the experimental literature on a scale never before attained, but
the price paid v/as that Freud's concepts were turned into vague
conceptions, barely related, and at times actually contradictory
to their original forms... The overwhelming majority of experi-
ments designed to test psychoanalytic propositions display a bla-
tant lack of interest in the meaning, within the theory of psycho-
analysis, of the propositions tested. Thus most of them did not
measure what they purported to... It is not that these experiments
are useless as confirming evidence, but rather that at this stage
of our knowledge it is not clear what--if anything--they confirm.
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^sychoana1ysis-a view of man, and a mode of discourse
. From an-
other point of view, psychoanalysis at its core is more than a set of
interrelated fundamental propositions with an accompanying conceptual
system; it is more than a genetic science. It contains a fundamentally
tragic view of man, a view which requires facing up to and admitting in
our theories. "To endure life" Freud said, "remains when all is said
and done, the first duty of all living beings. Illusion can have no
value if it makes this more difficult for us; if you would endure life,
be prepared for death. Freud was once reviewing a particularly de-
vastating attack on his person; he commented to Ernst Simmel : "this
author says I am wicked; he has committed a plagiarism. I said that
myself years ago."^^
This tragic vision, this critical edge, has been the target of
many subsequent theoreticians who, objecting to its 'pessimistic' na-
ture have taken from psychoanalytic theory some essential insights,
beautified them with another set of assumptions about the nature of
life and offered their new theories as a better version than the orig-
inal. Although psychoanalysis seems to have been well received in some
quarters in America its welcome has been conditional. The condition
has been that most of its essential insight has been softened up. One
brief example is given by three contemporary observers. Rycroft, Gorer
and others^^ point out that the reception to psychoanalysis in America
has not included an acceptance of the theory of infantile sexuality;
which is one of the three pillars upon v/hich the whole structure of
psychoanalytic theory is built. (It is in this viev; of man's life as
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essentially tragic that psychoanalytic theory radically parts company
with Freire, a point which will be further taken up in Chapter VI).
Very closely tied to this tragic view of man and life is another
central core to psychoanalytic theory: its insistence on a certain mode
of discourse, one that is summed up by the idea of nega ti on
. Erik
Eriksen is a psychoanalytic theorist who has deepened, expanded, and
made popular various aspects of psychoanalytic theory but he has done
so at a cost. The cost is only to be discovered by comprehending both
the subtle and obvious ways in which Eriksen has placed a halo around
some of the nastier aspects of psychoanalytic principles. My aim here
is not to explore Eriksen but to give one extensive quote from a re-
viewer of his work, Joel Kovel. The following from Kovel is in essence
a restatement and summary of various propositions that have been put
forth in this chapter.
A more primitive and elementary conception is that of negation...
to Freud human reality was a field of forces in conflict, within
which a trend, repression, exists to split off negated qualities
from the main, official body of consciousness. Further, these
split off qualities continue to exert a major effect behind the
screen of consciousness. This is the elementary explanatory
logic of psychoanalysis . The theory of infantile sexuality
plays such an important role in Freudian thought precisely be-
cause of its essential negativity. . .to recognize the ambivalence
in the midst of our nature. . .this was Freud's permanent achievement. “^0
Certainly, theoretical advances can and must be made.'^^ But the
deep meaning, the deep structure of the theory must be maintained in
order to represent psychoanalysis, as opposed to something else. "A
theory remains coherent only if it sticks to a certain cardinal form
of explanation, and organizes updated information under its aegis.
Thus when psychoanalysis loses its principle of negation it loses its
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critical and penetrating power as well. ••42 psychoanalysis
the truth that is lost when this negating explanatory principle is given
up, is almost the whole truth.
One central task for man is to be able to comprehend his helpless-
ness and yet persist all the while. In other words the distinctions
being insisted upon here are not simply nit-picking. A brief example
must suffice. The political implications of one position as opposed to
another are considerable. It is obvious that the growing •pessimism^ of
the 1970 •s in America is of enormous concern to American business. Evi-
dence of the concern can be found in the many current newspaper adver-
tisements urging Americans to rekindle their optimistic, idealistic
spirit. On the other hand a growing realism amongst Americans, which
the current pessimistic mood may give birth to, could be the way through
to a different kind of social structure:
In the light... the widespread loss of confidence in our political
institutions and leaders, the lack of respect for authority, the
alienation from the o-ficial values of the society, even the re-
vulsion against pol itics .. .appear as sensible response to the debacle
accomplished by those in authority. Ungovernability may be our last
but it is surely not our best hope. Our best hope paradoxically,
is in the pessimism of the present, in our disillusionment. It
may signify that as a nation we are finally ready to abandon child-
ish fantasies of collective omnipotence and overflowing abundance,
that we are repelled at having made legitimate the corpulent powers
that now govern us and at having accepted gratefully their tawdry
benefits. 43
Understanding a theory then is hard work. If one really comes to
know a theory as a v/hole, it has enormous consequences for the way we
will see and act upon the world. Knowing a theory in the full sense
which I have described here is by definition to come to see the world and
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act upon the world in a different way. Theory and action are disting-
uishable moments, but the distinction cannot be a radical one. A person
who knows psychoanalytic theory will alv/ays notice the sensuous facts,
will always insist upon desimplification in any description of reality.
What is at the surface is only partially true; the latent content con-
tains the more crucial truth, consisting of congealed phylogenetic and
ontogenetic history. Only with a discovery of the truth is there a
relief from the severity of the symptoms. Only with a perpetual effort
to continue to reach for latent content will the symptoms be prevented
from regaining power; its truths are never fully discovered or revealed.
Psychoanalytic theory, like critical theory, requires of those who study
it a capacity and a willingness to overcome wishful thinking, a con-
comitant willingness and commitment to unearthing and naming the uncom-
fortable truths, as well as a preparedness to tolerate the fact that so
little can be claimed as certain . Freud's 'illiberal' position on the
question of truth is appropriate here. He is addressing those who would
call on him to be more tolerant in his stance as to what constitutes
psychoanalysis and what does not;
What further claims do you make in the name of tolerance? That
when someone has uttered an opinion which we regard as completely
false we should say to him: 'Thank you very much forhaving given
voice to this contradiction. You are guarding us against the danger
of complacency and giving us an opportunity of showing the Americans
that we are really as 'broadminded' as they wish. To be sure we do
not believe a word of what you are saying, but that makes no differ-
ence. Perhaps you are just as right as we are. After all who can
possibly know who is right? In spite of our antagonism, pray allow
us to represent your point of view in our publications. We hope
that you will be kind enough in exchange to find a place for our
views which you deny'.^^
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...it is a simple fact the truth cannot be tolerant. ^5
Only by comprehending the inner core, the mode of discourse of psycho-
analytic theory can one understand the inner connections to critical
theory, and the fundamental way in which both are in opposition to what
is dominant, normal, everyday acceptable reality.
To sum up this section and introduce the next, the following thoughts
are in order. Without a theoretical self-consciousness, one is likely
to miss what is most progressive, and substitute what is most regressive,
while all the while under the illusion that what one is doing is in fact
more progressive. Theoretical illiteracy will result in a failure to
adopt revolutionary theory. The dominant mode in this country, as has
been argued, is a general suspiciousness of theory. This suspicious-
ness often hides anti-intellectualism and is part of the oppressive order;
thus the combatting of such suspiciousness would be a critical political
act. There is a general assertion amongst those who interpret Freire
naively that our task must not be to merely study the social sciences
but rather encourage action. This view misapprehends the state of af-
fairs in this already too activist a society, namely, we need much more
reflection organized and taught in a fundamentally different way to that
which exists at present.
The maintenance of a critical social theory in hard times, times
of encapsulation and integration, let alone oppression, is in fact
an act of political defiance--or an act of political hope or faith
The active pursuit of critical theory in a so-called knowledge
based society is in itself a political act, because a knowledge
based society depends on the production of technically utilizable
knowledge, not critical knowledge.46
It is hopefully clear now on the basis of what has been said in the last
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two sections, that education for theoretical self-consciousness would
be a significant contribution to the development of a critical con-
sciousness amongst various members of the academic community, including
students.
Section Three
Developing an Educational Program based upon Freire's Principles
Crucial to the establishment of any educational alternative is a
clearly articulated critique of what exists; the critique should display
an ability to address what is dominant at its roots, and be able to speak
the language of the dominant paradigm. The critique must make clear what
it rejects in the dominant paradigm and what it wishes to maintain. Crit-
ical theory looks for the 'old in the new and the new in the old.' The
statement articulating the purposes of the alternative must reveal a
theoretical self-consciousness; that is it must be a statement articu-
lating the roots of the alternative theory as well as its terms of dis-
course, its logic of explanation, what it considers as given, its view
of the human subject and the possibility for change.
One vital task we face is to educate for the development of theoret-
ical self-consciousness. The argument that such a task would consti-
tute an act of critical consciousness was made in the last section. So
many efforts to create alternatives fail because of the failure to com-
prehend the role of theory as it has been explicated. So many radical
positions have their sharpness dulled by those well meaning educators
who, in order that the theory be spread far and wide, simplify it, in-
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strumental ize it, and thereby reduce it beyond recognition.
For the purposes of discussion I wish to speculate upon the nature
of an educational program intended to educate for theoretical self-
consciousness geared for potential teachers as well as first year col-
lege students. The following two sections explicate what some of the
focii would be for these two differing groups. As far as the teachers
are concerned, I make the assumption that they are ready and willing
to undertake the course of study I describe; to an uncommitted group
I would suggest they go through a course of study very similar to the
one I propose for the college students in the second section.
Teachers . Freire's work is obviously addressed to intellectuals;
all those not committed to the intellectual endeavor would not have the
patience or the background to struggle through his books. Some, in
order to overcome this difficulty with Freire would simplify his words,
put them onto charts and attempt to experimentally prove various state-
ments of his as true or untrue. In the process, as has been argued at
length, the heart of Freire is neatly removed.
Teachers who would wish to understand and then use the principles
articulated by Freire, and critical theory in general, would, for one and
a half years of a two year program do nothing other than immerse them-
selves in the tradition of critical theory. This would mean readings in
Marx, Freud, analytic philosophy, the critical theorists, including
Freire, and readings about theory itself, so that a theoretical self-
consciousness could begin to develop. It is absolutely certain that one
criticism will quickly emerge: that this material is too difficult.
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too obscurely written, and too removed from the everyday world of teach-
ing problems. This will be responded to not by providing twenty minute
•nuclear problem solving sessions' in order to combat 'afternoon phil-
osophic yawns', but rather as an issue to be discussed. Why is there such
resistence to difficult material? Why might our intentions to master
the material wane so quickly? What do our demands for simpler material
say about our implicit understandings of the nature of humans and the
social reality? What analogues to this attitude exist in the culture
at large? Where do they come from? Who do they benefit? This kind
of dialogue should occur whenever the reading causes a particular kind
of response amongst a number of students; it would serve as a prototype
for the kinds of dialogue which may take place with their own students
when they begin to teach.
Those who wish to teach using these Freirian principles must be
prepared to read in the social and political sciences, or if not, at
least be prepared to explicate their contrary position. There is no way
to be an educator who has some critical awareness in the sense described
by Freire, and not to have read carefully and fully in these disciplines.
The power of the dominant theoretical paradigm in which we all live,
which is constitutive of what we see and how we act in the world, this
power is too great to assume that a 'consciousness raising group' will
achieve critical consciousness among its members. Only as ever deep-
ening understanding of the weight of history, of the weight of forms of
thought and language, and their intimate relationship to the world of
everyday action, can help make it possible for an individual to become
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slightly detached from the forces of the dominant paradigm. Thus the
content of our one and a half year long reading program would include
some work on the history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and
the concomitant emergence of the liberal doctrine, with a very strong
emphasis on the relationship of this doctrine to our institutional life,
including every day modes of discourse and action.
It will also become necessary for the future teachers to understand
that the crucial concepts of Freire's work such as reflection/action;
dialogue/dialectic/subject/object, magic, naive and critical conscious-
ness--have a history, that they have been debated and discussed for
many years, that Freire is addressing an audience whom he presumes to
hold a certain knowledge about the state of the debate. All arguments,
all theoretical explanations take place in a context, and one can only
claim knowledge of the theory when one also comprehends the context of
explanation (this will include the forms of investigation and evalua-
tion appropriate to that context).
The aim of this absorption in the tradition of critical theory is
to encourage people to begin to reason critically about their v/orld. It
is not a question of developing critical thinking skills . Rather it
would be a program intended to nurture the capacity to reason, by pro-
viding a theoretical framework, which assumes to begin with the immoral-
ity of what is, and argues within the context of explanation for a new
order. We must learn to reason critically.
The task is to re-establish once again the value of the philosophic
mind; philosophic thinking which is applied to the social reality is a
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Step toward critical consciousness. (Freire received his doctorate in
philosophy; Marx wrote his dissertation on a remote philosopher who
influenced Plato). It is the only way for the educators to approach
critical consciousness. We simply cannot transcend what is by magic or
by psychological manipulation, or by therapy (although the latter could
have a role to play, but not in the context of formal education ).
There must be an unwavering commitment to the pursuit of knowledge,
and a recognition that the effect on action is considerable but not in
a clear one to one relationship. The kind of knowledge worth pursuing
is not that which is technical, abstract, and instrumental, but that which
is passionate, and committed to the truth, which conceived of the intel-
lectual endeavor as a difficult task requiring struggle. The overall
goal of the educational effort then would be for the teachers to emerge
with one thought clearly in mind: the pursuit of knowledge and the
development of one's capacity to reason is a slow difficult path to
liberation. It does not guarantee liberation by any manner of means, but
it is the sine qua non of a truly democratic society. Freire puts it
this way: "To the extent an epoch dynamically generates its own themes,
men will have to make more and more use of intellectual and less and
less of emotional and instinctive functions
.
"^7
To those who ask how do we know that our teachers are approaching
a critical consciousness, we give the words of Jules Henry: To think
deeply in our culture is to grow angry and to anger others. One of
the
rewards of deep thought is the hot glow of anger at discovering
a wrong,
but if the anger is taboo, thought will starve to death.
Thinking
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must not be divorced from passion, nor passion from thinking. Ideally
the one must be continuously contributing to the other. Perhaps Freud
is the outstanding theorist of our time to demonstrate both in his person
and his work how these two domains can stand in dynamic relation with
each other.
The Students
. Let us assume then that a small group of educators
are in agreement about certain fundamentals as to the nature of theory;
they have some understanding as to the nature of liberal theory specif-
ically and the nature of the social institutions constituted by it.
There exists agreement that education should attempt to encourage nega-
tive critical thinking (see Chapter II) amongst students; and that one
way to do this is via an application of Paulo Freire's educational
theory, which can only be fully understood in the context of critical
theory in general.
Freire's work is written to a specific audience, which is the intel-
lectual community. His presumption is that the intellectual is faced
by a perpetual problem; how to translate truths which he/she is fairly
certain hold value for mankind in general, to the less educated, to those
whose critical faculties have been dulled due to oppressive social forces.
An intellectual (for purposes of this discussion) is one whose basic com-
mitment is to the search for knowledge, and to the discovery of some
fundamental truths. To intellectuals the task of understanding Freire,
may be a difficult one, but if there is an interest in his work the
effort will be made to read his specific work and those other works which
stand in his tradition. There is no need to come up with fancy techniques
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in order to educate intellectuals about Freire's theory. There exists
in them an active principle which makes banking education an impossibil-
ity-that active principle in this case is the desire to know. Individ-
uals who have this passion are actively engaged, even while sitting per-
fectly still listening to a lecture. There is a form of dialogue oc-
curing in this situation. Freire's pedagogy is intended for a very spe-
cific population: those people who have remained inhibited at a certain
stage, and no longer wish to know or rather are prepared to simply accept
whatever is given, without critically intervening in any way. (Note:
the oppressor has also lost his wish to know more: he usually unconsciously
thinks he knows a great deal, and is simply unable to put himself into
a learning posture toward someone else). These individuals, whether pea-
sants or first year college students are often taught various and
sundry subjects regardless of their wanting to know anything. The re-
sult at best, is that nothing at all is learned, and a good deal of en-
ergy has been wasted, or more likely, that an additional regression toward
apathy has taken place.
There are those who would argue that the university should not, and
cannot, make the attempt to reach that large number who do not come here
in order to discover, that there should be other kinds of institutional-
ized ways of making the transition from adolescence to adulthood, or of
being trained for a vocation. This argument has considerable strength.
Yet like it or not these shifts are unlikely to occur in the near future
and in one way or another we are faced with the problem of how to educate
these many students whose passion to know remains dormant. Various ap-
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proaches have been tried, some more successful than others. The fol-
lowing are some speculations on what some of the principles would be
guiding the establishment of a first year program based upon the edu-
cational theory of Paulo Freire.
I begin with a listing of principles. Following this there will
be commentary.
1. Education would tend toward the developing of a theoretical self-
consciousness, which in the long run would have profound implications
for action.
2. A highly held aim would be to provoke the passion to know more .
Students should leave a one year long program with a commitment to the
pursuit of knowledge, at least thinking about the proposition that the
right sort of knowledge can be a form of power. The right kind of know-
ledge in this case means knowledge which negates what responsibly
and coherently, and aims for truths leading to a more just social order.
3. In every case where the educators feel compelled to communicate some
principles which they feel the students should come to grips with, the
effort must be made to have the students accomodate the knowledge, rather
than via simple assimilation or absorption. (Accomodation in Piaget's
scheme involves struggle or work).
4. For this last to happen the educator must make every effort to come
to know the thought language reality of his students. This is a very
different proposition from the following which also argues that we need
to know more about our students:
(The) first step in making these studies is to know the entering
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student, to know him as an actual or potential scholar, to knowhim as a person and to see him against his background and against
the college environment and its subcultures. While the research
IS being done the unusually sensitive teacher will explore the
relationship for himself and teach and counsel in the light of
what he thinks he has discerned. ^9
So according to this position the less sensitive teacher would eventually
have a body of research while would provide him with the information he
needs in order to know the students. I, on the other hand, am calling
here for teachers interested in the teaching endeavor— for ^ to
become students of their students. Such knowledge cannot be abstracted
from the real concrete human beings and laid down as a static unchanging
body of knowledge in order to save the less sensitive teachers the trou-
ble. The only kind of knowledge of the students worth having is that
which is sensitively obtained from specific people in a specific moment
of history, who come from specific socio/economic classes and ethnic
groups. The task is to come to know their everyday knowledge. This
knowledge is in most cases unreflected opinion, and thus even if the right
opinion still in need of reflection. Without knowing the intricacies of
the thought language reality of the students, any efforts to educate will
almost certainly remain abstract, at least in the minds of the students.
The aim, then, is to discover those words, phrases, thought patterns,
which are taken as given by students, which seemed to be widely shared
by them, and which the critically conscious educator perceives as a
problem to be solved rather than a given order of things.
5. Finding out the nature of the students' reality is the first moment
of the educational endeavor. Research is not an isolated activity.
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however, to be followed by the appropriate courses. Discovery of the
students' world of knowledge and dialogue about it are distinct but
closely related activities. The educational program is underway at the
same moment that the research begins. It is the first stage of the
educational program.
These then are some of the principles which would inform our endea-
vor. The following is an elaboration on these points.
Ideally our group of educators would consist of a group who, apart
from sharing a common theoretical perspective would be specialists in
the following disciplines: social theory, education, language (includ-
ing linguistics) and its relationship to the representation of reality,
media (including reading, writing and use of film, slides etc.).
This group would in pairs or singly, or with some advanced students
and in the context of the classroom begin the investigation of the
thought language reality of the students. The entire first semester
should have as its primary emphasis the discovery of themes in the stu-
dents' lives. As has been said this means that education in the fullest
sense is occurring all the while. That is, the teacher is teaching at
the same time that he or she is attempting to learn from the students.
The investigation would have to take place regardless of prior knowledge
on the part of the educators regarding the nature of some of these themes.
The following paragraph of Freire's explains how I view this process:
If the educators lack sufficient funds to carry out the preliminary
thematic investigation as described above, they can with a minimum
of knowledge of the situation--select some basic themes to serve
as 'codifications to be tested'. Accordingly they can begin with ^
introductory themes and simultaneously initiate further investigation
50
216
Two interrelated themes would be at the heart of our educational team's
interest. One would be the attitudes and thoughts, the students have
about the world of knowledge and the actions they take with regard to it,
and the second will be the very closely related theme, the view of human
nature the students hold. As these issues are debated and discussed,
their discussion "touches upon other aspects of reality, which comes
to be perceived in an increasingly critical manner. These aspects in turn
involve many other themes.
Of course these issues--the nature of knowledge, and the question
of the meaning of being human--are immense and complex. Yet they are
surely part of the groundwork, part of what is absolutely fundamental
for the students to begin to think about. The crucial thing is for the
students to come to understand that they do have knowledge, and that
they are acting on the basis of this unreflected knowledge all the time.
The knowledge they hold contains the fundamentals of any system of know-
ledge: it consists of a set of fundamental propositions about the nature
of mind, the process of coming to know something, the meaning of being
human, work, all of which shades into a conceptual system which in turn
is intimately related to action. In the process of coming to know about
their own system of knowledge students come to know about systems of
knowledge in general. More significantly, of course, they begin to reflect
upon their ov/n system of knowledge at the same moment that they discover
that they do indeed have one.
In the process of decoding the participants externalize their
thematics and thereby make explicit their 'real consciousness
of the world'... By stimulating 'perception of the previous percep-
tion' and 'knowledge of the previous knowledge' decoding stimulates
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the appearance of new perception and the development of new know-
ledge.^^
So in the process of these discoveries the students may begin to make
some fundamentally different kinds of decisions about how they act in
the world. However, any real changes in attitude could only come about
if two further conditions hold; that the educators move slowly, and
that the students be able to participate in more than one course of
this sort.
The educators must be willing to move very slowly and carefully
when wanting to find out more from the students as well as when wanting
to communicate what they v;ant students to know more about. The process
of questioning students about the nature of their reality should follow
the same principles as those which inform the psychoanalytic investigator
who wants to know more about his patient. When the psychoanalyst listens
to his patient he takes nothing for granted; he does not remain satis-
fied until the meaning of an apparently obvious statement such as I am
'lonely' is clearly understood by both himself and the patient. There
is a continual 'say more about that', 'explain that word to me', 'what
do you mean by that?' from the psychoanalyst to the patient. So it
should be from the dialogic teacher who really wants to know more from
his students. In addition, like the psychoanalyst, the dialogic teacher
must learn to take what the students say absolutely seriously; often the
important moments are not those which are most obvious. So for example
the 'I don't know' from the students are the acceptance of a limit
situation by them, not a fact to be accepted as such. Two comments of
"...we have treated as holy writ whatFreud's are applicable here.
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previous writers have regarded as arbitrary improvisation. .. "53
"(Psychoanalysis) is accustomed to divine secret and concealed things
from unconsidered or unnoticed details, from the rubbish heap, as it
were, of our observations."^^
The educator is continuously using his critical interpretive pov^ers
to make sense of the information he is receiving; unlike the phenomenol-
ogists who wants to bracket his subjectivity, the critical educator
wants to use his in a controlled manner--! n the same way the psychoanalyst
does in the transference relationship. The aim is to make conscious what
theoretical or other principles are at work in interpretation, rather
than to pretend that it is possible to cause one's mind to become a
blank receiver to the essential truths of the 'things themsel ves
'
These helpful analogies to the psychoanalytic process should not
confuse as to the real nature of our task. The dialogic educator wants
to stay away completely from overtly psychological issues or material.
The educator wants to discover manifest and latent knowledge held by the
students, while avoiding the specifically personal troubles the students
are experiencing. Personal troubles which are shared widely by others
can be discussed as social issues . These can clearly be discussed
on the level of the social, and even though the result of such discus-
sion is self knowledge, the distinctions between education and therapy
are always maintained.
The same holds true for material which the educator wishes to com-
municate to the students. In some cases a short lecture is appropriate.
that the educator must move very slowly in his/The important point is
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her effort to communicate fundamental principles. These principles
will only be meaningful in any way if the students recognize their own
thought/language reality re-presented to them as a problem; they must
then be able to accommodate this material (i.e., grapple and work with
it). It is one central thesis of this work, and of Freire's pedagogy
that reflection, grappling with some root assumptions which students
recognize as theirs, will in the long run produce some profound change.
For college students I would argue this change could occur with regard
to the nature of their commitment to the life of the mind.
But profound change of any sort can only come with time. One can-
not simply switch theoretical propositions, especially culture wide
ones, the way one would turn off a light switch. We can only hope to
achieve a commitment to finding out more. In other words we can only
hope to have provoked some comprehension of pain amongst the students.
The normal state of affairs is taken by most students to be equivalent
to the natural or most human state of affairs. The pain they are ex-
periencing as they participate in this state of affairs is an unconscious
one. This is the meaning of Freire's 'culture of silence'; the people
perceive no problems. Only via a discovery of the actual pain which does
exist (the pain which has as its cause predominantly in the social ) can
there result a commitment to discovering ways of resolving the pain
which could then become a commitment to the life of the mind. Amongst
some students a commitment to a more just, human order may result. These
students will recognize that only a better use of human intelligence
will make it possible for the race to survive at all. The relationship
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of pain to learning was well put by Freud;
Do not have the syrnptorns disappear too guickly
. , .©very improvement
in his condition reduces the rate at which he recovers and diminishes
the instinctual force impelling him to recovery. If owing to the
symptoms having been taken apart and having lost their value his
suffering becomes mitigated, we must re-instate it elsewhere in the
form of some appreciable privation; otherwise we run the danger of
never achieving any improvements except quite insignificant and
transitory ones. 57
So the task is to provoke the pain where it is not realized consciously
by showing how the normal is in fact a problem to be solved. Then the
task is to maintain the provocation.
Of course, one course can only begin to raise the curtain of con-
sciousness, a curtain which for security reasons will be quickly drawn
again, unless the pressure is maintained. Thus we come to the second
requirement if the Freirian principles are to take hold--that the students
participate in a second stage of an educational program. Briefly this
stage would consist of the following: The educational team would attempt
to compile the words, phrases, thoughts, which the students were expressing
and which the educators thought were both social and problematical in
nature. Here I can only give some outstanding examples of what some of
these words, thoughts, phrases may be, based upon my own investigation.
I have already given those with which I explicitly worked. The following
are based upon my working notes.
1. 'We are all individual
s
'
--this in answer to the question--is there
a human nature? There is little sense amongst the students of ways in
which humans are really part of common social matrices and participate
in intersubjecti ve meanings. There is little recognition of how much
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needs to be done before one can claim to be an individual.
2. Closely connected, and a dominant theme acting as a limiting factor
much the same way as resistance does in the individual psyche, is the
following; Each one is an individual and has his/her own opinion'. The
unsaid part of this statement is: 'so there is no point in discussing
or debating this issue'.
3. 'Now that we are in college we are free', is a standard phrase; it
opens up the chance to explore at length the meaning of freedom. At
some point it would be appropriate to make a connection between free-
dom and knowledge. 'Slavery to an unknown master is slavery still; and
not to know even that we are in bondage is to deepen it.'^^
4. 'We learn from experience'. This is a major assumption the students
hold, and one that has been strongly buttressed by recent developments
in educational theory. Much the same argument is made by those who say
that young people are 'oppressed by elders' who claim access to truth
and therefore teach the young. The fact is that a critical relationship
to reality can only be maintained by theoretical critical reflection,
which in turn leads to action. And only by maintaining the strictest
discipline of continuous reflection can a tendency to reification be
avoided. People's experiences, especially for the young is distorted
experience
to privilege (this experience) is to absolutize a distorted rela-
tivity, to ground oneself in the flux of repression and to avoid^
the need to evaluate competing theoretical frameworks on the basis
of their theoretical force--which (one) comes closest to grasping
coherently a complex totality which incorporates the human subject
at its critical core. 59
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5. Explore the question of the absolute absence of the older generation
in the midst of student life. Virtually the only relationships of any
significance experienced by the students are with members of their peer
group. No greater guarantee of conformity could be found. In my exper-
ience with the students this was a theme that they would have quite wil-
lingly spent some time exploring. The relationship of a provocative
tension between the generations and the development of a critical con-
sciousness is well expressed by Morris: 'A newer view of education as
meaningful transaction between the generations through which society is
changed and redefined, implying a teaching-learning relationship of
partnership and discovery is only slowly gaining ground.
6. 'Things which are worth doing must be easy! " This assumption is ob-
viously one of those contributing enormously to a consumer mentality.
7. 'I and many of the students I know know too well what we're doing
here. So we spend a lot of time being bored.' The issue of boredom is
not something to be resolved by providing further entertainment for stu-
dents. This boredom is closer to a chronic depression and is pervasive
in the student community like the one at the University of Massachusetts.
A re-presentation to the students in the form of a problem focussed on
this theme might look like this: "U. Mass is a great party school; you
can also get a great education here if you push for it. Somehow I don't
have all that much fun; I'm also not having a great education, and this
is all my fault."
This however is not the context within which to present a detailed
description of the forms in which the re-presentation would take place.
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The point is that the second stage of the educational program will be a
systematic re-presentation to the students of aspects of their thought-
language reality. The educating team will systematize their presenta-
tions in consultation with each other. For example, the question of
boredom will be re-presented, for a period of time. The question of
individuality as it has developed in American History, and the direct
relationship of historical events to everyday actions in the present
would be discussed. Only via an understanding of the, philosophical
and historical roots of one's culture can one avoid blindly and uncon-
sciously replicating old and self-defeating forms of behavior. Slowly,
perhaps at the end of such carefully prepared systematic re-presentation,
the students will come to recognize the degree to which powerfully en-
hanced knowledge could provide power to take truly transforming action
on their worlds. Thus the change in action we would hope for from this
group would be a commitment to a lifetime pursuit of knowledge, regard-
less of one's specific career. This could be the most profound of ac-
complishments. Of course the task and problem is how to achieve this for
the 'new' student in the University. It has been and is my belief that
Freire's work with peasants in Brazil does give some clues as to how to
approach a population who share with the peasants similar oppressed
states of consciousness. Freire sums up:
The impor it thing from the point of view of libertarian educa-
tion is for men to come to feel like masters of their thinking by
discussing the thinking and views of the world explicitly or im-
plicitly manifest in their own suggestions and those of their com-
rades. Because their view of education starts with the conviction
that it cannot present its own program but must search for this pro-
gram dialogically v/ith the people, it serves to introduce the peda-
gogy of the oppresse'i n the elaboration of which the oppressed must
participate.^^
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CHAPTER VI
Freire can and has been critiqued from various perspectives, some
of which have more validity than others. Those which hold little val-
idity are critiques based upon a misreading of the nature of Freire's
theory; thus these critiques deteriorate into a caricature of the theory.
One example of such an effort is the strong critique of Freire's
work by William S. Griffith.^ Griffith echoes many in this technicist
age who decry theory as 'impractical' and who call for 'practical guid-
ance'. ^ A lengthy critique of technicist thinking is given in Chapter
III and will only be repeated here in summary form. Griffith and those
in his camp radically separate method and content, the development of
intellectual functions and the objects of knowledge. Thus it makes no
difference what teachers talk about as long as students are being asked
'higher order' questions, which encourage the 'development of analytic
and synthetic abilities which enable the students to examine the facts
of a problem situation, identify the likely consequences of alternative
actions, and finally select and implement the alternative.
Griffith decries the fact that Freire has not addressed himself
to all the academic material which shows how to enhance cognitive de-
velopment, and in doing so Griffith displays his failure to grasp the
deep structure of Freire's work. His demand that Freire use more up
to date language' fails to recognize the fully blown theory of society,
which, Freire argues, has implications for the nature of educational
praxis. A valid critique of the idea of banking education (which is an
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example of out of date language, according to Griffith) would be one which
discusses whether the metaphor, 'banking education', aptly describes the
line of influence running from a capitalistic economic system, to instru-
mental thinking, to everyday praxis, including educational praxis. Grif-
fith wishes that we could just develop minds, which are conceived of by
him as in an independent relationship to social structure. An education
for critical consciousness cannot be reduced to the development of synthe-
cizing, analyzing or coping skills. Education for critical consciousness
requires an awakening to the fact that one is inevitably bound up with
political forces, whether one is active or passive. Such an education
is based upon a theory of society, not a theory of cognitive develop-
ment. Such an education intends that people emerge with the recogni-
tion of the absolute necessity for reflection upon historical, phil-
osophical and economic categories which are dominant and constitutive of
everyday life. Reflection of this sort must lead to the recognition that
the forces acting upon all of us have implications for how we in turn act
in the world. Only reflection can produce action which responsibly
resists that which is dominant and also dehumanizing. This requires the
development of a moral position, something mere skills development can-
not produce.
A critique based upon a profound understanding of Freire's theory
is given by Manfred Stanley who, significantly, is a social theorist
himself. Some of his points are an excellent restatement of Freire's
position, as well as a critique of technicist analysis: "For Freire
literacy is a quality of consciousness, not simply mastery of a morally
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neutral technique. .. It is this connection between moral rationale and
practice, not faddish negation, that makes him a radical thinker; rad-
icalism entails locating what one believes to be the generic root of
the problem, analyzing implications and acting accordingly ."5 Stanley
recognizes that behind (Freire's) attack on the established notion of
literacy (as a problem to be solved by appropriate techniques) lies
a coherent diagnosis of what has allegedly gone wrong in modern socie-
ties... his concrete proposals for change derive with uncompromising
directness from the nature of the diagnosis."^ So, Stanley has under-
stood the deep structure of Freire's theory and his critique can be
taken seriously.
In this context I only wish to deal with one of the points Stanley
takes up, since I believe it to be so central a problem in Freire's
work. True to the utopian tradition of Hegel and Marx, Freire seems to
have a vision of a golden age when all people will once again have re-
entered the garden of Eden; a rosy glow pervades Freire's work; as a re-
sult he has a responsibility for articulating where he stands with re-
gard to what is permissible and not permissible to bring about such a
golden age, but he does not do so. We have ample evidence that believ-
ers in the possibility of such a golden age have practiced atrocities
beyond our power of imagination, to bring it about. Freire, as with
Marx and Hegel, stands firmly within the Judeo-Christian tradition,
which has always imagined that when the Messiah comes all men will once
again be living in a state of peace and harmony with each other and with
nature. Stanley says: "(Freire) does not apparently take much note of
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the complexities, much less the dark side of liberation itself."^
Explicit in Freire is the conviction that once people have freed
themselves from the internalized oppressor, they will be whole. There
is, in other words, little indication in Freire's argument that he re-
cognizes certain inevitable and eternal conflicts for man in his rela-
tionship to nature (both inner and outer), and civilization. Freud, on
the other hand, recognized that there were absolute limits in any effort
to reform civilization; he in no way thought, however, that we have
achieved all that we can, but argued that we must resign ourselves to
making very slow progress, and that there was kind of strength to be
obtained in this recognition. The last lines of Beyond the Pleasure
Principle are quoted from Ruckert's'Die Beiden Gulden': "What we cannot
reach flying we must reach 1 imping. . .The Book tells us it is no sin
to limp."^
Freire seems to be saying, in contrast, that there are no limits
to what can be achieved. And in this, there is always a danger that
those who read his work and others in his tradition will take it upon
themselves to give birth to the new age on the basis of their certainty
that such an age is indeed a possibility for mankind. Camus' speech to
American students in 1946 is exactly to the point:
Now that Hitler has gone we know a certain number of things.
The first is that the poison which impregnated Hitlerism has not
been eliminated; it is present in each one of us. Whoever today
speaks of human existence in terms of power, efficiency and his-
torical tasks' spreads it. He is an actual or potential assassin.
For if the problem of man is reduced to any kind of 'historical
task' he is nothing but the raw material of history, and one can do
anything one pleases with him. Another thing we have learned is
that
we cannot accept any optimistic conception of existence, any
happy
ending whatsoever. But if we believe that optimism is sil y,
we
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also know that pessimism about that action of man among his
fellows is cowardly.
9
Freire's refusal to recognize certain limits as absolute in the
human condition also. leads him to argue that limit situations (i.e.,
those situations which people perceive as absolutely given, as unchange-
able) are in fact only a state of consciousness . Oppressed consciousness,
for example, is typified by a fatalistic relationship to the world. Of-
ten such a fatalism is all encompassing and does blind people to real
possibilities for transformed actions upon the world. But the nature
of Freire's argument leads one to believe that fatalism of any kind is
inherently a state of false consciousness. There are, in other words,
no real limits out there in the world— limits which are simply inevi-
table; where a fatalistic response is justified. Indeed, perhaps a
fatalistic response in certain instances is a form of maturity. What
Freire lacks is a more subtle analysis of passivity and activity. One
can be actively passive. For example, when one is sitting in a lec-
ture listening to someone from whom one passionately wants to learn,
one is behaving passively in an active sense. The peasants with whom
Freire worked, and many of the students I met, were passive in a path-
ological way. Their passivity had no active element to be seen anywhere.
But Freire only argues for a complete rejection of fatalism; there is
no concept of an active fatalism. The dialectic between activity and
fatalism as a sound response to the world was well put by the psycho-
analyst Erik Eriksen.
A 'strong ego' is the psychological precondition for
that
freedom which has alternately been specified as the effort
through
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which the inevitable comes to pass-or the will to choose what
IS necessary
.
The psychoanalytic recognition of limits and its concomitant tragic
view of man, a view which is truer of Greek civilization than of the
Judeo-Chri s ti an
,
can counterbalance Freire's rosy optimism. It is a
great compliment to the psychoanalytic tradition that no atrocities have
been committed in the name of Freud, unlike the countless numbers which
have been committed in the name of Marx. True, much distortion of Marx
has taken place, but he must be held responsible for the seeds of such
possibilities which can be found in his work.^^
When Freire says: "All prescription is oppressive. he is
sewing seeds for a dangerous misreading of his work. He must be well
aware of the literature of developmental psychology, particularly the
psychoanalytic discussions about early childhood development. Yet he
lends himself to an interpretation from educationists and parents who
would have us educate future revolutionaries by letting children grow
up with a minimum of adult guidance. Surely Freire would agree that a
critically conscious individual must have a strongly developed ego--one
that can withstand the pressures from within and without to react auto-
matically. Such an ego must have as its foundation an early childhood
based upon relationships of both unqualified love as well as on pre-
scription and authoritative guidance. In the latter limits are set; as
a result a child can develop ego ideals of adults who are decisive, and
a sense of the world as a manageable place, where actions result in
responses, sometimes negative ones. The disclaiming of authority by
so many adults is to be seen everywhere, and often has, as its base,
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the assumption that children who are brought up in 'freedom' are going
to be agents for a new and more moral society. The increasing violence
among young people in schools may have, as part of its cause, this re-
fusal by adults to demand of the young that they meet certain standards
of excellence before they can make a claim to participate fully in soci-
ety. Eriksen points out that in Camus' The Stranger
, Meersault (The
Stranger), was pleased about and gave credit to his early participation
in the 'logic and the ethics—of soccer football.' Eriksen goes on: "To
fathom the limits of human existence you must have fully experienced at
some concrete time and space, the 'rules of the game.' To live as a
philosophical stranger is one of the choices of mature man; to have that
choice the immature person must, with our help, first find a home in the
actuality of work and love."!'^ Denying young people the chance to one day
make this choice is precisely what the older generation does when it
does not establish some 'rules of the game', which involves prescription.
Obviously these rules must be based upon as much as we know about the
nature of children. Alexander Mitscherlich, another psychoanalytic
thinker means the same thing when he says: "Even the human freedom to
attain critical detachment is not absolute; it has to be attained from
some role. Maturity of the ego presupposes adaptation. 15 Freud was
once very explicit on this point: "It is even my opinion that revolu-
tionary children are not desirable from any point of view. "15
So Freire's work suffers in general from a failure to discuss how
children become adults, and how education for critical consciousness
would occur in the relationship between children and adults. This must
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be a prescriptive process to a fairly large extent, and it is unfortun-
ate that Freire does not include distinctions between what he advocates
for adults and how he perceives the process for children. For this
reason he must be held responsible for educational praxis being taken in
his name and being entirely misapplied.
There is one apparent contradiction between theory and practice
in Freire's work which must be taken up. Symptoms of it appear in my
work with first year students reported in Chapter IV of this dissertation.
The problem may be posed as follows: How can one claim to be searching
with the students for the truth, while at the same time holding clearly
in mind certain principles which one wants them to learn? For example,
Freire wants people with whom he is working to comprehend the anthropo-
logical nature of man, that man is not one with nature and the group, but
rather is capable of conceiving of a 'project' as opposed to being driven
entirely by instinct. Freire clearly wants his students to learn some-
thing which he already has clearly formulated in his mind. Is not the
idea of co-investigating with them the nature of reality a papering over
of what is essentially just the 'discovery' method currently popular in
science education? Here the students are not taught Boyle's Law, but
are given all the material and information Boyle had available to him,
with the intention that they come to the same discoveries he did. I do
not believe that this analogy encompasses the idea of 'co-investigation'
or of dialogic education. The latter processes are by definition differ-
ent; by definition, because in dialogic education we are dealing with in-
terpretations subjects make of their world, not with interactions between
subjects and the hardware of experimental science or between natural
objects in the external world.
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A better analogy to help explain dialogic educational co-investi-
gation is with the psychoanalytic relationship between analyst and pa-
tient. The analyst knows that inevitably issues surrounding the oedi-
pal conflict arise, yet it is useless for the patient to come to know the
oedipal theory as it has been worked out in psychoanalytic literature.
The patient must describe as freely as possible whatever occurs to him.
The therapist, on the basis of his advanced theoretical knowledge,
makes interpretations of these thoughts as they are reported (i.e., he
provokes reflection). Even though the therapist is aware beforehand that
certain themes will arise, the way they arise, and the form his inter-
pretations take will be unique in every instance. The therapist does
not know and cannot predict the way in which oedipal issues will sur-
face. He can only probe with the patient in a common endeavor to compre-
hend the truth. He must ask questions which are genuine questions based
upon a real desire to know, and he must make interpretations based upon
his theoretical and practical knowledge.
The dialogic teacher also has more knowledge than his students. He
has the responsibility to introduce themes which he thinks are crucial
(such as discussion about the anthropological nature of man). But if
the students are not to perceive these themes as abstract and unrelated
to their world of discourse—without any significance, in other words--
the educator has to introduce them appropriately. And he can only do so
once he has made a significant effort to find out what the students' v/orld
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of discourse is. Like the psychoanalyst the educator must be genuinely
motivated to know how the students think about and act in the world. The
way the dialogic teacher introduces these themes is dependent upon the
degree of knowledge he has about the thought/language reality of the
students. (See for example the ten pictures Freire typically presented
to Brazillian peasants which provoked discussion of the anthropological
nature of man; they clearly reveal a profound knowledge of the way the
peasants understood their world).
The educator knows that he has succeeded in reaching the students
in the same way a psychoanalyst knows that an interpretation has struck
home.l^ A patient who says: 'yes that is true' to a particular inter-
pretation, but who then does not develop further associations, has in
fact not agreed with the interpretation, or the interpretation was in-
correct or inappropriately timed. An interpretation which strikes home
produces further associations and provokes deeper insight for the patient.
The analyst could only have made the interpretation as a result of what
the patient had told him and on the basis of his knowledge of the theory.
Again, Eriksen is to the point:
I, for one remember with pleasure the exclamations of a patient;
'You sure know how to decomplicate things!' Such flattery, how-
ever, is only as good as the surprise behind it: one cannot pre-
decomplicate things.
or from Freud:
The 'Yes' has no value unless it is followed by indirect confirma-
tions, unless the patient, immediately after his 'Yes', produces
new memories which complete and extend the construction . Only in
such an event do we consider that the 'Yes', has dealt completely
with the subject under discussion. 20 (my emphasis)
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If the dialogic teacher introduces a theme for discussion appropriate-
ly, it will provoke associations to other themes-themes which will be
suggested by the students themselves. In the process themes such as edu-
cation, culture, freedom, work, love, the nature of reflection itself,
are no longer seen as part of the natural order of things, but as problems
to be reflected upon. There is no Boyle's Law to be discovered. In
the act of dialogic education two subjects are attempting to find a
common ground where they can share each other's interpretations of the
world. In the process both are changed. The students may develop some
profound insights that go to the very core of what they conceive to be
right action. The teacher will be learning from them about their unique
way of defining and explaining the nature of reality, while at the same
time deepening an understanding of, and changing, when appropriate his
own theoretical perspective.
Like psychoanalytic dialogue, Freire's dialogic education is simul-
taneously research and teaching. 21 The differences between the domain
of communications between subjects searching for knowledge, and the domain
of scientific investigation--where subjects test theories via experi-
mental action--is crucial to comprehend. Habermas points out the dis-
tinctions and the implications of the distinctions clearly and summar-
izes the essence of the argument contained in this chapter. (When he
refers to 'theories' he is referring to the scientific endeavor, in
contrast with 'general interpretations' or hermeneutics):
In the case of testing theories through observation (that is in the
behavioral system of instrumental action) the application of assump-
tions to reality is a matter for the inquiring subject. In the case
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Of testing general interpretations through self-reflection (that isin the framework of communication between patient and physician)
this application becomes self-application by the object of inquiry
The process 0/ inquiry can lead to valid information only via a
patient's self-inquiry. When valid, theories
hold for all who can adopt the position of the inquiring subject.
When valid, general interpretations hold for the inquiring subject
and all who can adopt its position only to the degree that those who
are made the object of individual interpretation know and recognize
themselves in these interpretations. The subject cannot obtain
knowledge of the object unless it becomes knowledge for the object--
and unless the latter thereby emancipates itself by becoming a sub-
ject.
In the scientific endeavor 'A' acts upon and manipulates 'B'. In the
dialogic endeavor 'A' acts on 'B' who in turn acts on 'A'. 'A' cannot know
what his second action will be until 'B' has in fact acted. To equate
the instrumental and manipulative relationships necessary to the scien-
tific endeavor with dialogic education is to seriously misunderstand and
reduce the nature of its task.
Finally, reference to the psychoanalytic situation does highlight
one major problem which Freire does not address. A psychoanalyst only
engages in dialogue when someone recognizes a severe problem and comes
for help. Freire's work with peasants seems to involve his entering
a community with the intention of helping. There was no call for in-
tervention or plea for help. The same problem does not apply to the
work I did with Freshmen students since they have come to the University
ostensibly to learn. But the contradiction does stare one in the face
when considering Freire's efforts, and his failure to address this point
is a serious detriment.
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APPENDIX I
Presented to the students at the beginning of the class.
To: The students of Rhetoric 100$—Writing and the University Experience
From: Ron Goldman
This "letter" will be the first of several I will write to you dur-
ing the semester. The reason I will be writing (as well as speaking),
is because one of the very important requirements of a Rhetoric class
is that writing skills be developed. I know from long experience that
to write down one's thoughts so that others can understand what one
wants to communicate is a very difficult thing to do. So I would feel
very uncomfortable sitting up in front of the class pronouncing on the
"right" way to write without somehow also being involved in trying to
write clearly and correctly to you. Thus one common task we will have
this semester will be to develop our capacity to make ourselves under-
stood' by writing. There are going to be numerous occasions when you will
not understand what I have written (or when I am speaking, what I have
said), and the same will be true for me when I am reading your work or
listening to you speak. It is going to be our common responsibility
in this class to let each other know when those moments occur. I, for
one, will be asking questions often. Some of them will seem naive or
stupid to you, but I'll be asking them because I really want to be sure
that I have understood you clearly, and I am hoping that you also will
'push' me to be clear by asking questions, no matter how 'silly' they
243
may seem. So, to write and to ask questions are goals I set for myself
and expectations I have of you. I can only hope you will ask questions,
but the course we are in together requires that you develop writing skills
and that means you are going to have to write.
Those of you who are expert at anything, whether it be playing ball,
dancing, gymnastics, potting plants, reading or whatever else, know that
to become expert you had to practice a great deal. The same is true of
writing. The more you do of it the better you will do it. So I am going
to ask you to do ten to fifteen minutes a day. This is the one major re-
quirement of the class and I would like to see the work you have done
every Monday by twelve noon. I have a mailbox in Room 1 in the lobby of
John Adams Tower and it should be simple to drop off your week's work.
You will receive your papers at Tuesday's class and will spend part of the
class working on questions I will have asked of you. Completion of the
work will guarantee a "c" for the course. VJe will negotiate at the end
of the semester for any grade higher than a "c"; the criteria will be
what kind of learning has taken place for you, and/or some extra project
or reading you may have decided to do during the semester. In order to
make sure that v;e have the records of the semester's work intact please
keep all your writing in a folder with your name on it, and please date
all your work and also number all the pages starting from Page 1 to
wherever you get to by the end of the term. In a way you are going to be
writing a book.
"A BOOK!" I hear everyone silently scream as they read, "We do
not know enough to write a book." It is my belief that we are going
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to find out just how much we do know and the actual content of the
course and of the writing you will be doing will be our common effort
to discover each other's knowledge and in the process learn from each
other. We all know how to do multitudes of things; we just take most
of them for granted and do not consider what we know as knowledge
. Most
of us think of scientists, artists, musicians, dancers, authors, profes-
sors as somehow superhuman people as if they do these great things which
somehow set them apart from us lowly creatures. Our greatest problem,
I think, is that our knowledge is so close that many of us do not even
know we have any. Our knowledge is something like our clothes, or more
exactly like our skin. We have a lot of skin but take its existence
completely for granted, giving it the occasional wash, the very occa-
sional wash, the very occasional massage, sometimes cream or oil. If
someone were to come along and say, "Hey, you have a lot of skin", we
would think he or she had gone slightly dilly. But we do not easily
believe the person who comes along and says, "Hey, you have a great
deal of knowledge." The reason for the difference between skin and
knowledge: you can touch, feel, see skin but you cannot do any of
these things with knowledge; you have to discover it. That is our
common task. We are together going to try to discover each other's
knowledge.
But as I have said we have knowledge about a multitude of different
realities; each one of us is an expert in one reality or another.
Courses
at the University are usually organized by having the expert
in one reality
telling a large group about his or her knowledge; the expert
attempts to
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give knowledge to others. We are, however, going to start at that point
where we have all had some common experiences in order to share some of
those experiences and to find out what we want to know more about from
each other. The one place we can be sure of all having had common ex-
periences is in our varying relationships to this University. We all
have a great deal of knowledge about the University although it is
probably so skin tight most of us are not aware of the details and
richness of our knowledge. In order to discover these we need to do
some careful reflecting together and this is precisely what we will be
doing.
So we will begin with our common experiences as members of this
University. But it is too big an area for each individual to take on.
We have to each focus on some aspect of our lives here which we want
to come to know more about. We will spend the early part of our experi-
ence together choosing what area to focus attention upon, and I hope
to be helpful in this regard. Once you have made choices either indi-
vidually or in groups you will be ready to discover and share knowledge.
And the process and content of this experience will be what your book
will be about.
APPENDIX II
January 29, 1976
I am going to ask you a whole series of questions for this first writ-
ing assignment. Please take your time on each one. I really want to know
as much as you possibly can and tell me about life here at the University.
(1)
. Pretend you are writing to a complete stranger to the planet.
(That stranger is me). Tell me what this place called the University
is all about; keep in mind I have no idea what it is, why people go here
or what they do with their time. Nor do I know why they do what they do.
Start by telling me a story about how you come to go to the University
at all; how did you make the decision? What had you heard about Univer-
sity life? What did you hope to be doing here? Have you been disappoint-
ed or pleased with what you have been doing? Tell me more about this
disappointment and/or pleasure. What made you come to this particular
University? Is it pretty much the same as you thought it would be be-
fore you came? What was surprising to you when you first came here?
How is life different here from what you expected it to be? Can you
give me examples of things that you do that are different from what you
expected to be doing? What do you wish you were doing here that you are
not doing? What do you wish were happening here that is not happening?
(2)
. This is optional. It would be very helpful for a stranger
to this planet to know how you spend a typical day at this place called
the University, but 1 don't want to insist that you tell me now, because
it can be difficult to do so, but those who feel like spending a day a
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little differently or who feel like really practicing writing skills and
learning a lot at the same time can try the following; Decide tomorrow
morning that you are going to .tell me all about your day at the end of
the day, and try to keep that in mind all day long so that you can no-
tice carefully your thoughts, the conversations you have.
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While waiting for these assignments to be turned in I continued on
a very similar track. This one was heavily influenced by Alschuler's
idea of the 'stress hunt' and another American educator who has interpreted
Freire, John Ohlger. He suggests that one should not be asking people
what needs they have but what makes them mad. So I adopted a modified
version of these approaches and attempted to generate a long list of
those aspects of University life that made students mad, those that
pleased them (in order to balance the picture). I also focussed on
dormitory life in particular and on so-called interpersonal domain.
The class produced a long list of issues of concern and those that
Ve^med common to a large group were as follows: Cliques, Core Require-
Inents, lines (i.e., having to stand in long lines). Being used, the
problem of nothing to do (borddom). For a second writing assignment
I "asked different students to write about particular problems they were
IrioVt angry about; I asked them to tell me why they thought the problem
existed, and what they thought should be done about it (again a way
of approaching the students, which was heavily determined by Alschuler's
coding system). None of these efforts stuck . At least in their early
writings the students displayed little interest in writing about the
"material. A classic example of the difficulties I was having is con-
'tained in 'the following: I asked one girl (she preferred to be called
^girl) about the 'clique' problem; I asked her to write to me telling me
"what'the clique problem meant to her, how come it existed as a problem,
‘what kinds of cliques there were, how they were different from each other,
''and what they did, what cliques she belonged to, and how she ever got
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to be in one? I asked her who was to blame for the problem of cliques,
and what should be done about the problem? All her answers were one
sentence long containing scanty information. Her response was typical
and a replica follows.
Rhetoric lOOS
2b0
Sarah Miller
1. What does it mean to you? To me a clique is a small group of
people who believe that whatever they do is "cool". They will only
associate with other people who either almost meet their standards or
who worship them. Usually to become in their clique you have to do
something to prove you are good enough for them. They keep to themselves
and won't lower themselves to talk to someone who isn't in their clique.
2. How come it exists as a problem? It exists as a problem because
nobody should think that they are great enough to insult or make fun of
other people. We are all humans and we should all be treated as humans
by everybody.
3. What kinds of cliques are there? There are many kinds of cliques.
The jocks have their own cliques. The jocks' girlfriends have theirs.
High society people have cliques and schools have cliques.
4. How are they different? What do they do? Basically I think all
cliques are the same. Their primary goal is to be noticed by other
people because they are really insecure. They stay within their own
little group and party or do things by themselves without asking other
people to join in.
5. What clique do you belong to? How did you get there? I don't
consider myself belonging to any one clique. I hang around with about
four different groups of people and alot of different friends. I
don t
have one set group who I'm with all the time.
6. Who is to blame for this problem? Nobody is to
blame for this. It
is just an insecurity.
7. What should be done about this? Nothing can
be done about it. Where
ever you live or go to school you are always
going to run into cliques.
APPENDIX III
Rhetoric lOOS, Section 1.
An example of a re-presentation which failed.
March 29, 1976
The work we are going to be doing this half of the semester is of
a slightly different nature to that we were doing in the first half.
Throughout your career at college you are going to be asked to do spe-
cific assignments on topics decided beforehand by your professor. So
that is the kind of writing I am going to ask you to do, but you should
continue to use anything that you have discovered during the first half,
which works for you—which help you write well. Also the topics that
I will be asking you to write about will seem familiar to you; they
emerge from the writing and discussions we had during the first half
of the semester. Before I explain, a word about the amount of work I am
going to be asking of you for the next month. I assume that it was help-
ful to you during the mid-term period to have the pressure lifted slight-
ly by not having to worry about Rhetoric assignments; well the same
thing is possible as far as finals are concerned if we really work hard
for the full month of April. I will be asking you to do frequent writing
of thirty minute pieces, and I will be also asking you to do a group
project, about which I will be explaining more shortly.
The written assignments will all be about assumptions you have
expressed in different ways during the first half of the term. Basically
I want you to spend some time writing about these assumptions, considering
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whether you agree or disagree with them, and to consider their itnpli-
cations. Remember what I have said about assumptions:
1)
. They exist. All of us carry them around all the time.
2)
. They are often hidden (implicit, unconscious) from our con-
scious thoughts.
3)
. They affect all our thinking, acting, writing.
4)
. The more we discover what they are the freer we are to check
out their validity and therefore to choose whether to hold on to them
or not.
5)
. Every time one changes one's assumptions (no matter on how small
a scale) there is an implication for how one behaves, thinks, writes.
6)
. There are a few super assumptions; these have to do with the
assumptions we all make about what human beings are about, how they stand
in relation to their fellow human beings, how they relate to nature, cul-
ture, change and a number of other seemingly abstract notions. But
they are only seem to be abstract, because super assumptions have super
implications for how one behaves, thinks, writes, relates to others. So
the more one can find out what super assumptions one holds, expose them
to the light of analysis and critical thought, the more one can slowly
become free to choose the assumptions which have these super implications,
instead of simply being driven blindly by a whole set of assumptions
about which nothing is known.
So hoping that you understand the purpose of all of these writing
exercises (apart from the sheer practice in writing itself), here goes
with the first of them.
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Just about the only general statement I can make about human
beings is that we are all individuals j each one of us is so different
from one another that it is impossible to make any general izations--we
are all different. Yet we are all the same--human beings--it is only
these third world people and some women who keep harping on differences."
Please carefully state what your thoughts are about these two sen-
tences. (Take one at a time and say how you think about it, and then
discuss how they fit or don't fit and what you think about that). Do
you agree, disagree; altogether, just a little; with which part; which
part would you want to change altogether, which keep the same? Also
please tell me why you think the way you do, and give as many concrete
examples as you can to back up your argument. Define any word that you
use that may be ambiguous.
Please include in your discussion how you think it makes a differ-
ence in your daily lives, in your relationships with others, if you
think one way as opposed to another. Or does it make no difference at
all whether you think one way or another?
Two thirty minute pieces or one full hour, whichever works best
for you. Second draft if necessary. Third thirty minute piece (or
longer, if you are so moved).
APPENDIX IV (A)
In the class--and at the end of the seniester--the following three
documents were the catalysts for breakthroughs. People began to really
understand the relationship between assumptions and actions. This v/as
an aspect of Freire's theory that I had not originally expected to get
at; it in fact turned out to be the major part of the course.
Rhetoric lOOS, April 1976
Very often the task of trying to figure out what the meaning and
implication of 'super-assumptions' is, can be a complex, difficult task--
as complex as a mathematical problem, and I think more intriguing. The
following task I am asking you to do is difficult; therefore the first
part of the class will be devoted to allowing you to meet in small groups
to talk the problem over, and attempt to make some sense of it. Take as
long as you like; allow yourself to ask as many questions of each other
as you like, and when you are ready begin to write your thoughts down.
You may take the whole period for discussion. Either way get the writing
part done as soon as possible and please hand in the writing no later than
4 p.m. tomorrow. Do not get into a panic because this appears difficult;
rather take the opportunity to let your thinking powers go to work and
make an effort to 'say your own word', which would include giving any
concrete examples from your own life to make any points you wish to make.
To say your own word is to transform the v/orld. is the same as saying
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Man is different to animal or tree, precisely in that he/she is poten-
^ maker of culture." (Remember in the class discussion, I defined
this very broadly).
These are super assumptions and have huge implications (please
note) for every one of us in every aspect of our lives. For example
they have very considerable implications for our lives here at the Uni-
versity. At least two areas come to mind; the attitudes to and the choices
one makes about learning and knowledge; the attitudes to and our behav-
iors in the area of sexuality (with regard to oneself--one's own actions--
as well as one's attitudes and behaviors towards what others do, as well
as with regard to the kinds of social activities that are available, or
are not available for people here). You may wish to focus on only one
of these two areas. Go ahead and discuss; simply make the effort to
make sense of this. When you get home read the article by Booth; it is
a good example of how to let your assumptions lead you to implications.
(B)
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Many of you are fed up, puzzled, angry, have given up on, what this
course is all about. You can make no sense of what I am after--you
believe you have learned little, if anything at all-and those who feel '
they have learned something do not know exactly what it is they have
learned. The following is an effort to make myself clear, both to those
who are in a state of confusion and to those who cannot name exactly
what they have learned (I believe it is really important to name what
one is learning so that it 'sticks').
The essence of what I have been trying to do can be summed up very
briefly: to show that the assumptions we all carry around in our heads,
assumptions which we have mostly incorporated into ourselves from the
culture in which we have grown up, have enormous implications for how
we carry on our daily activities. Since most of us do not know what these
assumptions are we are not really choosing as we go about our daily
activities; we can only choose when we have identified what some of these
assumptions are, made some investigations as to their validity, and then
decide to reject them or adopt different ones which are closer to the
truth. I am making a large assumption that crucial to becoming human is
the capacity to choose
,
instead of simply doing 'what comes naturally'
to the extent we are not choosing, we are not engaging in a uniquely
human process, and somewhere in our lives we will pay a severe price for
this failure. There are many factors both in our inner lives and in
the outer world which prevent people from choosing; in this course I have
mainly focussed on one area— the assumptions we hold and the implications
they have for how we behave day to day. The last tv^o articles I handed
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out side by side sums up everything I have tried to do in this course—
the one, by Booth, which is a discussion of how different assumptions
one may hold about the nature of man affects the kinds of educational
programs which are set up, and the other by Hendin from his book The
Age of Sensation
,
which discusses the concrete world of sexuality as
experienced by college students. Before I go into any greater depth, I
want to go on a fairly long diversion to explain how I came to focus on
the interrelationship of assumptions and concrete reality.
For me the semester has been filled with struggling, questioning,
wondering, talking to others, reading books--all in an effort to try to
figure out what makes sense to talk about? What is important? What
is there I can try to give you? For me to be able to answer these ques-
tions I realized that it was important for me to come to know you in some
way; how could I give you anything, if I did not know enough about your
world to know at least what the issues are that are of concern to you.
What was there that you wanted to know more about? I also knew that it
would not really get us anywhere if I were to ask you, "well what do you
want to know more about?" I know that the things we really want to know
more about are often so close to us, that they are difficult to see (com-
pare this to the first little essay I handed you). They are the things
we think about v/hen we are alone, thinking, wondering--the things we may
risk talking to a close friend about--and numbers of issues that are just
difficult to get to and to get out. I had to try to listen to you— to hear
both the words you were using, and under the words--what was not being
said clearly. What were you asking for? What was important to you?
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Of course it has been very difficult. It would have been much easier had
I advertised a course I was interested in teaching, and those who were
intrigued would have come. We would have had an agreement to start with.
You and I had only one single agreement when we first came together--that
this course would have something to do with writing. As I told you at
the beginning I knew very little about how to help others write, but I
did do some research and would like to share with you some of the results
of this work.
First of all it quickly became obvious that numerous people around
the country were/are worried about you and large numbers of your fellows
from Harvard to University of Oshkosh, because it appears that, unlike
previous generations, you cannot write well. There have been many arti-
cles in the major newspapers discussing why this is so, and what is to
be done about it. I handed you one article from Newsweek , which was
the cover story of that issue of Dec. 7, 1975--this is usually a sign
that people are particularly worried. Now their worrying may be a mis-
take on their part
—
perhaps there is no reason to write at all in this
age, but the point is that large numbers were/are worried and are anxious-
ly figuring out what to do about you.
Second, I believed that one of the best ways to encourage the im-
provement of writing was simply by asking you to write as much and as
often as possible • This was based upon my assumption that one major reason
why there is a problem with writing is that people have not written very
much (for all kinds of reasons--e.g. , we now only need to make check
marks in multiple choice exams, which the computer corrects)--so just
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getting Into the habit of writing a lot would gradually begin to result
in better writing (you are the best judges of whether this assumption
was correct or not).
Third, I believed that there was a very close connection between
writing and thinking; the clearer one's thinking becomes, the clearer
and more understandable one's writing would become; the more one recog-
nized how difficult it is to think clearly, the more people would come
to realize that the act of putting one's thoughts down on paper helped
one get those thoughts clarified.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, there were close connections
between how one taught a writing course and how one viewed what education
was all about, which in turn was dependent upon the assumptions one made
about the nature of human beings. A man, who I believe to be very wise,
and who has made an important difference to my life as a result of his
writings
,
wrote the following:
(The teacher's) aim is to help the individual become a self-
educating man, who only then would be reasonable and free...
These are very large goals and I must explain them in a slightly
indirect v/ay. We are concerned with skills and values. Among
'skills' however, some are more and some are less relevant to the
tasks of liberation. I do not believe that skills and values can
be so easily separated out, as in our search for 'neutral skills'
we so often assume. It is a matter of degree, with skills at one
extreme and values at the other. But in the middle ranges of this
scale, there are what I call sensibilities and it these which
should interest us most. To train someone to... write is in large
part a training of skill; to help someone decide what he really
wants out of life, or to debate with him Stoic, Christian, and
Humanist ways of living, is a cultivation or an education of values.
...Alongside skill or value, we ought to put sensibility, which
includes them both, and more besides: it includes a sort of ther-
apy in the ancient sense of clarifying one's knowledge of self. It
includes the cultivation of all those skills of controversy with
oneself that we call thinking, and which, when engaged in with others
we call debate.
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.^._educator must begin with what interests the individi.;,!
deeply, even if it seems altogether triviciTThd^heToT
' He mu«;t
proceed in such a way and with such material sITTo enable the
student to increasingly rational insight into these concerns,
and into others he will acquire in the process of his education.
And the educator must try to develop men and women v/ho can and will
by thBinsGlvBS continuG whdt hG hds bGguni thG Gnd product of dny
liberating education is simply the self educating, self cultivating
man and woman; in short, the free and rational individual.
(from C. Wright Mills' book. The Sociological Imagination, pp. 186,
187, emphasis mine).
So, in summary, the question before me was; what did interest you most
deeply, no matter how trivial? If I could find out we could begin to
talk to each other, and if we really began to dialogue together perhaps
we would all begin to think better. Since writing is thinking on paper,
writing can improve, if thinking improves.
We can come back now to the early part of this paper--the relation-
ship between assumptions and real ity--this time by my telling you a little
about how I came to focus on these two aspects and what it was I was
trying to say about them. A little after the semester started I came
to the conclusion that v/e had to talk about something while we were try-
ing to find out what made sense to talk about (I sometimes wish I had the
courage to spend a whole term with people asking the single question--
What are the important questions worth focussing upon?, but at least for
the moment I don't think I could tolerate the frustration which would
emerge). I decided that one common ground we all had is that we all hold
assumptions about the world, our place in it, the purpose of life; the
task was for us to get to what some of these assumptions were (the con-
tent of our assumptions was bound to be different, but the common ground
was that we all held assumptions). How to get to them? I began by trying
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to explain what assumptions are. I went on to try to show how they affect
our behavior that how we think affects what we doi or how the assump-
tions we hold make us act in one way as opposed to another. So, for
instance, when I change my assumptions about who I am when I am writing,
or what I am writing for, or to whom I am writing, or even more generally,
when I change my assumptions about the value of writing itself, then my
writing, which is one form of behavior--my writing behavior changes. I
then went to try to get across the idea that apart from the many, many
little assumptions everyone holds we all hold what I called 'super as-
sumptions'; these are big general principles, such as what it means to
be human, how humans are related to other humans, how human beings are
related to nature (i.e., whether they are similar to or different from
trees and cats). I believe that we all hold a set of super assumptions
even though we often do not know what they are. I think if we did not
hold these assumptions, our behaviors, day to day, would make no sense;
they would be random, chaotic, without meaning. The task was, and is,
to find out what these super assumptions are, and then to try to show
how the kinds of super assumptions one holds have enormous implications
for the behaviors we engage in day after day, for the activities, actions
we partake in and for those we do not partake in. But if we do not find
out what assumptions we are operating under, then great big chunks of
our lives go on without conscious awareness on our part; we act blindly.
Humans can only become free if they are making some choices, or at
least trying to do something about those blockages (both inside oneself
or out there in the world) which are preventing them from making choices.
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And they can only make choices, I am arguing, if they can begin to un-
cover, unveil some of the assumptions which they hold unconsciously.
Only when some of the assumptions are uncovered, revealed, can one be
in a position to choose. The process may go something like this, al-
though it is never as simple: "aha! Now I see that all this time I
have just assumed that humans are pretty much the same as animals, and
I am also beginning to get a faint idea how this assumption affects
my everyday behavior; I even begin to understand that this assumption is
held by others and how it affects their behaviors; I see from this arti-
cle by Booth that it even explains a lot about the way people educate
other people in this culture. Well now that I realize that I hold this
assumption I can begin to try to check it out; I can read some books,
talk to others, go to certain classes in which this would be talked about--
I will even notice as I am doing this, that when I am actively trying
to find out the answer to a question that is important to me, I really
get into books, and into classes where these questions are taken up.
After a while I find out that my assumption is right; but I now can
choose ; indeed I have chosen, and am clearer about what I do everyday
and why. I may find out that I have been wrong all along, and now I
am confronted vvith a whole new set of problems that arise from the change
in my assumptions and the effect this will have on how I act day to day,
because I also am beginning to understand that how I think affects what
I do, and what I do not do, what I notice, and what I do not notice."
I have used the example of man's similarity to animals intentionally.
As our discussion about assumptions progressed I found out that a dominant
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dssumption most of you hold is thdt Man and Animal, Man and Troo (moro
generally man and nature) are more alike than they are different. That
is, the similarities between Man and Nature are more important than their
differences. (Now I am not saying that it is bad or wrong to hold this
assumption; the point is that we managed to uncover it, and now we are
in a position to dialogue about it, and what the implications of this
assumption are). The fact that this was a dominant assumption held by
you showed itself in many ways, both through things you said and did.
You have said it often very explicitly in essays you have written and
in class discussions. "Man is like a twig, blown about by the wind."
"Humans do not, cannot change society in any way." "History happens in
the same way that a tree grows." "Humans change in the same way that a
flower grows, naturally." "The way humans learn is the same way that
dogs learn--by condi tioning--by a process of reward and punishment." "The
building of houses by humans is the same thing as birds building nests."
Many have also said at different times that the whole discussion is
senseless--that these are all just 'words', that we are just the way we
are, which is close to the same thing to saying that we should just do
what comes naturally. Earlier in the semester when you spoke of learn-
ing, the analogy that made most sense, given the way you described V'/hat
you did every day, was that of a bird, waiting with mouth open for food
to be popped in. Booth put the same point another way: "Do you know
your own reasons for your beliefs, or do you absorb your beliefs from
whatever happens in your environment, like plankton, taking in nourish-
ment?" (p. 266). Again the analogy is to Nature— birds or plankton.
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So I handed you the Booth article to give you an idea about what some
of the implications of this assumption are (i.e., the assumption that man
is for the most part similar to trees, or animals). First of all you may
have become aware, with a feeling of relief perhaps, that you are not
alone in this assumption--that many many others in this society believe
the same thing and act accordingly. (The article also discusses two
other dominant assumptions in this society— that man is most like a
machine, or that man is most like an ant— that many of the activities
certain kinds of educators, for example, engage in, do not make sense
until we understand the dominant assumptions they are operating under).
I have hoped that this article would give you some idea about how super-
assumptions are directly related to activities people engage in: people
act one way when they are operating under one set of assumptions and act
in another way under another set of assumptions. The converse of this
is that very often people's actions only can make complete sense when
one is able to grasp what the underlying and often unconscious assumptions
driving these people are. (What can be very helpful in coming to know
both oneself and those around one is to come to know the set of inter-
related assumptions which make up this culture— the one that must have
influenced all of us considerably).
Booth's argument is that man is not reducible to metaphorical defi-
nitions, such as he/she is like animal, like machine, or like ant;
humans are ends in themselves, he argues. When you take the human ca-
pacity for curiousity, learning, loving laughing, crying, and consider
these as a whole--that is refuse to reduce the human to a part of
what
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he is, then you can at least set humans apart from nature, or machine,
in some way; not necessarily better, but apart, separate from. If we
accept this assumption that there is something absolutely unigue about
being human, and a second crucial assumption he makes, that one does
not automati cal ly become fully human, then we are forced to consider the
implications of such an assumption. Booth discusses the implications for
educational activity and makes various concrete suggestions for educa-
tion which would help nurture full humanness. It was Sara Natanson in
our class who said that one thing that distinguishes man from animal is
the fact that humans have such long chi ldhoods--they have a long span of
their lives devoted to education. Thus much of who we are as people has
been made by man so to speak. Dogs and cats and trees are virtually
incapable of going crazy; most of their activities are governed by their
bodies--by instinct; there is no room for choice, or very little.
The reason I mention this is that so much of what humans are about
is learned from other humans; huge possibilities for error, for violence,
brutality, lack of love, exist. Again we don't automatically become
fully human, in the same way that a tree does; we are only
fully human. A super assumption it is and obviously with super impli-
cations for the kinds of educational programs which should be available
to you and to me, but also for the kinds of choices you and I make about
what kinds of courses and programs we are going to take. This is the
essence of the Booth article, and the essence of what I have been trying
to get to you in a very tortured way.
But where does sex get into all of this you may well ask? After
all
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you remember me saying earlier in this essay that it was the handing out
of both the Booth article and the Hendin article (which deals with re-
lationship between the sexes in college), that represents the essence
of what I have been trying to do. You also remember that I said that we
got onto the subject of assumptions in this course because there was
no clarity for me about what we should say to each other. This was a
problem since in this class we had no previous agreement to begin with.
Well, in the course of the semester I read the Hendin piece and was
profoundly struck by it; he seemed to be very worried about what was
happening between the sexes. Listen to him: "The lives of college
students express with eloquence what it means to be alive in America
today... the collective thrust of their lives points to one overwhelming
fact: this culture is at war and young people are at the front lines...
the openness, the casualness with which young people regard each other
presents a picture of surface camaraderie that leads people to believe
we are ushering in an age of unprecedented sexual harmony. But in
actual experience greater openness between the sexes often means greater
openness about their fear and anger toward each other, and a general
cynicism, disillusionment, and bitterness that one rarely found among
the young tv/enty years ago." (pp. 2,3). I was astonished upon reading
this; in your writings there was no mention of any troubles or worries
you were experiencing with regard to the opposite sex, nor did you seem
to be noticing any among your friends. Either Hendin was overdramatic
or else for some reason his insights did not hold for this campus, or
else you were not thinking that this was 'relevant' to classrooms.
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It seems as if the troubles about writing are nationwide," thought I;
surely some of what Hendin is talking about must be happening here. So,
having slowly learned to take the questions I ask myself seriously enough
to want to find out more about them, I asked you individually and in
groups to tell me more about the reality of relationships between the
sexes. As I talked with you and read your writings I became even more
astonished because it seemed as if you would essentially disagree with
Hendin. Most of you seemed to be saying that basically things are okay--
since everything is normal, things are as they should be. In many cases
most of you were acting as if everything was fine; you were expressing
little concern either for yourself or for others.
So I began to think a little more carefully, asking myself what
assumptions you might be holding which would cause you not to notice,
not to care, not to speak-- 1 was not sure. But then I remembered var-
ious phrases I had heard from many of you over the course of the semester.
"Everyone should be allowed to do their own thing;" "Each opinion is as
valid as the next opinion;" "anything that anybody does or says is cool,
as long as no one gets physical ly hurt." All these assumptions were of
such a nature that nothing could ever appear as a problem, so there
would be no way that anyone would ever talk about problems that they
see going on around them. In fact, more to the point, if everything
everyone does is basically okay and natural then how can there be any
problems or troubles? Everything is 'normal' and 'natural'. This is
where the dilemma remains for me as we approach the end of the course.
I do not know whether Hendin is right or very very wrong about this
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campus. I do not know whether it is the assumptions you are uncon-
sciously holding which prevents you from noticing, caring one way or
another, or talking about it, or whether we have in fact arrived at a
state of sexual harmony.
I do want to point out, however, how the world of assumptions
intersect with and have an effect upon another aspect of your concrete
world, the world of sexuality. If we as humans are natural, like trees
and flowers and so on, then whatever is happening out there is 'just nat-
ural'. Someone who holds such an assumption might say some of the follow-
ing: "There is nothing I can do about anything because I am not a maker
of culture; I am more like a dog or a tree, just doing what comes
naturally, and allowing the rest of the world to take its natural course."
"I learn by experience, not by thinking about experience, and reading
and talking about questions that I have about my experience." However,
if one has different assumptions: that for instance there might be some
important ways humans differ from nature, then this has various impli-
cations. Human sexuality might be different in some way from 'natural'
sexuality. One may begin to try to figure out, read about, talk about,
what it means to be human, and begin to see how new understandings lead
to different kinds of actions. One may for instance look around at the
'normal' or 'natural' activities that are going on all around and sud-
denly realize that one is horrified (or perhaps delighted, depending
upon the nature of the understandings). One may be reminded at this
point of one thought which has been discussed at length in this class:
"Man is different from animal precisely to the degree that he/she is
269
potentially a maker of culture," and one may realize that now as a
result of careful reflection one is in a position to begin to fulfill
this potential. One has begun to see that the 'normal' and the 'natur--
aT are not necessarily the most human and that this casts the respon-
sibility to take some action, however small— to make culture--to trans-
form the world.
This action would only be a true expression of one's own word (an-
other phrase which has dominated in this class) if it were based upon
reflection (thinking, talking, reading about some specific problem),
and if following the action more careful reflection were done leading
once again to different, hopefully wiser action--a life time task. In
the context of life here at the University one may speak one's word
in a multitude of ways; perhaps next time one hears someone make a de-
meaning remark about someone else, in a sexual way, in a racial or eth-
nic way, or in one of the various ways that humans have developed, one
may try saying something to counter the remark. Or, one may believe
that an institution devoted to more human ways of bringing people toge-
ther should have different kinds of entertainments on the floors--dif-
ferent to those that exist at the present--or even more ambitiously that
there should be a real alternative to "Meat Market U.S.A." One would
also know that neither the wind, nor the sun, nor God is going to make
any of these things happen; only humans who share these assumptions and
who come together in order to give them fruit will make this happen.
"Together we can move mountains"--from a poster in my office.
(C)
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The Final Essay
There are various options open to you for this final piece of work.’
I am going to ask you three different guestions. You may answer one,
two or three of these questions. The only requirement I have is that
the total amount of writing add up to the equivalent of ten typewritten
pages or 2500 words. Only if you are absolutely unable to get your v/ork
typed will written work be acceptable-- if you have to write please do so
very carefully. As you can imagine to read twenty scribbled essays of
this length would be horrendous.
The remaining class sessions will be devoted to your forming groups
around the questions you want to answer and talking to each other
about the questions. If you find class time too short I recommend
arranging meetings outside of class. Obviously the final piece of writ-
ing must be done by you, but use the groups to get your thinking clear;
remember if your thoughts are clear your task of writing will be simpli -
fied. I am giving you these questions early on so that you will have a
chance to complete all the work required for this class before your exams
begin. I will be arranging meetings with you during the exam period to
get the grades set. You must have your paper done by then; also when you
come in for that final conference (which will only be a short one) please
bring the course evaluations with you, as well as your complete file of
writings organized properly--i .e. , sequentially. Good Luck. I hope you
enjoy working together on this project.
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(l). Write a history of this class. You may approach it from any number
of angles. You may be an 'objective' historian who describes what has
happened, interviews others, to find out what their thoughts, perceptions,
memories, learnings, have been. (Remember interviews are only really
useful if done in some depth). You may want to look at some of the
writings others have done as you develop this history. Or you may write
up a personal history of this class explaining your thoughts, perceptions,
memories, attitudes as they were at the beginning, and how they slowly
changed over time and why. Include in this what you have learned, why
you think it is important, what difference you think these learnings have
made in your own life (please give concrete examples in this case). You
will want to refer to your own writings to refresh your memories, or ask
others what they remember a specific class to have been about. Please
discuss the highlights of the course, the low points, what you found ex-
citing, what you found boring and why. A good historian also does com-
parative work. How was this class different from or similar to other
classes you have taken in high school or college; in analyzing these
differences what do you think are some of the elements of 'good' educa-
tion or 'poor' education and why? What makes for 'real' learning as
opposed to 'useless' learning and why? Include in your history an e-
valuation of what the instructor was trying to do; how well did he
succeed, how poorly--what should he have done? Do not forget to include
your research project as you evaluate what you have learned, and what
the course has been about for you (or for others in the event
that you
are playing at being an historian). Remember you are painting a
picture
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for the reader; he knows nothing unless you give him full color-details,
such as thoughts, feelings, descriptions of people, of small moments
as well as big--if you talk with each other your memories will be re- •
freshed. It's a chance to give full reign to your writing powers. Please
use the essay I wrote in any way that seems helpful to you. You may
want to take a few thoughts and critique them, or expand upon them or
show how they make a difference to your life (with concrete examples)--
or you may want to take one section and do the same thing, or you may
want to use the essay to weave in and out of your own discussion of the
history of the course as you and others see it.
(2). Do you think we are living in an age which can be described as one
where a 'sexual revolution' has taken place? In order to answer this
question you first need to explain what you understand by the idea of
'sexual revolution'. Then explain what your idea is of a previous age
where the 'revolution' had not yet happened. Then say how our age is
different as you understand it. If you do not think a 'revolution' has
happened explain why you take a position which seems to be in disagree-
ment with popular opinion. Discuss also your vision of how things
should be between the sexes in an ideal world, what should be done to
move toward that ideal, what gets in the way of our moving toward it,
and what you are going to do about it? Throughout your answer give as
many examples from your own lives here at the college or elsewhere
(including what you know about your parents' generation , so that your
discussion has color to it, and so that your points are backed up. This
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could include some of your own thoughts as to whether you are a part
of this sexual revolution? If so, how? If so how not? Do you have any
explanation for this—perhaps some description of your background, home '
town, ethnic group, religion may explain things to the reader. Obvious-
ly you should refer to any readings you have done on the subject and also
very importantly take up the issue I raise in my essay in the last three
pages. Can you answer my "dilemma" (see page 12)!
(3). You may feel that one or both these two questions are not the
important ones to ask--you may want to spend this energy making some
other type of investigation. You may want to spend your time in a group
trying to ask what the question of questions is, and then go ahead and
try to answer it; or you may want to extend part of your project, if you
are really into it and do some in depth research around a particular
question you have found that is most intriguing to you. So you may v/ant
to call for a group based upon something that it particularly fascinating
and important to you whether it be very small or quite big--such as what
needs to be happening to get people together differently that is not
happening and how can it be made to happen, to what kinds of courses
should be taught around here? It is difficult for me to give concrete
examples here, obviously. This question is intended for those fev/ who
really want the space to work on something that intrigues them— the
chance they take is that they will not have the advantage of the group
support; anyone who chooses this option should consult with me though.
Good luck and remember, "Say your own word."
APPENDIX V
The following are two sets of student writings. In each case I
have placed one of their early assignments first, followed by two of
their later assignments. Recall that at no time did I try to teach
about the 'mechanics' of writing. The change in style and content has
come about as a result of a different orientation to work in general.
This is a change that occurred for a number of students and is discussed
in the latter part of Chapter IV of this dissertation.
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Rhetoric lOOS Hollander
University Life
There are several reasons I decided to choose the University of
Massachusetts. After the completion of high school, which is a lower
form of education, I did not have by any means have a trade in which to
earn a living. I realized I had to continue my education if I was going
to be able to obtain a better job. Education at the high school level
seems only to scratch the surface of knowledge. I have a desire to learn
more about life and I think college helps to do this.
The decision to come to this University was not a difficult choice.
I had no idea of what I wanted to study in college. I decided that go-
ing to a large school would offer me a wider variety of fields to study,
hopefully finding a field that particularly interests me.
Another major factor in my decision was financial. I split the
cost of the school with my parents. Therefore the school could not
carry too large a price. Also I felt it was time to move out of my
home town and meet some new and different people.
People had told me about the University's reputation of parties.
I found this completely true. I met people who party six nights a
week. This facet of university life depended totally on the individual.
If you want to study, you can. The problem is finding a happy medium,
of studying and partying. This comes only through experience.
My first semester, I really didn't know what I hoped to be doing.
It is very hard for a freshman to get used to college life. My
whole
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first semester was a learning experience. At times I found my first
semester disappointing. The first four weeks were very confusing, of
course there were other setbacks, like tests. On the whole my first
semester was excellent. I made many friends, several of whom I am very
close to. I learned how to adopt to college life finding it very reward-
ing.
The University as a whole was just about as expected. One aspect
that I really liked is the friendliness everyone seems to share. How
everyone was accepted. In high school, people divided.
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Rhetoric lOOS Jay Hollander
"To say your own word is to transform the world" is the same as
saying "Man is different to animal or tree, precisely in that he/she is
potentially a maker of culture. These statements have profound meanings.
One rarely thinks as himself as a maker of culture. That one person
can make a change in culture. In our group we said that just by speaking
you influence other people. This is true but the influence exerted is
minute, and is usually forgotten as quickly as it was spoken.
To influence people with your thoughts one must learn to think. I
find most people are a product of their society and just don't think
for themselves. They seem to go on and on, their minds seem stagnant.
It is very easy to let yourself fall into this state of being. The
mind must be stimulated in order to be creative. Most of us don't influ-
ence culture, we just live inside of it. We follow an already estab-
lished system, not questioning if it is right and what is our place in it.
I was always under the assumption that college stimulated the mind.
That I would be more creative and learn to think. I have found my courses
the exact opposite. All my courses ask me to do is memorize and repeat
what I have learned on a test. My courses don't want any original thoughts.
What I am learning are other people's ideas and facts.
I feel the highest form of knowledge is original thoughts. Now I
seem to let other people do my thinking for me, I learn their ideas. If
one is to make culture one must have a mind which can think. Although
I influence people with my thought. My thoughts are all from the society
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in which I live. I just live with culture letting it take me along
instead of looking at it and deciding what I want to do with culture.
I am tired of learning straight facts, to me the value is insignif-
icant. I don't want to learn the same things in college as I did in
high school. How to memorize then forget. These two statements have
questioned my values and assumptions. I must decide what learning and
knowledge mean to me.
People in this society are not raised to think. They are raised in
such a way that they conform to the society in which they live. The
word potentially makes me wonder. Will I realize what this word really
means and make use of it or will I stay behind?
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Rhetoric lOOS jay Hollander
Learning About Learning
Rhetoric is a University requirement that should be avoided if at
all possible. Those were my thoughts about Rhetoric at the beginning
of the semester. I had taken two tests to become exempt from Rhetoric.
I was hoping to pass the exams, get the credits, and take another course.
When I came to school at the beginning of the semester, I discovered
I only passed one of the exams. Mow I had to take a Rhetoric course.
The next day I. spent three hours trying to add a Rhetoric course,
with no success. No professor would let me into their course. I re-
turned to the dorm later that day quite disgusted with the Rhetoric de-
partment. I went to get my mail and saw a sign advertising Rhetoric
lOOS to be taught in Mackimmie. I immediately signed up for the course
and thought how lucky I was to find a Rhetoric course. Better yet a
course taught in the dorm.
I returned to my room and started talking about the course to a
few people. They asked me what the course was about, and I said I had
no idea. The only thing that concerned me was the fact that I had my
fifth course and it was Rhetoric. I was already planning on sleeping
until eleven o'clock on Tuesdays and just run upstairs to go to class.
Many people I know had ta en a 100 Rhetoric and received an easy
"A".
Therefore I thought the caurse would be an easy grade. Since
the course
was taught in the lounge it would be a good way to meet
people who lived
in Mackimmie. All in all I thought Rhetoric would be
just another course
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The first day of class seemed to reaffirm my assumptions about
Rhetoric lOOS. The teacher did not show up. I just laughed to myself
saying "I hope he makes a regular habit of missing class." Bruce Rose '
handed out your first letter and all the students present read it. When
the letter said we were to write a book, I immediately started to think
about all the work I would have to do for the course. The amount of work
did not really affect me, I regarded it as a necessary evil. I still
hoped for an easy course which would improve my writing skills.
One thing did make me wonder about the course when Bruce Rose said,
in a very ominous voice, "Wait until you meet Ron Goldman." I started
letting my imagination run wild. I thought Ron Goldman would be a real
freak, boring and many other uncomplimentary things. Then I stopped and
decided I would wait until I meet this guy before I decide what he is
like.
In that letter there were two sentences that I read over. I did
not think about the sentences, "knowledge is so close we do not know we
have any", or "write about those aspects of life which one is puzzled,
freaked out or worried". At that time I did not give either sentence a
second thought. Little did I know how great an effect they v/ould have
on me later.
At our next class everyone met each other. I had my first taste
of brainstorming and I admit I had no idea what was going on. You ex-
plained your letter, about writing everyday, again I regarded this as just
a lot of work. I had no idea on the areas I would write.
My attitude toward class was that it was something I had to do.
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Somehow my mind did not believe I would learn anything. My attitude was
completely negative.
Rereading my early papers from the course my writing reflects this
attitude. One of not caring.
As our class continued and we did more writings, I started taking
notes. These notes were questions you had asked. I wrote them down
several times. They are:
"What is worth writing about?"
"What do you believe in?"
"What puzzles you about life?"
These were the type of questions I would think about for ten min-
utes, then put it off until later. I did this numerous times. Questions
like these worry me, but since I could not find a definite answer, I
put them outside of my head. When you brought up these questions I gave
them some thought, again I could find no answer. I did not know what kind
of answer you were looking for. I knew inside that you would keep rais-
ing these types of questions and expect me to answer them. My reaction
to this was to do exactly what Herbert Hendin wrote, 'not caring about
what bothers them is the answer to what bothers them.'
This was a big turning point in the class. I decided to completely
put these questions out of my mind. Right then I knew this class v;as
too much. The class was questioning my values about life and I did not
want to face them. My writing got very defensive. I would not write
anything you could question. I wrote very simply, avoiding any provoca-
tive areas of thought.
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I could not understand this stranger, Ron Goldman, and why he
wanted to know the answer to these questions. What gives him the right
to even ask these questions. Since I could not tell you that you had no
business asking these questions, I decided not to answer them, and as
you said, not getting into class'. I wanted to guard my opinions and
not let any of my personal knowledge be opened to criticism.
I also realized this course required original thoughts. I had
never written original thoughts in my life. I did not know how to think
an original thought. My mind had become so cluttered vn'th memorizing
and repeating. It was very difficult to handle new ideas about learning.
I could find no specific formula in vyhich to interpret my ideas.
The way I solved the problem of not being able to think was to run
away. I started missing classes. I figured I would pass in all the
papers, go to a few classes, and pass the course. I really was afraid
to go to class. I did not want to know which of my values would fall
next. Ron Goldman brought all my insecurities to the surface. Ques-
tions such as, "What about my future? Do I think or just function along
with everybody else?", I still could not answer. When I did go to class
I did not say much. I did not feel my ideas were worth being brought up.
My assumptions about learning, knowledge, and even life were being
questioned. I did not have enough confidence in myself to face up to
them. The whole first half of the semester was one of doubt.
I really do not know what drew me back towards the class. I know
there are several reasons. For instance, I was doing A/B work in my
four other courses and I thought it would be a shame to get a C in Rhetoric.
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Another reason which was far more important was our discussions
about how man related to animals. Listening to talks on this subject,
I could see how frustrated everyone was. The course seemed to be going
nowhere. Believe it or not, I felt good about this. Ron Goldman came
off to me as too perfect an individual. Someone who has all the answers
for himself, but just raised doubts with everyone in the class. The
two weeks spent on this topic showed me you were also struggling. You
really did not have all the answers. Slowly I started coming back to-
wards the class.
I wanted to try to face up to these questions. I do not like to
back away from a challenge. I never had a challenge concerning learning
and education. I was not proud of running away from the class. I had
to make another attempt to find out what this course was all about, what
you were trying to get from my mind.
Now the class started to mean more. I started to understand what
Ron Goldman wanted from me. He wanted to know my own ideas and feelings.
All I had ever learned was English, Mathematics and History, and everyone
else's ideas. If I could find a way to write my own ideas, I would learn
something about myself.
The complete change in myself and my attitude towards Rhetoric came
when you passed out the paper with the sentences: "To say your own word
is to transform the world, is the same as saying Man is different to
animal or tree precisely in that he/she is potentially a maker of culture."
I read these sentences and suddenly for the first time in college I had
an original thought. I was amazed at what I wrote. My mind had been so
284
Stagnant with other courses it seemed impossible for me to think for
myself. When I wrote that first draft I knew I had something. I finally
realized that I, Bruce Rosenberg, did not know how to think, and that for
twelve years all I learned about were other peoples' ideas and facts.
I had never learned about myself. Who Bruce Rosenberg was, is, and will
be. My mind felt so free after writing that paper, it was released
from invisible chains. This one paper took three months to write. Chang-
ing my assumptions so I could look at myself and make sense out of my
ideas.
As this course comes to an end, I can honestly say that I learned
numerous things. I can answer the three questions raised at the begin-
ning of this paper.
"What is worth writing about?" I found by writing down my ideas,
my thoughts were clearer. I can look at my work and decide if I really
understand what I think. When things are written down it is easier to
expand ideas. I plan on writing, just to please myself. I am really in-
terested in seeing what kind of work I can accomplish.
"What do you believe in?" I believe that education should deal
more with man and the common things in life that lead to the most puz-
zling questions. Education should teach people to understand more about
themselves than about other peoples' ideas. My education never once
tried to find out what puzzled me about life. It never questioned who
I was. Every course I took, I approached just to get a good grade and
never to learn something.
"What puzzles me about Life?" I would like to change this question
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to read: What is now clearer about my life? My ideas toward my own edu-
cation are clearer. I feel that I must spend more time learning about
myself. I feel I am just at the start of being able to be educated. When
I filled out my schedule this semester, I did not take courses simply
to fill University requirements. I took courses that can teach me about
myself. I am taking Psychology of Adjustment, which studies the devel-
opment of humans and their current identity; Development of American
Civilization, which criticizes the American Dream; Conversational French;
Rhetoric; and Calculus. I have a different attitude toward education
and I am now ready to learn.
Ron, you have made me realize I can think. I do have knowledge
and can influence people to make a better culture. This is the best
change I have ever seen in my character. Before, I had alv/ays kept my
feelings to myself and never thought to question them. Now I am not
afraid to let people know my ideas. I feel I can think objectively to
choose my own assumptions.
I can not say enough for this course. I realize that not only am
I a maker of culture, but more importantly, I am the maker of my life.
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Peter Argus Rhetoric lOOS
The University is a place where people can go to develop their
minds. It is also a whole learning experience where we meet new people,
make new friends, have good times and learn more about ourself. Who
we are and what we want to accomplish in our life time.
Many people go to our University so there are many different things
people do. Most all go to classes where we learn, we also do a lot of
studying in preparation for our classes. There are other things besides
classes and studying. Some people like to play or listen to music.
Others go to the gym and play ball others take walks or jog.
I decided to go to the University in my senior year of high school.
I really did not know what I v/anted to do with my life, I had the chance
to to, and I am glad I came.
One of the big reasons for my coming v;as to play football for U.
Mass.
I heard the University life involved a lot of hard work, but with
work v/as a lot of good times.
I have been really happy with what I am doing here meeting people
making new friends learning to depend on myself and learning. I was
really pleased when I made the football team, thus giving me a chance
to travel and play on a great ball team like U. Mass. This
was one of
the greatest experiences in my life.
Everything was just as I expected and wanted it to be. I especially
enjoy the beautiful country which surrounds this University.
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One thing that surprised me was how intelligent my professors are
and how much I have learned from them in one semester. I really didn't
think people could be that intelligent and I hope some day I may be as ’
intelligent as they.
I have been enjoying my life at the University, I have been learning
and having a great time doing so, and if you are going to stay for a
while you should think about giving U. Mass, a try.
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Peter Argus
. Rhetoric lOOS
I sit here in my small room amongst thousands of other students
or maybe I am a product, student or product what am I? I ask myself am
I a man a maker of culture or am I just a tree. How can I say just a'
tree, a tree is as important as you and I who am I to judge the import-
ance of a tree. I am not the lord but only a man. Or am I a product?
A product of a culture of products of a culture.
I have not created a man, but a tree can create another tree so I
being a man am less than a tree. Then to be a man I must create so I
am not a man. I am a product my number is 5896589 that is me a number
a product of the factory U Mass.
I may be a number a product the same but very different in a cul-
ture.
We are product the same but like a leaf in the wind being blown
about and controlled by our own culture. But all the leafs don't end
up in one pile, they land in different places, as do we end up different
even though controlled by our culture.
Who are you Joe McLaughlin a helpless leaf in the control 1 of the
wind called culture? I am not only a product, but also a leaf I will
blow in the same wind but fall in a different path from all the other leafs.
Peter Argus Rhetoric lOOS
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HI STORY OF A RHETORIC CLASS
I walked into the classroom in the back of flackimmie dorm lounge.
There were many other students there besides myself, all of different
shapes and sizes, from different families, towns and cities. I v/on-
dered what this class would be all about, and how much work I would
have to do. What will I learn? I was a bit scared, because a few days
before, I read the first handout and it said: "In a way, you will be
writing a book." Me write a book? No wayl My teacher, Ron Goldman said
not to get upset because it would not be that difficult to write a book
because we all have the knowledge to do so. At first I thought to my-
self, I have to get out of this class, but I decided to give it a chance.
My teacher was on the far side of the room from me sitting in a
regular chair. He v/as a young looking man, younger than all my previous
teachers at this University. He was of medium build and had dark hair.
I detected an accent in his speech and wondered where he came from. He
talked very clearly in a low voice, and it sounded very calm and pleasing.
He tried to give us the impression that this was his first class he ever
taught, and didn't know how he was going to run it. I say tried, because
he carried himself as though he knew every step and had taught for many
years
.
It was a lot of fun, we played a word game about how we could best
describe our life at the University with one word. This game
helped us
get to know each others names and how we thought of ourselves
to be in
the University.
It was real relaxed in class and conversation flowed
through the
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room with great ease. This is another reason why I thought he knew all
along what he was doing. See, in order for people to say what they really
think and feel they must be in a non-pressured situation. Unlike other
classes in this University, you could talk without feeling embarrassed.
When this class had ended I was debating keeping or dropping the
class. I could only think of the work I would have to do, not the pro-
fits I would be able to gain from this class. I really wanted to take
the easy way out and find another class, but I decided to stay with the
course. I knew I had to learn to write sometime, and I also knew it had
to be soon.
The first assignment I had to write was, "What is it like to live
at the University, why I had come, and what have I learned?" I sat down
and began to answer his questions as best as I could, or as best as I
conceived I could. I answered all his questions and I thought I had
written a very good paper, but I had only begun to tap my mind full of
knowledge, or so he said., I got mad when he gave me my paper back with
all the questions in the world on it. When I read the questions and
thought about them I realized that what I was writing was only bull-
shit. I was writing like I did in high school, writing to get it done,
and to get the grade. That was my big problem, not writing what was in
my mind, what I really thought: How could I change? How could I begin
to put my feelings on the paper?
In class we talked about why we had come to this college. I got
the impression that not many people really knew why. Most of us said
for knowledge, but what is knowledge? Ron must have asked this question
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a million times. He was always probing, digging, and asking questions.
He was trying to get the real thoughts and feelings out of us. I would
say I want to learn, to gain knowledge. Ron, with a gleam in his eyes’
and a smile on his face would ask me what knowledge was. I was confused,
I didn't know what knowledge was. I never questioned knowledge, I guess
I never really questioned very much. This was my big reason for coming
here, and seemed to be the reason for most in the class for coming to
college.
Ron was bringing up questions which were never asked in any of the
classes I had. They were questions which were important to me and other
students in the class. Questions about what it was like to live at U.
Mass, what v/e liked and disliked about it.
His questioning made me really start to think, why did I come to
college? After the class had ended, I walked out confused. Why did
you come to college Joe McLaughlin? For the first time in my life I had
to think and reason for the answer to this question. It really bothered
me, not knowing why I did come to college. Then, I realized I came for
a number of reasons. I was pressured by my parents, by the way they
always said "you must go to college in order to be a success in life."
Other reasons were that my high school was a college prep program, and
if you didn't plan on going to college, you v/ere looked down upon. I
also wanted to continue my career in sports. In high school I wasn't
really interested in college, until I started getting scholarship offers
to play football. This class made me realize that the only reason to
go to college v/asn't just for knowledge, but there were many hidden
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reasons for my coming, which I never realized until I v/as made to think
and ask questions about it. I don't know if Ron made me think or if he
just started the wheels to turn within me to make me do the rest.
As classes went on, I became more and more involved with the class.
I had attended all the classes and really got a lot out of them. We
would discuss things which really made a difference and I learned what
I thought about life here and what others saw life here to be. In my
other classes I felt like a sponge just absorbing answers, answers to
questions that did not even matter to me. I looked forward to going to
class just to discuss different aspects of the University life.
We then went into sex, and I really thought I had my head together
about relationships between men and women. Maybe I just never questioned
these things. We talked about sex and relationships to a great extent.
I heard other peoples feelings about this issue. Again I began to think
about the reasons for the different relationships, when sex and male-fe-
male relationships were involved. The dating games, the one nighter and
going steady. I really haven't found an answer to this question about
sex, but at least I am trying to find my own answers instead of being a
sponge.
After a while writing for me became a way to get my feelings out,
and I really started to enjoy to write. I never thought I could enjoy
writing, but I was. I started writing about things I did, trying to
paint a picture of my experiences and how I thought, felt, and sav/.
I wrote about my experience of thumbing home one night. I became
very involved in this story, and did as best as I could instead of just
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doing it for the grade. I could see my writing improve every time I
sat down to write. My thoughts and feelings were Flov/ing from the
wells of my mind, and pouring on to the paper with much greater ease
than ever before.
It was around the first of March, and I was looking forward to go
to class, to discuss, and listen to what others had to say. Ron said
we were going to write today for thirty minutes straight and not to stop.
I got a little upset because I was in the mood for a discussion, and I
was getting a lot out of them and enjoyed them. I knew I could not do
anything else but write, so I decided to do my best. We were supposed
to write about an experience which happened to us, and give as many de-^
tails as we could. I picked a scene where I was in a classroom. I
started to write and became more and more involved with my experience.
I was actually there in the classroom, and could remember every detail
and emotion of my experience. I was writing like I had never written
before, and tried to paint a picture of what it was like to be there.
I got inside my mind and dug out the real deep feeling, instead of^just
skimming the top of my mind. I had finished my writing and looked at what
I had written and could not believe myself. I was extremely proud of
what I had written, it was by far my best. Someone read their paper and
it was a very well written paper. I could not decide whether or not
to share my experience with everyone in the class. I was really worried
that the class would not like it, but something inside said go ahead,
you know it's good, so read it. I raised my hand to offer myself to the
class. When Ron said to read it a shock went through my body. What was
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I doing reading my writing to all these people? I became very nervous
and had to put my paper down because my hands were shaking like a leaf
in the wind. After I had finished, I felt good because I knew it was
a good piece of work. I looked around the room and I think everyone
also thought it was well written. I had a strange feeling, I felt as
though I gave a part of myself when I had finished reading.
One of the big reasons for my progress in my writing and in conver-
sation was the meeting I had with Ron Goldman. I walked into a small
room in the John Adams lobby where I greeted him at a small wooden desk.
We talked for a while about living in Southwest. Every time Ron would
ask me a question I would say "I don't know." He finally said "come on
man you do know." I felt a bit dumb because I did know, I ms just tak-
ing the easy way out by saying that I didn't know. While we were talking
he made me feel important, because the only thing that he was concerned
about was what I thought. He made me realize that I was a great deal
smarter than I let myself think; what I had to say was as important as
what others said.
This gave me the confidence to write and say what I felt inside,
instead of saying I don't know.
We talked about assumptions what they are and how they effect our
life. Ron passed out an assignment, instead of writing to him we were
writing to a wise old man. I finished the assignment but v/hat I had
written was not me, it wasn't a well thought out paper. I revyrote this
paper three times approaching it differently each time until I had what
I wanted. I v/ould have never rewritten a paper or put as much into
it
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in any other class, but for some reason I just had to write it over.
I grasped the meaning of assumptions in the final hand-out on
Comment on a Rhetoric Class . I realized how important they are and how
they effect my life. They prevented me from becoming a maker of cul-
ture. I was like a leaf in the wind when I assumed what I did and said
was not important. Now I realize what I do and say is important and
now I can control my direction and become a maker of culture.
As a conclusion, this class has done more for me than any other
class I have ever taken. I have learned so much about myself and others
and why we are what we are. I am glad that I stayed with this class be-
cause my writing has improved along with my speaking. The only reason
they have improved is because I have begun to think. I am glad I didn't
take the easy way out. Thank you Ron Goldman for helping me begin to
think.
APPENDIX VI
The following is another example of a re-presentation. Again the
advantage of the re-presentation is that the students, for the first time,
perhaps, began to detach themselves slightly from what is, and begin to
understand it as a cultural form among many, which could be different
in other cultures. This particular re-presentation I read aloud to my
students acting as if I were an anthropologist who was studying the
student culture.
Everybody dresses very similarly; all the people are of the same
age just about although it is very difficult to tell about ages
around here, because people look pretty much like big people or adults
or... 'what'? I do not know what words these young people use to des-
cribe people who are older than them--I don't know how they think about
people who are older than them. I don't know too well how they see
the older generation in this society— I must ask them. Do they think
there is anything to learn from older people or are they just out
of date? The feeling that I get when I am in the 'real world' as the
students refer to it (although I am not too sure what they mean by
that; I must ask them about that as well), is that older people don't
want to get old; they (the older people) seem to think that the best
time of life is between the ages of eighteen and tv;enty-two. This
is the prime of life; you have got to make this the good time of life
or else you've missed the boat. Coming to think about it I don't
know how these young people think about history; I have the feeling
that they don't think there is anything to be learned from his-
tory; I am not judging this as good 'or bad; I just don't know. They
don't seem to think about the future very much; everyone seems to
live in the present all the time.
These people are very sure that they are individuals. People
are so strong about this that they always try to solve the problems
that are going on by themselves. By that I mean they never sit
around in groups having pow pows about what to do about problems that
are going on. Each person is so individual that they always see
every problem (and that may be the wrong word I am using; people in
this society may feel that this is a word which has negative conno-
tations) as one which has to be solved by each separate person. In
this culture people only play together it seems.
Although they do go to classrooms in groups and go through a
ritual where most people sit and listen to one person who talks a
lot. This is the activity called work. The people in this culture
don't like this very much, but they show great fortitude because _
they get up every day early in the morning and stream to these activ-
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ities very purposefully. Work activities also go on within the
io aeJ thl' great%eluctance and attemptt g t e affair oyer with as hastily as possible. The individualsin this culture call this activity 'school' 'classes' 'study' (the
word class here means something very different to the meanihg
given it in the real world— referring to groups who have very dif-
ferent levels of income and power; this kind of 'class' does not seem
to be important to students because they do not talk about it very
much). In public at least these individuals refer to their work-
ing activities as 'getting an education' although they seem reluc-
tant to talk about this or else are not sure what this means.
All this reminds us of the kinds of rites that take place in
all cultures for people who are on the point of becoming adults
(in this culture the event takes place later than most). Most cul-
tures hold this rite when people are fourteen and fifteen; here
people are eighteen. In most cultures this is the time when young
people are taken away from their homes so that they can make the
psychological break with their parents, especially their mothers.
They are taken to some separate place where they are subjected to
various painful rituals, and instructed in the ways of the culture,
so that they can play their full role in the culture as adults. In
this culture, however, as we've said people seem to think that what
they are doing here has very little relationship to the real world.
It is clear however that these people are at the age where puberty
rites would be taking place. The reason we are so certain about
this is that these people got very heated about whether they are 'boys'
'girls' 'men' or 'women'. Some members of the group insist that they
are boys; none of the males felt strongly that they should be called
men. Some women in the group however felt that not only should they
be referred to as women, but that all the other females should call
themselves women, and that all the males should be called men. Many
of the females seemed to believe that it did not matter very much to
them, and so did a few males. What is peculiar about this culture
is that none of the older generation seems to meet with these younger
members to explain to them about these details; this is indeed very
unusual, for as we have said in most other cultures this is precisely
the time when adults other than the parents meet with the youngsters
to educate them in the ways of life of their people. Here, when
these youngsters and adults do meet (in the classes we referred to
earlier), the adults do not refer to the issues which these young-
sters seem concerned about—whether there are jobs to be had, what
to do about the opposite sex, what the world and the culture and people
are all about, and how they, the students, can be best prepared to
face it. These adults talk about other things mostly, and these
seem to be very important judging by the time the adults and the
youngsters spend on it. When one leaves this arena of meeting ground
between the generations--that is the classrooms--one finds that there
is virtually no other place where the members of these two generations
really meet each other. In other words these young people spend all
time outside of the classroom engaged in activities where no members
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of the older generation are present. In some ways we had difficulty
fathoming this, since many of the questions about life, sex, relig-
ion, death, which one would expect to be dealt with between older and
younger generations did not happen here. These kinds of discussions,
as well as all leisure time took place only amongst people of ’the same
generation. There was never any kind of socializing between people
of different generations. Thus it seemed difficult to imagine how
the members of the older generation could discuss much that what was
of concern to these young people, because they were hardly ever
present in the daily non-work parts of the people's lives. We soon
realized that this particular puberty rite did in fact help people
find out the ways of their world, but in a more subtle way than that
which could be fathomed from the public instruction. We needed to
spend a great deal more time trying to get to know the people better.
The discussion which took place following this re-presentation was
intense, and mainly focussed on the issue of the older generation. There
was general agreement that adults are missing from their lives. There
was general agreement stated amongst the men that they were here to get
a job and not for any other reason. There was general agreement that
there was something to be learned from adults, if the adults would not
be so naive, or pretend not to know what is going on, or not engage in
weird fantasies about the sex lives of students. Any intense anger at
the older generation seemed noticeably absent, although there was no
reason to expect it to emerge in the context of the discussion. My
emphasis on the issue of the absence of older adults is a reflection
upon my conviction that this fact is a major theme in the lives of
students, one that goes unnoticed and therefore is not discussed by many
educators who think about students coming to college.
APPENDIX VII
Co-Investigation of Reality
It became obvious that the co-investigation of reality which v/as
to become a central part of the course simply could not be. There were
two reasons for this. The first was that the students' lives are really
disparate to an extent that makes it very difficult to find certain
thematic areas which they can all agree upon need to be focussed upon.
Their 'life style' distinguishes them from the village population which
Freire might enter. People here are really not sharing a life together.
This fact is indeed a major theme in its own right and should be addressed
by educators. There simply is nothing resembling an intellectual
community. Each student has his or her own little program which is
different from every other. The result is that it is impossible that
there be any discussion after class about issues which may have come up
in class. People's experiences are too disparate. The result of all
this freedom to choose one's own courses is to prevent students from
really ever doing any serious investigation, in depth, of any issues,
and prevents the establishment of anything that can be called a community.
This is now being addressed in a college in Baltimore vjhere students
focus on a common theme such as 'the meaning of being human' and inves-
tigate it from the eyes of science, the arts, and the humani ties--an idea
whose time is long overdue. The second reason the co-investigation could
not really work had to do with the nature of the course. It was vir-
tually impossible to break out of the mode of being in a formal class
together and to begin to seriously investigate the nature of reality.
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Except for a very few, the students treated these efforts of mine as
parts of assignments for the Rhetoric class; this obviously would not
do. It would have been far better to advertise a course which would
be one where we would be learning to do ethnographies and where eventually
the nature of student reality would be investigated. The Spradley McCurdy
book Ethnography in a Complex Society would be an ideal text.
After considerable effort I simply launched a common investigation.
The common focus was to be the relationship between the sexes. There
is no doubt that an enormous amount is to be learned from such an inves-
tigation. Herbert Hendin's Age of Sensation provoked my effort. Hendin
analyzed the dreams of Columbia University Freshmen and argues in his
book that even though students will report that all is easy between the
sexes, Hendin believes that there is in fact a war going on, and that it
is intensifying, and has never been like this before. I hoped to find
some of this out. But the task was too great and we had only begun
by the time the semester was out. The evidence I did glean was too
scanty to make it worthwhile presenting here. It would be perhaps in-
teresting to the reader to get an idea of what I was learning and there-
fore I present a short excerpt from my notes.
A meeting in a student's room to plan a co-investigation . The room in which
the meeting was held was an explosion of color (pink and red), posters,
pictures, clever sayings— the child and the adult stood side by side on
the walls of the room. Two pictures were particularly striking. Two
tiger pictures. The one v/as of a tiger taken in the midst of a ferocious
snarling growl with fangs exposed. The other was a tame looking tiger
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almost in the posture of the domesticated cat. To my astonishment
two students of the four I was meeting with, speaking casually to each
other, referred to the growling creature as the female and the 'cute'
tiger as the male. In my astonishment I pursued the matter; the only
response I got was that the ferocious tiger was a sign of passion
while the other was just quiet and sweet. Conversation swept on...
but I will take it up later.
The formal conversation begins and I explain that I am running a
first year program and that it is a concern of mine that the program
offer courses that are not abstract, but that come close to issues people
are concerned about; the problem, I say, is that we who run these pro-
grams don't know enough about the reality of the people's lives. What
I am here for is to try to figure out a way to begin to cope with the
problem, that I don't know too clearly what it is that I am after, but
that in the process of talking with them it will emerge.
I try to make my explanation more concrete. Would you be interested,
I say, in a course focussed on something like, "the psychology of love"
and "the problems in loving" or "What is love" and their nods and yesses
tell me instantly, what I had gleaned before from private conversations,
that I've struck a chord. The nods and yesses were said with conviction.
Now the problem I have is how to design a set of courses with-
out knowing the details of what is going on between men and women, boys
and girls (whether people should be called boys or girls, men or women
was a sore point of debate in Southwest, a fact which emerged for
me
both in and outside the classroom). Getting those details somehow
is
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what I want the group project to be.
We went straight into it. After that I merely tried to keep track
and pay attention, because suddenly there was real dialogue happening.
"Well, you have to break it into its different aspects," says Kelsie.
"There's the bar scene, dating, dorms, co-ed life, all male floors,
fraternity life," and she relates stories which clarify her point. At
some point I saw that there are also other groups which can be classified
as: a group of men and women who want to get into bed with each other,
and another group who have a hard time really meeting the opposite sex.
Ray talks about his difficulties in making contact with girls, "I'm sorry,
women," he says to Nancy who had been insisting on the distinction once
in a heated discussion in the classroom. "They aren't interested in me;
they just want to hear themselves talk." Nancy reminds him (in thinking
about it later) of Hendin's notion of a wall between the sexes when she
responds by asking whether or not it is the male who is the aggressor or
the female who is the aggressor (emphasis mine). The conversation ranges
to the group that's out to get laid and Joe says it is easy for him to
record a conversation between his friends as they discuss how to get a
chick. And then came: "Ah, and there is a big difference between how
guys from the city date and how guys from the suburbs date." It was a
really good example for me about the kind of thing I was looking for
without knowing it.
The conversation ranged from whether we could do without marriage
in society to how people avoid meeting each other, to stories about bar
scenes. Eventually we discussed the best place to get close to a scene ,
and the Blue Wall was the place chosen with the agreement that we
focus
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in tight on one particular scene within the Blue Wall and attempt to
describe it. The students who participated in this investigation wrote
up their descriptions and shared them with the class. They proved to be
fascinating.
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